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This dissertation examines the intersections of transnational anarchist terrorism, 
American foreign relations, and national security in the late nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries. As such, the primary purpose is to examine how cultural 
concerns exert an influence over discussions of national security in the United States. 
In the face of an unprecedented wave of bombings and assassinations around the 
world, Americans made clear that anarchist terrorism was a dual menace. First, the 
actual threat of violence posed an external security problem that needed to be 
addressed. Government officials as well as private individuals debated the need to 
protect public officials, curtail press freedoms, punish anarchist crimes, and cooperate 
with other states to suppress anarchist violence. At the same time, however, many 
Americans expressed concern that by overreacting and making acceptable the passage 
of measures that would erode traditional values in the name of providing security, 
anarchist terrorism posed a second—greater—threat to American society. The failure 
to satisfactorily resolve those conflicting priorities, this dissertation argues, set the 
boundaries within which discussions over how to protect society from the threat of 
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INTRODUCTION: FRAMING ANARCHIST TERRORISM AND NATIONAL SECURITY 
 
“Assassination has never changed the history of the world.” – Benjamin Disraeli1 
 
 
 On the evening of 29 July 1900, disaster struck as King Umberto I and his wife left 
an athletic ceremony in Monza, Italy. As the king’s carriage navigated through the crowd-
lined streets, a figure pushed forward and fired several shots from a revolver, striking and 
fatally wounding Umberto. Onlookers quickly subdued the assassin, an Italian immigrant to 
the United States and a self-professed anarchist named Gaetano Bresci, and he was swiftly 
put on trial for the king’s murder. Under examination, Bresci cited the bread riots that had 
recently taken place in Milan and Stroina, Sicily, as the reason for his deed, declaring that he 
acted, “to avenge the misery of the people and my own.” When given further opportunity to 
speak, Bresci calmly requested: “Sentence me. I am indifferent. I await the next revolution.”2 
The Italian court found Bresci guilty and sentenced him to life in prison, first in Milan and 
subsequently at the penal colony of Santo Stefano. Less than a year later, a prison warder 
found Bresci hanged in his prison cell on 21 May 1901 with the word “Vengeance” 
scratched into the wall. Accounts differ on whether Bresci committed suicide or if prison 
guards murdered him.3  
 Anarchist terrorism illustrated its perpetrators’ transnational reach and encapsulated 
the challenges to and perceived vulnerabilities of American society at the turn of the 
																																																								
1 Parliamentary Archives, HC/Deb 1 May 1865, Vol. 178: 1246. 
2 Bresci Given Life Term,” Chicago Daily Tribune 30 August 1900: 4; “The Assassination of 
King Humbert of Italy,” Harper’s Weekly 4 August 1900: 736. 
3 “A Forlorn Letter from Bresci,” Washington Post 18 November 1900: 30; “Bresci Commits 
Suicide: Murderer of King Humbert Hangs Himself in Prison,” New York Times 24 May 
1901: 9; “Say Bresci was Murdered,” New York Times 24 May 1901: 9; “Indirect Capital 
Punishment,” Chicago Daily Tribune 24 May 1901: 12. 
 
 2 
twentieth century. Rather than portray Bresci’s violent action as an aberration, contemporary 
reactions painted a radically different picture. Police and high-ranking government officials 
from the United States, Spain, France, Germany, and Italy spent more than a year 
investigating Umberto I’s assassination as part of a global anarchist conspiracy. In the United 
States, the popular press eagerly reported every detail to an anxious, interested public that 
was quickly becoming accustomed to such violence as a new norm. The Boston Morning 
Journal followed the multinational police investigation into Bresci’s movements in Europe 
and reported on time Bresci spent in Spain—where rumors indicated he was dissuaded from 
assassinating the Spanish Minister of the Interior—to his presence for several years in 
Germany and his time spent in Paris before the actual assassination.4 Interest intensified 
when it was rumored that Errico Malatesta, a leading figure of the international anarchist 
movement and disciple of Mikhail Bakunin, had been in Paterson, New Jersey the year 
before Umberto’s assassination. The press also reported that Italian ambassador in 
Washington, D.C. received a police report alleging that Bresci volunteered to assassinate 
Umberto at a meeting presided over by Malatesta. The report went on to say that in other 
meetings in cities around the United States, Malatesta preached murder and laid plans for 
not only the assassination of the king of Italy but the heads of other foreign governments as 
well.5 Specific interest in Bresci periodically returned to the American consciousness in the 
decade after his crime.6 American newspapers also widened their scope beyond Bresci and 
																																																								
4 “Prearranged Plot?” Boston Morning Journal 1 August 1900: 1. 
5 “King Humbert Conspiracy,” Washington Post 12 February 1902: 1. 
6 In 1905 national papers reported when police in Cairo arrested an alleged co-conspirator of 
Bresci’s who had disguised himself as a priest. In 1910, the Washington Post reported the 
release of an Italian convict from a prison in Siena, Italy because he retold a story he had 
heard from a fellow convict about the organization of the Paterson plot. See “Alleged 
Accomplice of Bresci Arrested,” Washington Post 7 May 1905: 6; “Bresci’s Accomplice 
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frequently reported about “anarchical brotherhoods” formulating conspiracies and plots to 
commit future assassinations across Europe and North America.7 
 This dissertation examines domestic American statecraft and foreign relations in the 
face of a transnational security threat. In the last two decades of the nineteenth century, an 
intensifying campaign of bombings and assassinations around the world sparked concern 
that civil society was under attack. Americans observed, with growing concern, that 
anarchists not only repeatedly crossed international borders when perpetrating their crimes 
but targeted republics and monarchies alike. Whereas once most Americans believed that the 
virtues of their society insulated them from such violence, that confidence was shaken by 
reports of global conspiracies and continued rumors of American statesmen as possible 
targets. Americans made clear that anarchist terrorism was a dual menace. First, the actual 
threat of violence posed an external security problem that needed to be addressed. 
Government officials and private individuals alike debated the need to protect elected 
officials, punish anarchist crimes, prevent anarchists from disseminating their beliefs, and 
cooperate with other governments to suppress the transnational threat of anarchist violence. 
At the same time, however, many expressed concern that by overreacting and making 
acceptable the passage of measures that would erode traditional values in the name of 
providing security, anarchist terrorism posed a second—greater—threat to American society. 
This dissertation argues that the failure to satisfactorily resolve those conflicting priorities 
																																																																																																																																																																					
Caught,” New York Times 7 May 1905: 2; “Drew Lots to Kill King,” Washington Post 6 January 
1910: 1. 
7 “To Kill All of Europe’s Sovereigns?” Boston Morning Journal, 1 August 1900: 2; “Other 
Countries’ Boxers,” Daily Herald (Biloxi, MS) 11 September 1900, 3, no. 21: 3; “Another Plot 
–To Assassinate McKinley is Discovered,” Daily Herald 28 November 1900, 3, no. 85: 1; “A 
Move Against Anarchists,” Dallas Morning News 27 August 1900: 2 [op. cite New Haven 
Evening Register and Morning-World Herald (Omaha, NB)]; “Plot to Kill Rulers,” Washington Post 
4 August 1900: 1. 
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established the boundaries within which would take place specific policy discussions on how 
to best protect society. As such, this dissertation explores the contradictions, paradoxes, and 
nuances of political and social liberalism in the United States in light of the challenge posed 
by anarchist violence. 
 
THE DILEMMAS OF ANARCHIST ASSASSINATIONS: 
 Outside of the infamous act with which he was inextricably tied, the other details of 
Gaetano Bresci’s life are hardly unusual. Born in 1869 to working-class parents in Prato, near 
Florence, Bresci eventually left his family behind and immigrated to the United States in 
1894. There, two years after his arrival, he married an American woman, Sophia Knieland, 
and they soon had a daughter, Madeline. He spent Sundays with his wife and daughter at 
their tenement in nearby West Hoboken. During the week, Bresci typically lived in a 
boarding house in Paterson, New Jersey, where he, like most of the area’s thriving Italian 
immigrant community worked as a weaver in the silk industry. As a worker at the Hamil & 
Booth Mill, Bresci was highly recommended as “a good workman and a man who had never 
made any trouble.” Yet Bresci also fit into his adopted community on another level: having 
“imbibed Anarchist principles and ideas” long before he left Italy, he felt quite comfortable 
amongst the sizable anarchist community in Paterson and he gained ready acceptance into 
the “Right of Existence Group” [Gruppo diritto di esistenza], the leading anarchist organization 
in Paterson and the publisher of La Questione Sociale.8 As his wife later acknowledged, though 
he rarely discussed his anarchist beliefs, she “knew that [he] frequently met his friends and 
																																																								
8 Assassin’s Lot Fell Upon Anarchist Here,” New York Times 31 July 1900: 1; Francis H. 
Nichols, "The Anarchists in America," Outlook, 10 August 1901. 
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discussed the affairs of the Government of Italy just as any foreigner naturally takes an 
interest in the doings of his mother country.”9  
 When the first reports of Umberto I’s assassination raised the possibility that an 
anarchist group in the United States planned the assassination, it ignited a firestorm of 
interest. The rumors originated when the New York Times reported that a supposedly 
incriminating letter was found on the body of Carboni Sperandio, an Italian anarchist from 
the same group as Bresci. Sperandio committed suicide after he shot and killed Giuseppe 
Persina, foreman of the Wildman Dye Company of Paterson on 22 July 1900.  The letter 
detailed that during an anarchist meeting in Milan in February lots were drawn to determine 
who would be responsible for killing King Umberto I.  “That lot fell to me,” Sperandio 
claimed, but since he was in America, “the society has left it to my full liberty to choose as a 
substitute whomsoever I wish.” Sperandio targeted Persina because he was a “brute… who 
did not respect anybody, who ill-treats his own countrymen.”10 The Philadelphia Inquirer 
picked up the story from the New York Times on 1 August and investigated whether 
Sperandio and Bresci were associates. The newspaper spoke about “a mysterious visitor” 
who would frequently walk the streets with Sperandio late at night, speaking in hushed 
tones. Based on the physical description, Sperandio’s friends identified Bresci as the visitor. 
The story took further twists and turns as the Paterson group denied any connection 
between Bresci and Sperandio and subsequently denied that the letter even existed.11 The 
																																																								
9 “Was it a Plot? Assassin’s Wife had no Inkling,” Boston Morning Journal, 1 August 1900: 2. 
10 “A Confirmatory Letter,” New York Times 31 July 1900: 1.  See also “The Anarchists of 
Paterson,” The Independent 9 August 1900, 52, no. 2697: 1888-89. 
11 “Woman Plotter Holds Clue,” Philadelphia Inquirer 1 August 1900, 143, no. 32: 1.  See also 
“Assassin’s Comrade Nicola Quintavelli,” New York Times 2 August 1900: 3; “Plot to Kill 
Rulers,” Washington Post 4 August 1900: 1; “Searching Among Paterson Anarchists,” New 
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Trenton Evening Times reprinted a letter by C. Luigi Alfieri, a self-proclaimed member of the 
Paterson group, that repeated the story that Gaetano Bresci was selected to kill Umberto I 
by drawing lots and next alleged that a second named individual “was chosen to slay 
President McKinley. Men were also named to assassinate President Loubet of France, 
Emperor William of Germany and the emperor of Austria.”12  
 Bresci’s crime highlighted some of the significant challenges to authorities charged 
with designing measures to avert such acts as well as punish perpetrators when crimes could 
not be prevented. First, plots—in some cases real conspiracies by groups desiring to murder 
a specific head of state, but in many cases the fevered imaginings of a nervous press—were 
covert by their very nature and, consequently, posed hurdles to authorities trying to uncover 
them. While Richard Jensen’s statement that “documents show that in 1901 the only federal 
agency that had a nationwide network and was available to carry out some kind of 
surveillance of the anarchists within the United States was the Post Office” is extreme, there 
was no centralized investigative organization, such as the modern Federal Bureau of 
Investigation or the Central Intelligence Agency.13 Britain, which had similarly become a 
hotbed of anarchism, also lacked a national investigative agency. Second, anarchists 
frequently used publications or held mass meetings to spread word of their cause, yet neither 
the American nor British governments emulated their continental peers who systematically 
restricted the ability of anarchists to spread their message. Eugene Emley, the Prosecutor of 
the Pleas in Paterson, made clear that “No permit is necessary and there is no law to prevent 
																																																																																																																																																																					
York Times 1 August 1900: 1; “The Anarchist Investigation,” New York Times 13 October 
1900: 7. 
12 “The Plot Details,” Trenton Evening Times 14 August 1900: 7.   
13 Richard B. Jensen, “The International Anti-Anarchist Conference of 1898 and the Origins 
of Interpol,” Journal of Contemporary History 16, no. 2 (1981): 337. 
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men expressing their sympathy with an anarchist who has committed a crime.”14 Next, 
Bresci purportedly purchased the revolver he used in the murder in New York; anarchists 
elsewhere perpetrated crimes using explosives manufactured abroad. While many states 
passed laws restricting the manufacture, transportation, and use of explosive materials, the 
United States did not have any federal laws restricting explosives until 1917. Finally, Bresci’s 
immigrant status fed into public concern over the circumstances of “new immigrants.”15 Was 
it possible that the industrial conditions in the United States were little better than those in 
Europe and the country could become a breeding ground of anarchist discontent? Harper’s 
Weekly demonstrated the depths of this concern when it attacked William Jennings Bryan—
once rumored to be a target of anarchist assassins himself—as “a contributing factor to the 
forces of anarchy” because he and politicians like him “preach the gospel of discontent,” 
which “contributes in some proportion… to the anarchistic cause.”16  
 Bresci’s crime—like many of the assassinations committed by anarchists in the late 
nineteenth century—had a pronounced transnational element, which further complicated 
efforts to deal with it. While governments had a shared interest in monitoring the 
movements of anarchists and communicating that information to others, there were also 
incentives against such cooperation. Anarchists were not evenly distributed around the world 
																																																								
14 “Assassin’s Comrade Nicola Quintavelli,” New York Times 2 August 1900: 3. 
15 Thomas Archdeacon, Becoming American: An Ethnic History (New York: Free Press, 1983); 
Michael J. Greenwood and John M. McDowell, “The Factor Market Consequences of U.S. 
Immigration,” Journal of Economic Literature 24, no. 4 (December 1986); Timothy J. Hatton 
and Jeffrey G. Williamson, Global Migration and the World Economy: Two Centuries of Policy and 
Performance (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2006); John Higham, Send These to Me: Immigrants in Urban 
America (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1984). 
16 “The Assassination of King Humbert,” Harper’s Weekly 11 August 1900: 740.  For the 
rumored assassination of William Jennings Bryan by anarchists, see “Bryan on the List,” 
Bismarck Tribune 25 August 1900: 1. 
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and states were not eager to receive more; nor were they eager to accept the return of 
anarchists who had departed for other locales. This presented powerful incentives to not 
share information on the movements of anarchists in a timely manner. There were also 
concerns about the crime itself. Bresci’s offense—murder—was universally punished, but 
other potentially illegal acts associated with the primary crime were not always treated in a 
similar fashion. For those anarchists rejoicing over Umberto’s death, the most severe crime 
authorities in New Jersey could charge them with was disorderly conduct.17 Regarding any 
potential conspiracy, Assistant Prosecutor of Pleas Philip Shaw acknowledged, “even if it 
was proven beyond a shadow of a doubt that Bresci was sent to Italy as the result of a pre-
arranged plan, the ones that sent him could only be tried for conspiracy. Conspiracy in New 
Jersey is only a misdemeanor punishable by a fine not exceeding $1000 and imprisonment 
not exceeding three years.”18 Perhaps most galling to foreign officials, expressions of 
sympathy by anarchist groups that would be cracked down on in many countries did not 
constitute criminal offenses in the United States. 
 Even “murder,” the crime that Bresci was charged with committing, highlights a 
fundamental challenge that anarchist terrorism posed to those who would debate measures 
for its suppression. Anarchists, whether they attacked heads of state or detonated bombs in 
public locations, were typically sentenced to capital punishment.19 Bresci, as contemporary 
																																																								
17 “Searching Among Paterson Anarchists,” New York Times 1 August 1900: 1. 
18 “Woman Plotter Holds Clue,” Philadelphia Inquirer 1 August 1900, 143, no. 32: 1. 
19 For example, the infamous French anarchist Ravachol, who set off a series of bombs 
around Paris in 1892, was guillotined, as were the anarchist bombers Auguste Vaillant and 
Émile Henry. Sante Caserio, who assassinated French President Sadi Carnot in June 1894, 
met a similar end while Michele Angiolillo, the assassin of Spanish Prime Minister Antonio 
Cánovas del Castillo, was garroted. Luigi Lucheni, who committed suicide while serving a life 
sentence for the assassination of Empress Elisabeth of Austria, initially requested that his 
trial take place in Lucerne, which retained the death penalty. Finally, Leon Czolgosz, who 
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sources and later scholarly works pointed out, was sentenced to life in prison because the 
Italian government had, under the Penal Code of 1889, abolished capital punishment.20 He 
could have been sentenced to death, however, had he been charged with treason because the 
Military Penal Code [1869] still permitted capital punishment. If Italian authorities had 
labeled Bresci’s crime treason instead of simple murder, however, they would implicitly 
recognize a political dimension to his offense. That, in turn, would raise the possibility that 
should some future anarchist assassin escape abroad, a state might resist surrendering the 
offender because the crime, however distasteful it may have been, could be interpreted as a 
political offense, which was typically exempted from extradition. Unsurprisingly then, those 
who recognized that transnational anarchist criminals could only be contained through some 
level of international cooperation were steadfast in rejecting the notion that assassinations 
committed by anarchists could, in any way, be classified as a political crime.  
 
FROM NATIONAL SECURITY TO SOCIETAL SECURITY:  
 A thorough examination of how assassination affected American foreign relations in 
the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries is inevitably complicated by situating 
																																																																																																																																																																					
would assassinate U.S. President William McKinley in 1901, died in the electric chair and his 
body was subsequently dissolved with sulfuric acid. 
20 On the status of Bresci, see “Bresci Commits Suicide,” New York Times 24 May 1901; 
Pietro Gandetto, "Criminal Law in Giacomo Puccini Operatic Production: The Crimes 
Against Persons in Tosca," in Law and Opera, ed. Filippo Annunziata and Giorgio Fabio 
Colombo (Berlin: Springer, 2018), 155-56.  
The Grand Duchy of Tuscany had abolished the death penalty on 30 November 1786, the 
first modern European state to do so. Umberto I issued a royal decree of pardon in January 
1878, which informally halted subsequent capital punishments until the Penal Code of 1889, 
commonly called the Zanadelli Code, formally ended the practice. The Code passed with 
almost unanimous approval. See generally John Gooch, The Italian Army and the First World 
War (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014), 134-36; Luigi Lacchè, “Un Code Pénal 
Pour l'Unité Italienne: le code Zanardelli (1889) -- La Genèse, le Dèbat, le Projet Juridique,” 
Seqüência 68 (June 2014). 
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contemporary debates on the danger posed by anarchists within a larger understanding of 
state power during this period.21 As a result, this dissertation forces us to reassess the 
relationship between assassination, national security, and foreign relations in the late 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Scholars such as Lewis Gould and David 
Hendrickson have argued that foundational aspects of the modern American state—a strong 
executive branch, and a commitment to internationalism—were laid in the last decades of 
the nineteenth century.22 Charles Maier, however, cautions: “get real. For all the recent 
histories that suggest the state became exponentially more ambitious and powerful in 
controlling its citizens, nineteenth-century governments still hardly ‘penetrated’ society.” 
Indeed it is only in the later part of the century, Maier argues, when central governments 
started encroaching upon local and non-state authority.23 As this dissertation demonstrates, 
contemporaries recognized a degree of institutional weakness. When confronted by the 
menace of anarchist violence, they debated and developed measures that most hoped would 
provide meaningful security against the danger.  
 The dilemma highlighted by Maier has defined much of the historical scholarship on 
national security in the United States. Most studies of national security begin their analysis 
with the post-1945 world despite a recognition that the effort to protect against, and the 
																																																								
21 Foreign relations rather than foreign policy is used deliberately for, as Frank Costigliola 
and Thomas Paterson point out, it “can be used to explain the totality of interactions – 
economic, cultural, political, and more – among peoples and states.” Frank Costigliola and 
Thomas G. Paterson, "Defining and Doing the History of United States Foreign Relations: 
A Primer," in Explaining the History of American Foreign Relations, ed. Michael J. Hogan and 
Thomas G. Paterson (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 10, n. 2. 
22 Lewis L. Gould, The Modern American Presidency (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 
2003); David C. Hendrickson, Union, Nation, or Empire: The American Debate over International 
Relations, 1789-1941 (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2009). 
23 Charles Maier, "Leviathan 2.0," in A World Connecting, 1870-1945, ed. Emily Rosenberg 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2013), 163-4. 
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desire to be protected from, external threats is not an exclusively modern concern. This is 
largely a consequence of the attention devoted to the complex network of formal 
institutions, ideologies, and commitments that guided what Julian Zelizer identifies as 
“continual engagement overseas through diplomacy, war, and covert action.”24 Such studies 
typically take the National Security Act [1947] as their starting point. They analyze how the 
act centralized control of the military under the National Security Council and provided for 
the formation of the Central Intelligence Agency.25 To the extent that these studies consider 
earlier developments, Michael Stewart traces “the roots of the national security ideology in 
America’s prewar and wartime experience, and places a much greater emphasis upon Pearl 
Harbor as a turning point.”26 Melvyn Leffler’s seminal A Preponderance of Power only discusses 
early national security issues insofar as the memories of Woodrow Wilson’s failures shaped 
the outlook of those individuals who would shape policy in the post-World War II world, 
while Zelizer ascribes the desire to create a robust national security agenda to Theodore 
Roosevelt who was, nevertheless, “unable to break through nineteenth-century resistance to 
																																																								
24 Julian E. Zelizer, Arsenal of Democracy: The Politics of National Security from World War II to the 
War on Terrorism (New York: Basic Books, 2010), 2.  
25 See, for example, Andrew Bacevich, ed., The Long War: A New History of U.S. National 
Security Policy since World War II (New York: Columbia University Press, 2007); Michael J. 
Hogan, A Cross of Iron: Harry S Truman and the Origins of the National Security State (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1998); Saul Landau, The Dangerous Doctrine: National Security and 
U.S. Foreign Policy (Boulder: Westview Press, 1988); Melvyn P. Leffler, A Preponderance of 
Power: National Security, the Truman Administration, and the Cold War (Stanford: Stanford 
University Press, 1992); Garry Wills, Bomb Power: The Modern Presidency and the National Security 
State (New York: Penguin Press, 2010); Zelizer, Arsenal of Democracy: The Politics of National 
Security from World War II to the War on Terrorism.  
26 Michael T. Stuart, Creating the National Security State: A History of the Law that Transformed 
America (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008), 2. In his examination of the 
intellectual genealogy of national security, Andrew Preston points to Franklin D. Roosevelt’s 
physical and normative framing of “home defense” as the birth of modern national security 
complex. Andrew Preston, “Monsters Everywhere: A Genealogy of National Security,” 
Diplomatic History 38, no. 3 (2014): 492. 
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internationalism and a national security state.”27 Ultimately, the emphasis on institutional 
mechanisms overshadowed older, more fluid debates about security and created a significant 
historical blind spot. Rather than a fundamental driver for social organization in the first 
place, security became almost exclusively a product of, and synonymous with, the modern 
nation state.28  
Some studies that situate security in the longue durée do indeed trace the roots of this 
idea further, sometimes by tracing the development of specific issues rather than security, 
broadly conceived. Scholars like Christopher Capozzola, Marc Eisner, and Roberta 
Feuerlicht argue that the experiences of Americans during the upheavals of the early 
twentieth century led to increasingly interconnected relations between the government and 
the public.29 This is part of a growing body of scholarship that continues to push the 
																																																								
27 Leffler, A Preponderance of Power: National Security, the Truman Administration, and the Cold War; 
Zelizer, Arsenal of Democracy: The Politics of National Security from World War II to the War on 
Terrorism, 18.  
28 Scholarly studies of American political development and state-making in the late 
nineteenth century is extensive. See, for example, Brian Balogh, A Government Out of Sight: The 
Mystery of National Authority in Nineteenth-Century America (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2009); Daniel Carpenter, The Forging of Bureaucratic Autonomy: Reputations, Networks, and 
Policy Innovation in Executive Agencies, 1862-1928 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001); 
William J. Novak, The People's Welfare: Law and Regulation in Nineteenth Century America (Chapel 
Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1996); Theda Skocpol, Protecting Soldiers and Mothers: 
The Political Origins of Social Policy in the United States (Cambridge: Belknap Press, 1995); 
Stephen Skowronek, Building a New American State: The Expansion of National Administrativ 
Capacities, 1877-1920 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982). 
29 Christopher Capozzola, Uncle Sam Wants You: World War I and the Making of the Modern 
American Citizen (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008); Marc Allen Eisner, From Warfare 
State to Wlfare State: World War I, Compensatory State Building, and the Limits of the Modern Order 
(University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2000); Roberta S. Feuerlicht, America's 




temporal focus back in time and trace the development of security.30 Other studies, 
traditionally done by political theorists, focus on general theories of security. They trace the 
idea back to Enlightenment thinkers like John Locke and Thomas Hobbes and examine how 
security is socially constructed at different moments, rather than accepted as a given.31 
Falling under the umbrella of “Security Studies,” scholars such as Robert Jervis show how 
security concerns developed out of the First World War.32 As Eli Jelly-Schapiro 
acknowledged, however, “Despite the reciprocal emergence of security thinking and the 
modern state, the absolute saturation of social and political discourse within security rhetoric 
is a twentieth-century phenomenon.”33  
This dissertation adopts the premise of Melvyn Leffler’s widely accepted definition 
of national security and focuses on the years between 1881 and 1907—from the 
assassinations of Tsar Alexander II and President James Garfield to the Sundry Civil Services 
Act, which formally funded the Secret Service’s protective role. There are no institutional 
																																																								
30 In addition to Capozzola, other notable examples include Mary S. Barton, “The Global 
War on Anarchism: The United States and International Anarchist Terrorism, 1898-1904,” 
Diplomatic History 39, no. 2 (2015); James Chace and Caleb Carr, America Invulnerable: The Quest 
for Absolute Security from 1812 to Star Wars (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1988); Ryan M. 
Johnson, "War is the Health of the State: War, Empire, and Anarchy in the Languages of 
American National Security" (University of Minnesota December 2014); Robbie Totten, 
“National Security and U.S. Immigration Policy, 1776-1790,” Journal of Interdisciplinary History 
39 (2008). 
31 Mark Neocleous, Critique of Security (Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2008); 
Mark Neocleous, “Security, Liberty, and th Myth of Balance: Towards a Critique of Security 
Politics,” Contemporary Political Theory 6, no. 2 (May 2007). 
32 Shiping Tang, “The Security Dilemma: A Conceptual Analysis,” Security Studies 18, no. 3 
(October 2009); Robert Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1976); Jack Snyder, "Perceptions of the Security Dilemma in 
1914," in Psychology and Deterrence, ed. Robert Jervis, Richard Ned Lebow, and Janice Stein 
(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Univesity Press, 1985). 
33 Eli Jelly-Schapiro, “Security: The Long History,” Journal of American Studies  (May 2013): 2. 
On the relationship between the state and property rights, see Neocleous, Critique of Security. 
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requirements to Leffler’s definition of national security. Rather, national security 
encompasses “the decisions and actions deemed imperative to protect domestic core values 
from external threats.” Moreover, Leffler argues, it has “been an enduring element of the 
American diplomatic experience,” not just the result of the security realities of the atomic 
era.34 A number of scholars argue that the immediate aftermath of Leon Czolgosz’s 
assassination of President William McKinley was a turning point, whether framing it as the 
genesis of the national security state or something even greater.35 Eric Rauchway, for 
example, argues McKinley’s death made way for political modernization. “William McKinley 
had two killers,” he writes, “the man who shot him and destroyed his body, and the man 
who succeeded him [Theodore Roosevelt] and erased his legacy.”36 That may well be the 
case, but this period also offers important insights into how events can shape security 
debates. National security in these decades defined by anarchist bombings and assassinations 
was an evolving concern, subject to constant debate, negotiation, and contradiction. 
																																																								
34 Melvyn P. Leffler, "National Security," in Explaining the History of American Foreign Relations, 
ed. Michael J. Hogan and Thomas G. Paterson (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2004), 123, 36. 
35 Barton, “The Global War on Anarchism: The United States and International Anarchist 
Terrorism, 1898-1904.”; Richard B. Jensen, The Battle against Anarchist Terrorism: An 
International History, 1878-1934 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013); Richard B. 
Jensen, “The United States, International Policing, and the War Against Anarchist 
Terrorism, 1900-1914,” Terrorism and Political Violence 13, no. 1 (Spring 2001); Johnson, "War 
is the Health of the State: War, Empire, and Anarchy in the Languages of American National 
Security"; Julia Rose Kraut, “Global Anti-Anarchism: The Origins of Ideological 
Deportation and the Suppression of Expression,” Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies 19, no. 
1 (Winter 2012). 
36 Eric Rauchway, Murdering McKinley: The Making of Theodore Roosevelt's America (New York: 
Hill and Wang, 2003), xi-xii. 
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Anarchism was a truly transnational movement and, consequently, measures to 
suppress it involved both internal domestic issues as well as external international ones.37 
Unlike other strains of radical thought in the late nineteenth century, anarchists seemingly 
denied the validity of any and all government and, consequently, they were not engaged in a 
struggle to impose their own kind of rule. Anarchist violence, as Julian Mack concluded in 
1910, was “not directed against one country alone and its political conditions, but directed 
against human society in general.”38 Anarchist violence was an external threat to society and 
the perpetrators of such infamous acts were “hostes humani genris [sic.], enemies of 
mankind.”39 Hostis humani generis, as a legal term, originated in admiralty law and was first 
used to justify action against pirates and slavers and has subsequently been applied to 
terrorist crimes.40 Like piracy in earlier centuries, governments tried to craft international 
agreements to suppress and contain the threat posed by anarchists, though with very limited 
success. At the same time, governments strenuously rejected the idea that anarchists engaged 
in a struggle to impose their own vision of social organization. Instead, governments and 
																																																								
37External security is traditionally oriented toward addressing threats from other states while 
internal security refers to threats coming from within the state or society that is being 
protected. See Wolfgang Wagner, “Building an Internal Security Community: The 
Democratic Peace and the Politics of Extradition in Western Europe,” Journal of Peace 
Research 40, no. 6 (November 2003): 696, n. 2; Barry Buzan, People, States, and Fear: An Agenda 
for International Security Studies in the Post-Cold War Era, Second ed. (Boulder: Lynne Rienner 
Publishers, 1991 [1983]), 86, 112-23. 
38 J. Reuben Clark Jr., Frederic R. Coudert, and Julian W. Mack, "The Nature and Definition 
of Politcal Offense in International Extradition" (paper presented at the Proceedings of the 
American Society of International Law, Third Annual Meeting, Washington D.C., 23 April 
1909), 156. 
39 James B. Angell, George Ticknor Curtis, and Thomas M. Cooley, “The Extradition of 
Dynamite Criminals,” North American Review 141, no. 344 (July 1885): 48-49, 50. 
40 Douglas R. Burgess Jr., “Hostis Humani Generi: Piracy, Terrorism and a New 




civil society in general treated anarchists the way they would the mafia and terrorist 
organizations in subsequent decades, as ordinary—if dangerous—criminals. While 
international agreements occasionally addressed the suppression of anarchist violence, the 
primary responsibility fell within states, to police or national legislators. In the last decades of 
the nineteenth century, contemporaries weighed domestic responses such as employing 
undercover agents, expanding federal power to punish attacks on officials, or press 
restrictions—all hallmarks of modern national security policies. At the same time, they also 
challenged such solutions on the grounds that such measures undermined perceived core 
values like freedom of speech, judicial review, rights to expatriation, or the concept of 
equality before the law. The threat of anarchist terrorism, this dissertation argues, forced 
those seeking to defend society to increasingly favor security measures that undermined the 
principles on which they believed their society was based. 
 
ASSASSINATION AND SECURITY: EMOTION, COGNITION, AND PERCEPTION 
 Assassinations, successful and unsuccessful alike, stand out as some of history’s most 
prominent and universal occurrences, yet they remain largely shrouded in vagaries. As a 
tactic, it has endured across time and space: assassins have struck on every continent except 
Antarctica; it has been used as a weapon of the strong as well as the weak; and it cuts across 
gender and cultures. Despite this prevalence, there is little agreement on what actually 
constitutes a definition of assassination. At the most basic level, one can identify four core 
elements: first, assassination involves the use of lethal force; second, it encompasses intent, 
the deliberation to kill, and some degree of premeditation; third, it entails the targeting of 
individually selected persons or groups for political purposes; and fourth, it is generally 
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conducted through covert means.41 In addition to the debates over meaning—for example, 
to be assassination, does the target have to have a political role or is it sufficient that the act 
have a broader political resonance?—few studies actually investigate the practice rigorously.42 
 Extant literature on assassination, which can provide some useful building blocks, 
falls into four basic categories. While there is obviously some overlap across the different 
groupings, the first, and largest, covers the many accounts of individual assassinations.43 
Such studies, despite their popularity, often fail to make connections to broader social and 
political factors and, consequently, do little to advance our understanding of assassination as 
a historical phenomenon.44 A second, and related, literature delves into the assassins 
themselves.45 Unfortunately, as the political scientists Iqbal and Zorn point out, “such 
studies imply that assassinations are essentially random acts of violence, the explanation for 
																																																								
41 The first three elements are central to the modern idea of “targeted killing,” which some 
distinguish as a phenomenon separate from assassination. See, for example, Nils Melzer, 
Targeted Killing in International Law (New York City: Oxford University Press, 2008), 3-4; Col. 
W. Hays (USMCR Parks, Ret.), "Memorandum on Executive Order 12333 and 
Assassination," ed. Office of the Judge Advocate General of the Army (Washington D.C.: 
Department of the Army, 2002 (2 November 1989)), 2; Stephen T. Hosmer, Operations 
Against Enemy Leaders (Santa Monica: RAND, 2001). 
42 J. Bowyer Bell, “Assassination in International Politics,” International Studies Quarterly 16, 
no. 1 (March 1972): 60. 
43 There is, for example, a veritable cottage industry built around the assassinations of figures 
like Abraham Lincoln and John F. Kennedy, encompassing serious scholars and conspiracy 
theorists alike.  
44 This has somewhat changed in recent years. See, for example, Kenneth D. Ackerman, 
Dark Horse: The Surprise Election and Political Murder of President James A. Garfield (New York: 
Carroll & Graf Publishers, 2003); Candice Millard, Destiny of the Republic: A Tale of Madness, 
Medicine and the Murder of a President (New York: Anchor, 2011); Rauchway, Murdering McKinley: 
The Making of Theodore Roosevelt's America. 
45 See, for example, James W. Clarke, American Assassins: The Darker Side of Politics (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1982); Roger Manvell and Heinrich Fraenkel, The Men Who Tried 
to Kill Hitler (New York: Coward-McCann, 1964); Geri Spieler, Taking Aim at the President: the 
Remarkable Story of the Woman who Shot at Gerald Ford (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009). 
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which can be found at the individual level.” Consequently, such works fail to “offer 
generalizable theories to understand the determinants of assassination as a political and 
social phenomenon.”46 A third approach, generally the domain of political scientists, has 
tried to employ datasets on political violence to trace the roots of assassination to the 
character of the domestic political system or has focused on the relationship between 
institutions and the influence of individual leaders.47 While occasionally making insightful 
conclusions, such studies are more often beset by a host of methodological problems and 
can even disagree over what actually constitutes “assassination.”48 A final branch of the 
literature is made up of those works that evaluate assassination, and covert operations in 
general, from the perspective of state policy.49 
																																																								
46 Zaryab Iqbal and Christopher Zorn, “Sic Semper Tyrannis? Power, Repression and 
Assassination Since the Second World War,” Journal of Politics 68, no. 3 (August 2006): 489. 
47 Bruno S. Frey, "Why Kill Politicians? A Rational Choice Analysis of Political 
Assassinations,"  (Basel: Center for Research in Economics, Management and the Arts, 
2007); Bruno S. Frey, "Overprotected Politicians,"  (Zurich: University of Zurich and the 
Research Center for Economics, Management, and the Arts (CREMA), Working Paper No. 
2007 - 7, 2007); Iqbal and Zorn, “Sic Semper Tyrannis? Power, Repression and 
Assassination Since the Second World War.”; Benjamin F. Jones and Benjamin A. Olken, 
"Hit or Miss? The Effect of Assassinations on Institutions and War,"  (Cambridge: National 
Bureau of Economic Research, May 2007); David C. Schwartz, “On the Ecology of Political 
Violence: 'The Long Hot Summer' as a Hypothesis,” American Behavioral Scientist 11, no. 6 
(July/August 1968). 
48 For a discussion of some of the problems associated with data collection, see Ivo K. 
Feierabend et al., "Political Violence and Assassination: A Cross-National Assessment," in 
Assassinations and the Political Order, ed. William J. Crotty (New York: Harper and Row, 1971), 
54-140. Regarding a restricted sample size, Jones and Olken’s method of using failed 
assassinations to control for successes only focuses on cases where a weapon was actually 
used. This approach is limited in that it fails to account for when plots are detected or 
weapons are deactivated before they can be triggered.  
49 See, for example, Louis Rene Beres, Assassination, Law and Justice: A Policy Perspective. 
(Purdue University, N.D. [cited 18 November 2004]); available from 
http://web.ics.purdue.edu/~lberes/articles.htm; Patricia Zengel, “Assassination and the 
Law of Armed Conflict,” Military Law Review 134 (Fall 1991); United States Senate, "Alleged 
Assassination Plots Involving Foreign Leaders, An Interim Report of the Select Committee 
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 Scholarly debate over the significance of assassination has been shaped by a deeply 
ingrained belief that despite their universality and obvious immediate impact, assassinations 
are isolated, seemingly random attacks that do not have an enduring, tangible legacy.50 The 
quote at the beginning of the introduction—assassination has never changed the history of 
the world—highlights the shortcomings of our understanding of assassination. As part of his 
speech introducing a resolution of sympathy for the United States in the wake of President 
Abraham Lincoln’s assassination, Benjamin Disraeli made one of the most often-repeated 
statements about assassination as a historical phenomenon. Decontextualized by later 
interpreters, it stands as the foundation of our popular understanding of such violent 
actions: assassination does not change history. This is especially true in discussions of the 
United States, where this particular type of violence is seen as unusually anomic and 
inconsequential, perpetrated by mentally unstable individuals.51 Yet when conceptualized in 
																																																																																																																																																																					
to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities," ed. United 
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Assassination an Option?," in Hoover Digest (Stanford: Hoover Institute, 2002); Bert 
Brandenberg, “The Legality of Assassination as an Aspect of Foreign Policy,” Virginia Journal 
of International Law 27, no. 3 (Spring 1987); Hosmer, Operations Against Enemy Leaders; Brian 
Michael Jenkins, "Should Our Arsenal Against Terrorism Include Assassination,"  (Santa 
Monica: Rand Corporation, January 1987); Melzer, Targeted Killing in International Law; Parks, 
"Memorandum on Executive Order 12333 and Assassination."  
50 See James F. Kirkham, Sheldon G. Levy, and William J. Crotty, Assassination and Political 
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Praeger, 1970); Franklin L. Ford, Political Murder: From Tyrannicide to Terrorism (Cambridge: 
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The Politics of Assassination (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1970). 
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this way, the extant literature cannot capture the cumulative effects the spate of 
assassinations had on socio-political debates in the United States at the turn of the twentieth 
century and fundamentally misrepresents how contemporaries perceived these attacks. 
 While we do not know the manner or tone in which Disraeli delivered this particular 
speech, the written transcript overflows with evocative, emotional language that reveals a 
good deal more than the quote itself. The loss was a personal one: Lincoln “sprang from the 
same fatherland, and spoke the same mother tongue” while his character “touches the heart 
of nations.” In the face of such violent action, he cautioned, the “public mind is apt to fall 
into gloom and perplexity; for it is ignorant alike of the causes and consequences of such 
deeds.” Yet, in his public dismissal of assassination as a means of structural change, Disraeli 
argues that it is “one of our duties to re-assure the country under unreasoning panic or 
despondency… let us not, therefore, sanction any feeling of depression.” This would, of 
course, necessitate a forceful denunciation of assassination as a source of significant change. 
Disraeli elaborated on this point: “Elevated and chastened,” he said, the populations of 
North America “will be enabled not merely to renew their career of power and prosperity, 
but they will renew it to contribute to the general happiness of mankind.” In this, one was to 
draw comfort not from the remote past where “the costly sacrifice of a Caesar did not 
propitiate the inexorable destiny of his country;” rather, one was to look “to modern times, 
to times at least with the feelings of which we are familiar, and the people of which were 
animated and influenced by the same interests as ourselves.” Here, in that context Disraeli 
																																																																																																																																																																					
Psychiatry of Presidential Assassination, Part II: Garfield and McKinley,” The Journal-Lancet 
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recalled the “heroic” Henry IV of France and the Prince of Orange as “conspicuous 
illustrations of this truth,” that assassination has never changed the history of the world.52 
Violence has an emotional impact on individuals and the feelings aroused influence 
how that violence is understood. For Disraeli, the danger was gloom, confusion, and 
depression; to guard against that, he needed to marshal temporally relevant evidence to give 
emotional weight to his argument. Less than forty years later, assassination and anarchism 
were seen as radical deviations from social norms and the anarchist assassin’s willingness—
even eagerness—to accept death as a consequence of their actions reinforced such notions. 
Consequently, when contemporaries labeled something an “assassination” or someone an 
“anarchist,” they were making subjective, emotional rationalizations as well as objective 
descriptions of a particular type of violence or political philosophy.53 Even a cold, 
premeditated assassination is, as James Clarke argues, “a highly charged emotional 
expression of something more than simple aggression.”54 Consequently, by exploring 
assassinations through a lens that takes emotions and their capacity to shape 
understanding—influencing perception and, as a consequence, the policies on which those 
perceptions were based—into account, this dissertation aims to help bridge the divide 
between scholars who emphasize state power with those who focus on cultural factors. 
																																																								
52 Parliamentary Archives, HC/Deb 1 May 1865, Vol. 178: 1245-6. 
53 In the early nineteenth century, assassination could be used to describe a nefarious murder 
devoid of political meaning; for example, a brother that killed his sister over her inheritance 
was branded an “assassin.”  When Secretary of State William Seward was attacked as part of 
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54 Clarke, American Assassins: The Darker Side of Politics, 7. 
 
 22 
While the study of emotion in history has grown slowly over the last two decades, 
the relationships between emotion, foreign relations, and security remain critically 
understudied.55 It is somewhat counter-intuitive because the emotions so closely associated 
with security—fear, hate, and jealousy, for example—seem self-evidently important; yet 
scholars have rarely examined them critically.56 This is largely a consequence of the centrality 
of the realist perspective and a presumption of rationality that has dominated thinking on 
this topic, despite the fact that, as Roland Bleiker and Emma Hutchinson point out, “just 
about every philosopher considered central to the tradition of IR [International Relations] 
scholarship… has engaged the role of emotions.”57 Emotions have a long history of being 
perceived as irrational;58 they may be useful to explain misperceptions, but most often stand 
																																																								
55 Recent work by Frank Costigliola, who uses emotion as a way to reframe the origins of the 
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in explicit contrast with rational cognition in studies of foreign policy decision-making.59 
Lastly, there are major methodological questions: emotions are ephemeral, hard to define 
and measure, of potentially questionable authenticity, and subject to tremendous change.60 
The problem is magnified for historians because, while the theoretical debate is largely 
settled—scholars generally agree that there is both a biological and socio-political 
component to emotions—there is still recognition that emotions are “plastic;” while we may 
see similarities in anger, fear, or happiness, they are not the same across time, culture, and 
gender.61 Even Disraeli, recognizing this dilemma, urged his audience to look to modern 
times, to people motivated by familiar interests. 
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The general agreement that emotions have both biological and socio-political 
components has helped reinforce the understanding that emotion works in tandem with 
rationality, which has implications for decision-making. As Neta Crawford argues, “the 
concept of a security dilemma pivots on perceptions of intention, not reality… Emotions are 
part of perceptual processes.” Emotion also helps shape cognition, information gathering, 
and processing; “Emotions influence actors’ understanding of the past and sense of what is 
possible in the future in four ways: emotions influence recall, the use of analogy, the 
evaluation of past choices, and the consideration of counterfactuals.”62 Insecurity and the 
fears it spawned, in this case, arose from the reality that anarchists were responsible for 
repeated attempts on heads of state in a closely bounded period of time. Contemporaries 
had the knowledge that anarchists crossed borders to avoid various crimes, perpetrated 
crimes in other places, were tied into a global communicative web that allowed them to share 
ideas, and more. This knowledge, coupled with the deeply ingrained image of the sinister 
anarchist bomb-thrower, colored perceptions of the threat’s magnitude and influenced 
contemporary responses.  
Scholars have often invoked emotions as a way to understand anti-radical efforts in 
the early twentieth century. Louis Freeland Post, the Assistant Secretary of Labor who 
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helped end the first Red Scare, characterized the period as one of needless panic and titled 
his work, The Deportations Delirium of Nineteen-Twenty. “With nerves unstrung,” Post wrote of 
the period, “the public easily saw anarchy spooks in every shadow.”63 Robert Murray 
perpetuated this aspect of the narrative, labeling it “national hysteria” because, in his view, 
foreign-born radicals never presented a serious danger to American values or society.64 Some 
scholars have opted to downplay the role of emotions and instead examine anti-radical 
efforts as a question of tension over governmental repression and the protection of civil 
liberties.65 Approaching security from a different angle, scholars of immigration examine 
how xenophobia and nativism, inspired in part by fears of how immigrants affected the 
nation, contributed to the emergence of what Erika Lee calls the “gatekeeping nation.”66 In 
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the eyes of others, anarchism was a threat to the health of the body politic and scholars have 
studied how medical rhetoric about foreign disease justified efforts to improve policing, 
surveillance, and immigration bureaucracy.67 
This dissertation offers new insights into the evolution of early discussions about 
national security by examining how contemporaries understood the threat of anarchist 
assassination and why they responded to it in the ways that they did. Popular apprehension 
over assassinations in such close temporal proximity underscored the feeling that theirs was 
a society under attack, a feeling that was reinforced with a shift in how the victims were 
portrayed. The Daily Picayune (New Orleans) highlighted the trend: despite “the general 
betterment” of people globally, “the almost complete extinction of arbitrary power wielded 
by monarchs” did not diminish the number of assassinations.  “As a matter of fact, attempts 
upon the lives of monarchs and rulers seem to have increased, rather than to have 
diminished in recent times.”68 Umberto I, Carnot, Cánovas, and Elisabeth were 
“representative,” according to another iteration of this thinking in the North American Review; 
their only crime was that they had “contrived to accumulate a little bric-a-brac, while so 
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many of [their] countrymen had to sell their furniture for bread.”69 The increasingly popular 
perception that the attacks were linked, and intensifying, shaped the debates on potential 
solutions. Various policy alternatives—harsher penalties, protective measures, greater 
cooperation with other countries, and, ultimately, exclusion—challenged the external threat 
posed by anarchists; at the same time, contemporaries debated whether such measures went 
too far, becoming an internal danger to the society and values they were trying to protect. 
 
ORGANIZATION AND CHAPTER OUTLINE: 
 The first chapter uses emotion as a lens to examine how popular reactions to 
assassinations and anarchists changed over the last two decades of the nineteenth century, a 
time period largely defined by acts of anarchist terror. It focuses on language and imagery in 
contemporary sources and shows how popular media increasingly framed anarchists as a 
threat to both the national body and spirit. Analyzing representations of anarchists and 
assassination in newspapers, magazines, serial publications, and novels engages with what 
Joseph Campos calls the “textual field of U.S. national security” where “loaded vocabulary, 
metaphors, synecdoche… delimit options and possibilities.”70 This popular discourse was the 
backdrop against which policymakers deliberated over how to create domestic security 
measures and engaged with foreign peers who were likewise confronted with the menacing 
specter of anarchist violence. Emblematic of this is Leon Barritt’s “In the Cradle of Liberty,” 
published in the aftermath of William McKinley’s assassination. The anarchist is a serpent, a 
popular, dehumanizing representation at the time that was both exotic and an unwelcome, 
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dangerous presence. Uncle Sam, representing the government, would have to take an 
increasingly active, protective role because anarchists could not be trusted to discern the line 
between “liberty and license.” This chapter argues that, over time, evolving attitudes about 
the anarchist danger to society increasingly left anarchists outside the bounds of civil society 
and vulnerable to a range of security measures that had earlier failed to gain popular support.  
Figure 1.1: Leon Barritt, “In the Cradle of Liberty!” New York Tribune, 12 September 1901: 
9.71 
 The second chapter begins with the assassination of U.S. President William 
McKinley and examines domestic efforts to suppress the danger of violent anarchists: 
prosecution of anarchist offenses, protection of political elites, and policing of dangerous 
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radicals. It first examines the legal questions raised by the prosecution of Leon Czolgosz as 
well as the arrest and detention of other anarchists in the aftermath of McKinley’s 
assassination. From questions about justice, the chapter then considers issues of security and 
debates over how to best protect public officials. While the Secret Service Division of the 
Treasury Department began to informally protect President Grover Cleveland in 1894, 
permanent funding formalizing this role only came with the passage of the Sundry Civil 
Services Act for 1907 [34 Stat. 708]. Protecting public officials, such as the president, from 
harm necessitated a better understanding of possible threats. Yet, while prominent police 
officials devised measures to investigate individuals and anarchist groups, a wary public 
debated whether such undercover, covert measures were any better than the practices of 
those targeted for surveillance. 
 The third chapter analyzes how the American government participated in the halting 
efforts to construct an international regime designed to counter anarchist terrorism and how 
civil society reacted to these developments. The first section of this chapter examines how 
states adapted extradition treaties to address the problems posed by attacks on heads of state 
and of political offenders, more generally. The second section examines the challenges 
delegates to the International Conference of Rome for the Social Defense Against 
Anarchists [1898] faced while trying to negotiate acceptable compromises on cooperative 
measures to suppress anarchist terrorism. Finally, the third section analyzes how the British 
and American governments responded to a Russo-German initiative to suppress anarchism 
following the attempted assassination of the Prince of Wales in 1900 and the successful 
attack on President McKinley in 1901. This initiative, which resulted in the secret St. 
Petersburg Conference [1904], explicitly referred to those attacks to justify greater 
international cooperation. Yet, even though a British delegation participated in the Rome 
 
 30 
Conference and President Theodore Roosevelt called for an international response to 
anarchist crime, neither government participated. 
 The fourth chapter examines the debates around anarchist restriction that shaped the 
eventual passage of the Immigration Act of 1903 [32 Stat. 1213] and argues that 
transnational and international currents challenged domestically oriented conceptions of 
national security. Over the last two decades of the nineteenth century, individuals in public 
forums, state governments, and the offices of the federal government considered 
immigration control as part of an interdependent web of other measures aimed at curtailing 
what they perceived to be the anarchist threat to society. As such, anarchist exclusion was 
more than a sudden nativist eruption sparked by Leon Czolgosz’s assassination of President 
McKinley in 1901. It was intricately tied into the country’s foreign relations. Anarchists, like 
any other group of immigrants, were fully enmeshed in a vibrant transnational network and 
those individuals advocating measures to restrain and, ultimately, restrict their activities were 
cognizant of how that reality complicated their efforts. Contemporaries understood that 
successfully restricting anarchists at the gates required cooperation beyond the country’s 
borders, and exclusion, when it finally took shape, was the result of nearly twenty years of 
evolving debate. If the “master theme of immigration politics,” according to Roxanne Lynn 
Doty, is “the fear that we are losing control of our way of life,” then understanding how the 
fear of anarchist violence helped shape the contours of the domestic and diplomatic debates 
over anarchist restriction is critical as these old questions of transnational immigration 
control reemerge.72  
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By examining shifting attitudes about anarchism and anarchist violence, this 
dissertation shows how Americans came to terms with such violence and how their 
understanding of it shaped discussions of security in the last two decades of the nineteenth 
century. As the spate of anarchist violence increased and blossomed into what 
contemporaries perceived to be a social crisis, people began to argue in favor of security and 
increased state power. Counterarguments that the appeal of American institutions and values 
were sufficient to assimilate dangerous anarchists became less dominant, though they never 
completely went away. Anarchists, by nature of the violent deeds attributed to them, 
gradually transformed from being viewed simply as foreigners to being depicted as inhuman 
creatures or demons. Consequently, it became easier to subject them to increasingly 
restrictive security provisions. Members of civil society deserved protections for free speech, 
from political persecution, and more. Anarchists, by contrast, had increasingly found 
themselves defined as outside of, and in opposition to, that society. The scales, which for 
two decades weighed the realities of an increased security presence against ideals about 





CHAPTER 1: ANARCHIST TERRORISM AND ASSASSINATION IN A GLOBAL CONTEXT 
 
 On December 3, 1901, President Theodore Roosevelt delivered his first State of the 
Union address to Congress and the nation “under the shadow of a great calamity.” Three 
months earlier, the self-professed anarchist Leon Czolgosz assassinated Roosevelt’s 
predecessor, William McKinley, at the Pan-American Exhibition in Buffalo, New York. 
Roosevelt, as did countless others, explicitly linked the assassination of McKinley to attacks 
on other political figures. “Of the last seven elected Presidents,” Roosevelt reminded his 
audience, “he [McKinley] is the third who has been murdered” and that reality was 
“sufficient to justify grave alarm among all loyal American citizens.” Unlike the deaths of 
Presidents Abraham Lincoln and James Garfield, however, McKinley’s death at the hands of 
an anarchist was a “blow… aimed not at this President, but at all Presidents; at every symbol 
of government.” Roosevelt expressed the views of many, arguing that anarchists were “not 
merely the enemy of system and of progress, but the deadly foe of liberty.” He briefly 
acknowledged one of anarchists’ primary critiques—that a growing economic divide 
exacerbated social discontent. Though he contended such criticism was overblown, 
Roosevelt conceded that rapidly accelerating industrial development resulted in “very serious 
social problems” that “aroused much antagonism.” Nonetheless, Roosevelt maintained that 
anarchist grievances were not the byproduct of socio-economic or political injustice. An 
anarchist, he claimed, “is in no sense… a ‘product of social conditions,’ save as a 
highwayman is ‘produced’ by the fact that an unarmed man happens to have a purse.” 
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Rather, as a majority of Americans agreed, “The cause of his criminality is to be found in his 
own evil passions and in the evil conduct of those who urge him on.”1  
 Roosevelt’s speech revealed the depth of American hostility to—and fear of—
anarchists at the turn of the twentieth century. It embodied the tropes that had largely come 
to define anarchists. Anarchists were “evil,” “foreign,” even inhuman creatures, not ordinary 
criminals. Their “crimes”—which, in the eyes of many, included simply adhering to anarchist 
philosophy, regardless of whether an individual anarchist believed in violence or not—were 
not conventional criminal acts. Rather, anarchist offenses fell beyond the pale of civil 
society. As such, most Americans viewed anarchists in the same light as pirates and slave 
traders. Roosevelt added a powerful voice to the chorus that had long advocated for 
definitive action to suppress and punish anarchists of all stripes. In addition to eulogizing his 
slain predecessor, Roosevelt used his State of the Union speech to call for domestic 
legislation and international action. He endorsed measures that Americans, and others 
affected by similar violence around the world, had debated for close to two decades: punish 
those who spread anarchist teachings, expel those who held—and admitted to—anarchist 
beliefs, and coordinate with other countries to defend a shared interest in the well-being of 
society. 
 Why then did so many repressive measures fail if anarchist violence was so unsettling 
and proponents of its suppression articulated a coherent series of inter-dependent measures 
to quarantine it? While subsequent chapters address specific anti-anarchist measures, this 
chapter examines the nature of anarchist violence and explores Americans’ evolving 
opinions about it during the last two decades of the nineteenth century. The modern view of 
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assassination holds that such incidents are singular events typically perpetrated by mentally 
unstable individuals.2 Americans during the 1880s and 1890s, by contrast, viewed such 
attacks as evidence of an organized, systematic anarchist threat to society. While the 
widespread belief in a global anarchist conspiracy that targeted heads of state for 
assassination proved imaginary, popular fear of this played a significant role in shaping views 
of anarchism and anarchists. Studies of anti-anarchist measures that begin with McKinley’s 
assassination unfailingly note the depth of the emotional turmoil and fear Czolgosz’s attack 
instilled.3 Scholars including Mary Barton, Nathaniel Hong, Ryan Johnson, and others push 
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the origins of national security debates back to this violent episode. Rather than identify any 
single event or moment as the genesis of modern national security concerns, this chapter 
examines contemporary characterizations of anarchists to shed light on the cultural roots of 
national security. “Cultural processes,” W. Lance Bennett argued, “produce common social 
understandings.”4 While Americans were quick to condemn anarchist crimes, they were also 
hesitant to embrace harsh, repressive measures. Calls for comprehensive, severe responses 
occupied the same public space as pleas for caution, lest proposed solutions lead to 
potentially unanticipated consequences to deeply held principles like freedom of speech or 
equality before the law.5 The failure to satisfactorily resolve those conflicting views, this 
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chapter argues, shaped subsequent discussions over how to protect society from the threat—
both real and imagined—of anarchist violence. 
 
THE NATURE OF ANARCHIST VIOLENCE: 
 Sunday, March 13, 1881 inaugurated the first wave of modern terrorism.6 On that 
morning, Tsar Alexander II was returning to the Winter Palace in St. Petersburg after his 
weekly inspection of a Cossack military parade. Traveling in a bomb-proof carriage that was 
a gift from Napoleon III and accompanied by a small escort of guards, the Tsar’s retinue 
came to a halt when Nikolai Rysakov threw a bomb from the crowd that detonated under 
the Tsar’s carriage, killing one and wounding several others. Though Rysakov missed his 
mark, another co-conspirator and fellow member of the revolutionary Narodnaya Volya 
[“People’s Will”] was ready: Ignatei Grinevitsky threw a second bomb that exploded at the 
feet of Alexander II as he stood amidst the carnage of the first blast. The bomb killed 
Grinevitsky. The Tsar, bleeding profusely and with one leg nearly severed, was carried by 
sleigh to the Winter Palace, where he died that afternoon.7 
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 Alexander II’s assassination was a seminal moment in the emergence of modern 
terrorism. Up until that point, scholars David Rapoport and Benjamin Grob-Fitzgibbon 
argue, assassins sought to destroy those who corrupted the system. Terrorists, while they 
may have employed similar techniques, aimed to destroy the system that corrupted 
everything it touched.8 The People’s Will targeted Alexander II—a moderate ruler when 
compared to his predecessor and successors—because he embodied the system of 
centralized authority, rather than for any “crime” he committed.9 Members of the 
organization plotted for years against the Tsar in the hope that his assassination would 
undermine popular acceptance of the institution of the Tsars, cripple the Romanov dynasty 
itself, and initiate a widespread popular uprising. It was, Matthew Carr writes, “the most 
significant act of regicide since the execution of Louis XVI.”10 While the assassination of 
Alexander II had the opposite effect of what its perpetrators intended—resulting in a hard 
freeze on popular reforms under the reign of Alexander III—this method of violence would 
be widely copied over subsequent decades.11  
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 The technological revolution of the nineteenth century facilitated such violence.12 
While anarchists used daggers and pistols in their most infamous targeted killings, the 
enduring symbol of anarchist terrorism was the bomb. Patented by Alfred Nobel in 1867, 
dynamite was substantially more powerful than black powder. Related inventions of the 
blasting cap and, in 1875, of gelignite—a more powerful and stable explosive—allowed 
political radicals to deploy increasingly sophisticated and powerful devices. While anarchists 
were most closely associated with bombs in the popular imagination, revolutionary 
nationalist organizations, such as the People’s Will, Clan na Gael, and the Fenian 
Brotherhood first employed explosive devices to commit violence.13 Each of these groups 
participated in sustained bombing campaigns intended to pressure governments to enact 
reforms and inspire popular insurrections.14 Mikhail Frolenko, a member of the executive 
committee of the People’s Will recalled a debate as to whether the group should use an 
accurate pistol to assassinate the Tsar rather than a less precise explosive. This suggestion 
was dismissed because, as he recalled it, “This assassination would not have created the same 
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impression. It would have been interpreted as an ordinary murder, and would not have 
expressed a new stage in the revolutionary movement.”15  
Yet the anarchist tactic of “propaganda by deed” relied as much on revolutionary 
changes in communication and transportation as much as it did on harnessing the power of 
a new type of explosive. Dynamite possessed significantly more destructive power than black 
powder, which made bombs more dangerous. But it was the rise of literacy, the proliferation 
of mass-circulation newspapers, and the speed at which individuals and information traveled 
that caused panic and drew greater attention to such acts. Lower barriers to travel meant that 
anarchists—who often had to cross international boundaries to escape domestic 
repression—could keep in contact with a transnational community of like-minded 
individuals.16 Newspapers covered the movements of prominent anarchists and reported on 
expulsions elsewhere, heightening fears that the United States—and other western 
countries—would become the inevitable destination of such people. Perhaps even more 
crucially, groups and individuals who espoused or perpetrated acts of violence depended on 
the news of such acts being transmitted quickly and widely. The ready delivery of 
newspapers and affordable print publications helped anarchists disseminate their message, 
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circulate news of their deeds, and cultivate the technical skills required to imitate their 
methods.17  
 The infamous German anarchist printer, Johann Most, offers a classic example of 
how anarchists utilized these developments to further their own ends. Most lived an itinerant 
life: born in Bavaria, he worked as a bookbinder in Switzerland in the 1860s, served briefly in 
the German Reichstag as a social democrat, and fled to London in 1878 after a period of 
imprisonment following Bismarck’s passage of a series of anti-socialist laws. This nomadic 
existence enabled Most to foster connections with, and draw inspiration from, prominent 
anarchist figures such as Mikhail Bakunin and Auguste Blanqui. In London, Most founded a 
paper, Freiheit, and used it to espouse a policy of direct action. Twice jailed in Britain, once in 
1881 for publishing an article approving of Tsar Alexander II’s assassination and again after 
Irish nationalists murdered Lord Frederick Cavendish in Dublin, Most departed for the 
United States in December 1882. There, he re-established Freiheit and, in 1885, published his 
most infamous work, a pamphlet entitled: Revolutionary War Science: A Handbook of Instruction 
Regarding the Use and Manufacture of Nitroglycerine, Dynamite, Gun-Cotton, Fulminating Mercury, 
Bombs, Incendiary Devices, Poisons, etc. Part how-to manual and part call to arms, anarchist 
newspapers serialized it and translated it into numerous languages, which meant it gained a 
wide readership. Most advocated using bombs and other devices to carry out terrorist acts 
against the established order. He placed as much emphasis on the terrorizing effect of 
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dynamite—especially as word of such deeds got out—as on its destructive power: “what can 
tear solid rock into splinters,” he reasoned, “may not have a bad effect at a ball where 
monopolists are assembled.”18 Most’s fiery public speeches, strident calls for and support of 
violence, plus his infamous, heavily-bearded visage did much to engrain into the popular 
imagination the image of a wild-eyed, bearded, anarchist clutching a bomb in one hand and a 
revolver in another.19  
 Though technological developments facilitated and magnified anarchists’ use of 
violence, the relationship between individual anarchists, anarchist philosophy, and violence 
was complicated. As Martin Miller argues, the currents of anarchism and terrorism 
overlapped, “fusing at a historical moment, then separating.”20 Peter Kropotkin, the most 
prominent anarchist thinker of the early twentieth century, defined anarchism for the tenth 
edition of the Encyclopedia Britannica [1910] as “the name given to a principle or theory of life 
and conduct under which society is conceived without government – harmony in such a 
society being obtained, not by submission to law, or by obedience to any authority, but by 
free agreements concluded between the various groups… freely constituted for the sake of 
production and consumption.” To the general public, Kropotkin begrudgingly 
acknowledged, violence may have been “the substance of anarchism,” but supporters saw 
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violence as a reaction to state “repression.”21 While anarchists such as Pierre-Joseph 
Proudhon, Mikhail Bakunin, or Kropotkin himself, saw utility in violence—at least at 
different times during their lives—they did not call for the bombings and assassinations that 
came to define anarchist terrorism.22 At their core, however, anarchist philosophers 
envisioned a society fundamentally different from what existed and they viewed modern 
society and the power of the state as the root of all social ills. Therefore, while it is indeed 
possible to see anarchist theory as not inherently violent, there was—and is—an 
irreconcilable tension at its heart.23  
 The methods some anarchists developed for using violence as a tool for socio-
political change emerged out of the upheavals of the nineteenth century. During the Age of 
Revolutions, the diffusion of ideas regarding individual and collective freedoms as well as 
notions of popular sovereignty helped shatter the Ancien Régime’s monopoly on violence. The 
régime de la terreur, as Gus Martin writes, “was an instrument of revolutionary justice, so that 
terrorism was considered a positive medium used by the defenders of order and liberty… 
acceptable and necessary to consolidate power and protect liberties won.”24 Anarchists 
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believed they continued this tradition. Alexis de Tocqueville was the first to describe the rise 
of the “professional revolutionary” as a new type of individual whose sole aim was changing 
the face of society.25 Many mid-century liberals held failed revolutionaries like Guiseppe 
Mazzini, Lajos Kossuth, or Guiseppe Garibaldi in high regard despite their occasional 
espousal of the same techniques of violence later made infamous by anarchists.26 As Barton 
Ingraham writes, the political offender “was seen as motivated by moral considerations: 
Fighting for liberal democracy against autocratic and repressive regimes, fighting for the 
cause of nationalism or self-determination… but never acting from personal considerations 
of greed or lust for power.”27 
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Anarchists drew lessons from the experiences of political radicals during the mid-
nineteenth century. Heinzen, in the 1840s, framed terrorism as a necessary response to state-
sponsored violence aimed at suppressing revolutions and inspiring fear in those who would 
try to upset the existing order. In 1857, the Italian revolutionary Carlo Pisacane, Duke of San 
Giovanni, first formulated the idea that would evolve into the anarchist strategy of 
“propaganda by deed.” In his “Political Testament,” Pisacane wrote, “Ideas spring from 
deeds and not the other way around.” Violence, according to this logic, served two 
interrelated functions: it drew attention to a cause and, as individuals became more 
informed, the masses would rally to that cause.28 Yet time and again, the “masses” failed to 
rise to the challenge. In the 1860s and 1870s, governments in Spain, France, and Italy 
successfully crushed mass movements inspired in part by Bakunin. Of these, the most 
dramatic failure was the Paris Commune in 1871. Amid the turmoil caused by the Franco-
Prussian War, the collapse of the Second French Empire, and the start of the Third 
Republic, radicals including anarchists occupied Paris from March until May, when it was 
brutally suppressed by the French army. Ulrich Linse, echoing revolutionaries from Heinzen 
to Kropotkin, argues that state repression and the repeated failure of the mass insurrection 
necessitated a turn toward asymmetrical violence.29 The failure of the French population to 
rise up in support of the Commune and the inability of workers manning barricades to turn 
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back the French army highlighted the weakness of the revolutionaries’ position compared to 
the forces of the state. Indeed, it is not surprising to find that ardent proponents of 
propaganda by deed such as Errico Malatesta and Carlo Cafiero had first-hand experiences 
with the difficulties of fomenting mass insurrection.30 In December 1878 during the Berne 
Congress of the Anti-Authoritarian International, the two Italian anarchists declared, 
“insurrectionary deed, designed to promote the principles of socialism by acts, is the most 
effective means of propaganda… and attracts the living forces of humanity in the struggle 
that upholds the International.”31 Mere months after the assassination of Tsar Alexander II, 
an international congress of anarchists met in London and officially endorsed propaganda by 
deed and word of this spread quickly.32 In 1883, during a national convention in Pittsburgh, 
Johann Most joined with Albert Parsons and August Spies, two of the most prominent 
anarchists in the United States, to draft a statement for their movement. The Pittsburgh 
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Manifesto began with an excerpt from the American Declaration of Independence. After 
condemning the brutality of the bourgeoisie of all countries—“in America as well as in 
Europe”—the authors then declared, “It becomes, therefore, self-evident that the struggle of 
the proletariat with the bourgeoisie must have a violent revolutionary character.”33 
Anarchist terrorism in the last two decades of the nineteenth century fell into two 
broad categories. First, and most common, were attacks on representative social institutions. 
In September 1883 two German anarchists, working under the direction of August 
Reinsdorf attempted to kill Kaiser Wilhelm I, Otto von Bismarck, and a large number of 
German social elites by detonating a bomb at the inauguration of the Niederwald 
Monument, which commemorated the founding of the German Empire.34 In Paris, in 1892, 
the anarchist François-Claudius Ravachol committed a string of bombings, robberies and 
murders, which he later claimed were inspired by the punishment of workers for their role in 
a May Day demonstration in 1891. While some contemporaries were dubious about his 
connections to anarchism, Ravachol’s actions left such an impression that his name was 
																																																								
33 Timothy Messer-Kruse, The Haymarket Conspiracy: Transatlantic Anarchist Networks (Urbana: 
University of Illinois Press, 2012), 181. 
34 The bomb failed because the two tasked with carrying out the plot decided to save money 
and did not buy a waterproof fuse, which then failed to ignite after heavy rain. They then 
detonated the explosives outside of a banquet hall in Rüdesheim instead. Reinsdorf was 
arrested in 1895, charged with high treason and executed. When the State’s Attorney asked if 
he had in mind the death of any particular person in his planned attentat, Reinsdorf replied: 
“I didn’t know whether or not the king of Saxony would be there, and it was all one to me. I 
knew merely that a great many princes would be gathered together, and it was a matter of 
indifference to me which of them should be struck down. I’m done now. I do not care to say 
anything more.” After his death, Most published a pamphlet in New York dedicated to 
Reinsdorf’s life and actions, “August Reinsdorf and the Propaganda by Deed.” Folder 02: 
“Rocker, Rudolph --- ‘Johann Most,’ Typescript, pp 101-250,” p. 205. Paul Avrich 
Collection, Series I, Box 25: Rocker, Rudolph to Rudome, Jacques and Helen. Rare Books 
and Manuscripts Reading Room, Library of Congress, Washington DC. 
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given to a verb, ravacholiser, meaning to blow up.35 In Spain in the 1890s, Barcelona was the 
site of a series of violent acts and harsh reprisals, a brutal cycle of protest, repression, and 
revenge. A bombing at the Barcelona opera in 1893 killed thirty people and, in June 1896, 
another bombing killed numerous women and children during a Corpus Christi procession. 
In 1886, in the United States, mass strikes for an eight-hour workday climaxed in a series of 
violent confrontations in Chicago. On May 4, as police tried to break up a demonstration in 
Haymarket Square, someone threw an explosive into a group of police officers and in the 
subsequent explosion and confused gunfire, several individuals died.36  
The second category of violence included assassinations of heads of state and 
prominent public figures—often the living embodiment of state authority—as well as attacks 
motivated by revenge for actions the state took against fellow anarchists. In the last two 
decades of the nineteenth century, there was a demonstrable shift in the frequency and 
success rate of assassinations that helped fuel the contemporary belief that these acts of 
violence were part of a sustained political crisis rather than a series of traumatic, individual 
occurrences. For this purpose, Franklin Ford’s definition of assassination is appropriate: 
“Assassination is the intentional killing of a specified victim or group of victims, perpetrated 
for reasons related to his (her, their) public prominence and undertaken with a political 
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purpose in view.”37 According to this definition, 76 attempts—successful and 
unsuccessful—would be a conservative estimate on the attempts on heads of state or similar 
public figures between 1800 and 1900.38 For this period then, there was at least one such 
attempt every sixteen months, on average; they occurred on five of the seven continents, 
against leaders of democracies and autocracies alike, and 36 of the attempts were repeat 
attacks on individual leaders. 
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Upon first glance, it would appear that the decade between 1870 and 1880 
undermines any argument for the distinctiveness of the 1890s, as the total number of 
attempts was higher. Yet, a closer look at the numbers reveals that the attempts of the earlier 
decade are skewed upward by multiple failed attempts on the life of one individual, Tsar 
Alexander II. Moreover, the key indicator, successful assassinations, is nearly doubled in the 
later decade. The true distinctiveness of the 1890s lies not in the number and frequency of 
assassinations alone but in correlation with the rate of successes. During the 20-year period 
between 1881 and 1901, the rates of success jump: 73 percent in Europe and 100 percent in 
the United States.39 “The record is appalling,” said U.S. Circuit Judge LeBaron Bradford Colt 
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in an address to the New Hampshire Bar Association in 1902, “In thirty-seven years three 
Presidents of the United States have been Assassinated, an average of one every twelve years. 
The history of Europe for a thousand years furnishes no parallel. To find one we must go 
back to the military usurpers of ancient Rome.”40 
The shock expressed by Judge Colt emphasizes just how alarmed Americans were 
about what this wave of violence could imply about society. After all, though they were 
dramatic incidents, assassinations were not a new or terribly unusual phenomenon, 
historically.41 Alexander II had survived five previous attempts while U.S. President James 
Garfield—assassinated less than six months later—was the third American president 
targeted by an assassin.42 Alexander II’s death prompted an outpouring of sympathy toward 
the Russian government because Americans associated the Tsar with President Lincoln—the 
Tsar Liberator and the Great Emancipator, each murdered by assassins. Amidst the public 
grief surrounding Garfield’s struggle for life—he was shot on July 2 and died on September 
19—was a crisis of confidence as people wondered what a second successful attack on an 
American president could mean about the country’s political system.  
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Anarchist violence intensified in the 1890s, a period that became known as the 
“Decade of Regicide.” In June 1894, the Italian anarchist Sante Caserio assassinated French 
President Sadi Carnot after the latter gave a speech in Lyons. Caserio, who denied having 
any accomplices, was inspired by Carnot’s refusal to pardon the anarchist Auguste Vaillant, 
who threw a bomb in the French Chamber of Deputies in December 1893 and was 
subsequently executed in February 1894.43 Three years later, in August 1897, the Italian 
anarchist Michele Angiolillo shot the six-time Spanish Prime Minister, Antonio Cánovas del 
Castillo, at a thermal bath resort in northern Spain. Angiolillo, who also denied having any 
accomplices, had traveled to Spain via London and Paris under a false identity. He was 
motivated by Cánovas del Castillo’s role in ordering the arrest, detention, and torture of 
political radicals at the Montjuïch fortress outside Barcelona.44 Thirteen months later, in 
September 1898, the French-born Italian anarchist Luigi Lucheni stabbed Empress Elisabeth 
of Austria as she was traveling to a steam ship on the shores of Lake Geneva, Switzerland. 
Lucheni had initially wanted to kill the Duke of Orléans, the pretender to the French throne, 
who had already left Geneva for the canton of Valais. “I am an anarchist by conviction,” 
Lucheni later declared. “I came to Geneva to kill a sovereign, with the object of giving an 
example to those who suffer and those who do nothing to improve their social position; it 
did not matter to me who the sovereign was whom I should kill…. It was not a woman I 
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struck, but an Empress; it was a crown that I had in view.”45 Less than two years later, in July 
1900, the Italian anarchist Gaetano Bresci traveled from the United States and assassinated 
King Umberto I in Monza, Italy. Bresci, who worked as a silk weaver in Paterson, New 
Jersey, shot Umberto as an act of revenge for the king awarding General Fiorenzo Bava-
Beccaris the medal of Great Official of Savoy Military Order for the general’s role in brutally 
suppressing a series of bread riots in Milan in 1898.46 Finally, fourteen months later, the 
American-born anarchist Leon Czolgosz shot U.S. President William McKinley at the Pan 
American Exposition in Buffalo, New York.  
To contemporary observers, the similarities made it seem like each of these tragic 
events were part of a larger anarchist attack on the social order, even if there was no “deep-
seated international movement among the anarchists.”47 First, with the exception of 
Czolgosz, each assassin crossed international borders to execute their attacks. Anarchists 
rejected the authority of the state and were often hounded from state to state due to 
repressive measures passed by authorities. Relatedly, while each of the anarchist assassins 
mentioned went to great pains to deny that they acted as part of a larger conspiracy, 
anarchists often explicitly linked their acts to acts committed elsewhere.48 Èmile Henry who, 
like Caserio, committed a series of anarchist outrages in retaliation for Vaillant’s execution, 
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explicitly stated this at his trial. “You have hung men in Chicago, cut off their heads in 
Germany, strangled them in Jerez, shot them in Barcelona, guillotined them in Montbrison 
and Paris,” he declared. “But what you will never destroy is anarchism. Its roots are too 
deep: it is born at the heart of a corrupt society which is falling to pieces; it is a violent 
reaction against the established order.”49 By referencing violent actions elsewhere as 
justification for their own action, anarchists fed into the notion that their actions were a 
directed reaction to state-driven violence.  
Press reports, official actions, and rumored undercover operatives also nourished 
notions of widespread conspiracies. The idea of a shadowy conspiracy where anarchists 
chose lots to assassinate various public figures was a common element in newspaper 
reports.50 The press reported, for example, that New York City police prepared a report 
alleging that Bresci volunteered his services to assassinate Umberto I four months prior to 
his action during a meeting, presided over by Malatesta. The published account went on to 
say that in other meetings in cities around the United States, Malatesta preached murder and 
laid plans for not only the assassination of the King of Italy but the heads of other foreign 
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governments as well.51 Press reports and public authorities also blamed anarchists for 
inspiring violence they knew nothing about or may not have supported.52 Johann Most was 
jailed in England for Freiheit’s vocal approval of the Tsar’s assassination in 1881—an act not 
committed by anarchists—and for an article published in the wake of Cavendish’s 
assassination by Irish nationalists—an action that, as an anarchist, he would not have 
approved. He, as well as Emma Goldman, were subsequently jailed in the United States in 
the wake of Czolgosz’s attack on William McKinley. Anarchists also suspected—and 
scholars have subsequently demonstrated—that authorities in the United States as well as 
across Europe used undercover agents and agents provocateurs to uncover and, in some 
notorious cases, instigate anarchist conspiracies.53 It is hardly surprising then that, when set 
against the backdrop of a very real spike in the frequency and rate of success of 
assassinations, the American public was ready to accept that there was a broad, directed 
anarchist conspiracy against the social order driving this violence.   		 
Anarchists too had a role—sometimes deliberate, sometimes unintended—in 
perpetuating the idea that these attacks were all part of a larger assault on the social order. 
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Although they would come to disavow violence later in their lives, Malatesta, Kropotkin, and 
other prominent anarchist theoreticians initially called for propaganda by deed as a way of 
instigating a wider rebellion. Emma Goldman, speaking in December 1900 said that at a 
recent conference in Paris anarchists decided, “not to kill any more kings or crowned heads.” 
“The killing of King Humbert,” she went on, “was not done through the instigation of 
anarchists as a body… We do not justify the killing and do not look upon it as an act to be 
applauded.”54 Even in denying it though, Goldman’s statement reminded an anxious public 
of previous anarchist endorsements of this kind of violence. Her denial that this specific 
attack was ordered by some nebulous anarchist “body” did nothing to diminish—and 
possibly strengthened—popular fear and suspicion that such a body did exist and had in the 
past, or would in the future, order such attacks. Second, while transnational anarchist 
networks were very real, individual anarchists often emphasized their connections to others 
as a way of magnifying their reach and influence. For example, while Bresci lived and worked 
in Paterson, he was active in the leading anarchist organization in the city, the “Right of 
Existence Group” [Gruppo diritto di esistenza]. As such, he was acquainted with some of its 
most prominent figures: Malatesta and another Italian proponent of propaganda by deed, 
Giuseppe Ciancabilla. These connections featured prominently in the hysterical newspaper 
reporting that covered Umberto’s assassination and rumors of anarchist conspiracies. Finally, 
as Derry Novak recognizes, while there were plenty of examples of anarchists making—
typically vague—calls for action, they most often found themselves having to defend violent 
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acts after they had occurred.55 Goldman, for example, argued that prior suspicions that Leon 
Czolgosz was a police spy should be put aside after McKinley’s assassination and an 
infamous falling out between her and Johann Most depended, in part, on Most criticizing 
Alexander Berkman’s attempted assassination of the industrialist Henry Clay Frick.56  
There is a mistaken tendency to frame anarchism during the last two decades of the 
nineteenth century as existing on two different planes.57 On one, the intellectual giants of the 
movement reside in a world dominated by their philosophical writings about the struggles of 
social organization or the dangers of property ownership. Here, the focus is on Kropotkin’s 
life in the London suburbs where he rubbed shoulders socially and intellectually with 
prominent figures such as William Morris and George Bernard Shaw. This existence was a 
far cry from his early years during which time he was imprisoned in St. Petersburg’s Peter 
																																																								
55 Derry Novak, “Anarchism and Individual Terrorism,” The Canadian Journal of Economics and 
Political Science 20, no. 2 (May 1954): 176-82. Marie Fleming reiterates the complexities of this 
dynamic. See Fleming, “Propaganda by the Deed: Terrorism and Anarchist Theory in Late 
Nineteenth-Century Europe,” 15-26. 
56 Berkman’s action was inspired by the Homestead Strike and the subsequent violence in 
July 1892. It was coincidental that his assassination attempt took place merely two weeks 
after Ravachol was executed in Paris for his own acts of terror. For a discussion of 
Berkman’s attack, see Paul Avrich and Karen Avrich, Sasha and Emma: The Anarchst Odyssey of 
Alexander Berkman and Emma Goldman (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2012), 57-71. 
57 E.L. Godkin distinguished between “the militant or homicidal anarchists” and the “dreamy 
persuasive anarchists.” Subsequent writers would do the same. E.L. Godkin, “The execution 
of the Chicago anarchists,” The Nation, November 10, 1887: 366; “Anarchists: Their 
Methods and Organization,” New Review, January 1894: 1; “W. Gladden, “The Philosophy of 
Anarchism,” Outlook Magazine, October 19, 1901: 449. Scholars have continued to do this as 
well. See, for example, Joll, The Anarchists, 110-11; Kassel, “Terrorism and the International 
Anarchist Movement of the Late Nineteenth and Early Twentieth Centuries.” By contrast, 
Nathaniel Hong argues that in doing so, contemporaries perpetuated “a genuine distortion 




and Paul Fortress or exiled in Siberia.58 On the other plane resides those bedeviled 
psychopaths and demonic mad dogs who brooded and hatched their nefarious plots in 
secret with a small number of like-minded individuals or sometimes with nothing more than 
the voices in their heads. This dichotomy is problematic on two levels. First, it minimizes the 
active role that anarchists such as Bakunin, Malatesta, and Berkman had as both intellectual 
theorists of anarchism and active practitioners of violence. More importantly, however, it 
denies that the cranks had legitimate gripes. It is likely that Leon Czolgosz was mentally ill.59 
It is also true that his disadvantaged position—which mirrored the conditions of millions 
struggling to adapt to the socio-economic realities of the late-nineteenth century—was a 
legitimate source of anger at the state of society. A contemporary sociologist quoted the 
German economist Adolph Wagner arguing that the Social Question of the day revolved 
around “the consciousness of a contradiction between economic development and the social 
ideal of liberty and equality.”60 Revolutionary violence in the mid-nineteenth century not only 
failed to achieve its political objectives, but it failed to rectify the ills caused by economic and 
social dislocation and prompted some to turn to more drastic means. 
It was this idea, that the social inequality of the times was the driving force behind 
the increasing prevalence of assassination, which imparted a sense of urgency to discussions 
of the anarchist threat. Writing in the North American Review, F.L. Oswald drew parallels 
between ancient Rome and modern Italy. “The suggestive fact that the assassins were natives 
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of the country where the contrasts of wealth and poverty have reached their most cruel 
extreme” was central to Oswald’s argument. “Forests, fun and freedom have now vanished 
together. Italy has become a treadmill,” he argued, “where hundreds of thousands can by 
incessant labor just earn enough to toil another day.” The Colorado Springs Gazette published 
an article, entitled “Italy the Home of Assassins,” in which the author not only suggested 
that high incidents of violent crime in Italy nurtured the assassins but that Italian courts 
failed to enforce strict enough penalties for these crimes.61 Another article, in the Idaho Daily 
Statesman, included an interview with a leading member of the Italian community who 
attributed the threat of Italian assassins to social circumstances as well as ethnic stereotypes. 
“In the first place, the Italian laborer is the poorest in the world,” he argued, and the cries of 
the family “drive him to the wrathful despair which welcomes crimes against the social order 
responsible in his eyes for his poverty.”62 Anarchist justifications, lamented the journalist 
Francis Nichols after the 1898 assassination of King Umberto I of Italy, “made positive 
converts of doubting Italians, and attracted the attention of hundreds who believed that the 
‘times are out of joint’ but had heretofore seen no cure in Anarchy.”63	
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AMERICAN RESPONSES TO ANARCHIST TERRORISM: 
 Recall the question at the outset of this chapter that asked why, if fear of anarchist 
terrorism was so pervasive, did societal protections develop in such an uneven fashion. An 
obvious possible answer is that while individual attacks were sensationalized, the actual fear 
people felt was not as profound as it seemed. Indeed, leaving aside Russia, the number of 
actual victims of anarchist terror was quite small.64 Richard Jensen estimates the number of 
victims of anarchist terror was approximately 150 killed and over 460 injured between 1880 
and 1914—with roughly half of each of those figures coming in the decade of the 1890s. 
While those numbers pale in comparison to modern acts of terrorism, such violence was 
unprecedented in the late nineteenth century.65 Newspapers informed an ever-growing 
audience of each new offense and the fact that many of the most infamous victims were of 
great social or political significance magnified the horror. Even though popular suspicion 
that a shadowy anarchist cabal directed this violence was false, such suspicions were not 
unreasonable. As the contemporary historian Richard Ely lamented, anarchy was “a social 
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disease of a malignant type” and “the most dangerous theory which civilization has ever had 
to encounter.”66 Newspaper reports of anarchist movements, police and government 
investigations, and rumored conspiracies all gave an ominous weight to what people could 
readily perceive: anarchist violence was unprecedented in its intensity and many perpetrators 
explicitly referenced other attacks as inspiring their own.    
 This necessarily raises two interrelated questions about American attitudes 
concerning the security threat posed by anarchist terrorism in the last two decades of the 
nineteenth century. First, it begs the question how did American views of anarchism evolve? 
Scholars traditionally view popular opinion about anarchists as static. Nathaniel Hong, for 
example, argues that they were “consistent:” anarchists were foreign, often inhuman, and 
belonged to a “frightening world of wanton criminality and menacing insanity.”67 Not only 
did Americans have a more nuanced and fluid view of anarchists than has been appreciated, 
but a static view fails to explain why proposals to address the dangers of anarchism did not 
receive uniform support over time. The second question asks if Americans believed 
anarchists’ punishments fit their crimes? “Punishment,” in this sense pertains both to the 
actual legal punishments individual anarchists received as well as to more general efforts to 
inhibit their actions. The challenge then is to understand how these sentiments about 
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anarchists and the methods to suppress them shaped the contours of the public debate over 
the dangers of anarchism.  
 In the early 1880s as Americans first became aware of an anarchist threat to the 
social order, most viewed it as one of many social ills. In the immediate aftermath of James 
Garfield’s assassination, former president Ulysses S Grant jumped the gun in assigning 
blame for the act and declared, “If the shooting were the work of Nihilism, the would-be 
assassin and all his followers should be stamped out, and no quarter shown them or their 
opinions.” The article’s author helpfully clarified that Grant “did not mean merely the special 
social and political excrescence [Nihilism]… but he evidently meant to include under the 
term, all the drastic and revolutionary isms that aim at the destruction of all modern 
governments.”68 That same year, a contributor to the New York Herald identified three suitors 
for the hand of the Republic. First was the “all-grasping monster,” business monopolies. 
Next was that which “owns nothing but a knife for universal cutthroatery and a nitro-
glycerine bomb for universal explosion” and killed both the Tsar of Russia and Abraham 
Lincoln, Nihilism. Third, the “the monster of monsters” was infidelity, which posed such a 
moral threat that it “makes the difference… between American civilization and Bornesian 
cannibalism.”69 Zion’s Herald, the venerable Methodist weekly magazine published in Boston, 
Massachusetts, noted in 1882 that “the comparatively small number of Nihilists, Socialists 
and the like who seek security among us should not be made the occasion of any undue 
alarm.” More dangerous, in the magazine’s view, was the Roman Catholic Church, which 
“was dangerous to our educational interests,” and whose adherents hoped to gain “evil 
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results in political matters.”70 In 1883, during what the Boston Daily Globe dubbed “The War 
on Monarchs,” the author noted the advances made by Nihilism, Socialism, and Anarchism 
around the world.71 That same year the San Francisco Chronicle identified an interviewee as 
both a “nihilist and one of the head leaders of the Irish dynamite party.”72   
 These appraisals of anarchism reveal certain themes that run through the early 
popular discourse. First and foremost, there was a widespread acknowledgement that 
anarchists represented a violent threat to the existing social order. Indeed leaping to the 
conclusion that a nihilist may have been involved upon hearing of Garfield’s assassination—
a rumor that occurs repeatedly over the two decades under consideration—demonstrates 
just how aware Americans were of this fairly new political movement. Related to this, 
implicating anarchists in Lincoln’s assassination was emblematic of the kinds of exaggerated 
claims that would follow anarchists. Americans were not just aware of anarchists, but they 
projected them as the cause of a multitude of unrelated traumatic events. By extension, 
anarchism as a philosophy of political and social order is instead framed as solely a doctrine 
of violence. Consequentially, most sources use anarchist, nihilist and even socialist or 
communist as interchangeable, revealing fundamental confusion over—and no interest in 
discovering—the very significant differences and tensions between adherents of these 
various radical philosophies.73 Overwhelmingly however, these sources conveyed that while 
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Americans were aware of the potential danger anarchists could pose, they got lost in the 
shuffle. Most Americans projected an air of cautious hopefulness, believing as Julius Seelye 
did, “that political problems are not likely to be solved by force and fear alone.” Instead, 
there was an overriding faith that “the attempted application of anarchical theories, 
therefore, to the civilized world will find itself hindered quite as much by a popular instinct 
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This view of seeing anarchists as indistinct from other social ills was surprisingly 
durable. Consider Figures 1.2 and 1.3. The artist Charles Taylor created the lithograph, 
entitled “Our statue of Liberty—she can stand it,” in 1886 for the satirical magazine, Puck 
[Figure 1.2].75 In it, the Statue of Liberty is beset by all manner of “-isms” such as socialism, 
anarchism, communism, but also by “boycott” and “intolerance” in an image that evokes 
Gulliver’s encounters with the Lilliputians in Jonathan Swift’s Gulliver’s Travels. 1886 was 
notable for both the formal dedication of the Statue of Liberty—which took place the day 
after Taylor’s article appeared in print—and for the Haymarket bombing and subsequent 
trial of eight anarchists that May. Even in a year that saw one of the few anarchist outrages in 
the United States—and a seminal act of labor-related violence—anarchists were still just one 
of the many “-isms” that Americans worried about. Figure 1.3 appeared in print five years 
later in Puck’s print rival, Judge Magazine. “Where the blame lies,” the cartoon by Grant 
Hamilton, depicts a man holding a top hat and gesturing toward a racialized depiction of a 
horde of immigrants, including German socialists, Russian anarchists, Italian brigands, Irish 
paupers and more. In the caption, the man complains to Uncle Sam, “If Immigration was 
properly restricted you would no longer be troubled with Anarchy, Socialism, the Mafia, and 
such kindred evils!”76 Here again, anarchists appear alongside other political radicals, but also 
paupers and other undesirables, all embedded in a highly racialized discourse that 
preoccupied many Americans at the time—and since. 
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 Anarchist violence first erupted in the United States in Chicago in 1886.77 On May 1, 
at the instigation of the Federation of Organized Trades and Labor Unions—forerunner to 
the American Federation of Labor—thousands of workers across the United States went on 
a general strike in support of the eight-hour workday. Two days later, workers on strike 
outside the McCormick Harvesting Machine Company plant got into a violent confrontation 
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with strikebreakers and police and the altercation left two workers dead. Local anarchists 
organized a protest rally for May 4 at Haymarket Square. Around 10:30 in the evening, as the 
anarchist Samuel Fielden ended a speech, local police attempted to disperse the rally. At that 
point, an unknown assailant threw a bomb at the line of police officers and, in the immediate 
aftermath of the explosion, an exchange of gunfire erupted between police and 
demonstrators.78 Ultimately, seven police officers died from injuries stemming from the 
bombing and an unknown number of demonstrators also suffered injuries. In a widely 
publicized trial that lasted six weeks, prosecutors charged eight prominent anarchists—
Albert Parsons, August Spies, Adolph Fischer, George Engel, Louis Lingg, Samuel Fielden, 
Michael Schwab, and Oscar Neebe—with being accessories before the fact to the murder of 
Mathias J. Degan, the first officer killed by the bomb. Though prosecutors failed to identify 
who threw the bomb, they argued that since the defendants had not actively discouraged it, 
they were equally responsible as co-conspirators.79 A jury found all eight guilty and, after 
their appeals were rejected, Parsons, Spies, Fischer, and Engel were executed by hanging on 
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November 11, 1887. Lingg committed suicide the night before the scheduled execution, 
while Fielden and Schwab had their sentences commuted to life in prison and Neebe was 
sentenced to fifteen years. Spies, as he was led to the gallows famously shouted, “The time 
will come when our silence will be more powerful than the voices you strangle today.”80 
 In important ways, the Haymarket bombing had far more to do with the history of 
labor strife in the United States than it did with the threat anarchism posed to American 
security. James Green argues that contemporaries saw Haymarket as one of the “domestic 
battlefields in a growing class war.”81 Many workers suspected that the bombing was the act 
of Pinkerton agents or others trying to discredit the labor movement in the United States.82 
Thure de Thulstrup’s famous illustration, “The Anarchist Riot in Chicago,” depicts a clash 
between workers and the police, but none of the imagery was uniquely “anarchist” as was 
the norm in other visual representations of anarchist crimes [See Figure 4].83 As such, 
Haymarket fits into the narrative history of labor violence in the United States along with the 
railroad strike of 1877, the Homestead Strike of 1892, and the Pullman Strike of 1894, 
among others. As Ryan Johnson argues, “Anarchism was seen as an acute instance of the 
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imperfect qualities building within the burgeoning nation, not the source of the nation’s 
undoing.”84 
	
Figure	1.4:	“The Anarchist Riot in Chicago” 
 At the same time, however, the trial of Spies, Parsons, and their co-defendants was 
inextricably tied into fears of anarchist terrorism and propaganda by deed. Henry David, in 
his foundational study of the Haymarket bombing, notes that it fixed in the popular 
imagination the stereotypical image of the anarchist as “a ragged, unwashed, long-haired, 
wild-eyed fiend, armed with a smoking revolver and a bomb—to say nothing of the dagger 
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he sometimes carried between his teeth.”85 A majority of the exhibits the prosecutors 
introduced during the trial were excerpts from speeches and articles that contained 
exhortations to violence published in the Arbeiter Zeitung, the German-language radical 
newspaper edited by Spies, and The Alarm, the prominent English-language anarchist 
periodical edited by Parsons.86 Even Johann Most’s influence was felt at the trial: a copy of 
his infamous pamphlet was taken in one of the police raids of Spies’ office and was 
introduced as evidence in support of the idea that the accused were acquainted with, and 
advocated the use of, bombs.87 Most, though not in Chicago at the time, was arrested a few 
days after the bombing because a week before the Haymarket affair he gave a speech in New 
York during which he grabbed a musket and advised his audience to buy guns and “take 
what belonged to them.”88 Two days after the bombing, the New York Times proclaimed, 
“The villainous teachings of the Anarchists bore bloody fruit in Chicago tonight and before 
daylight at least a dozen stalwart men will have laid down their lives as a tribute to the 
doctrine of Herr Johann Most.”89 During the trial newspapers across the nation excoriated 
the defendants as “arch counselors of riot, pillage, incendiarism and murder,” “bloody 
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monsters,” and “fiends.”90 In the courtroom, prosecutor George Ingham made clear in his 
closing argument that anarchism itself was on trial. Responsibility for officer Degan’s death 
was not “the real issue” the jury would decide upon. “The bomb,” Ingham argued, “was 
aimed at the law of the State of Illinois, and so it happens… the law of this State attempts to 
vindicate itself, and so it is that the great question which you are to answer… is whether the 
law of the State of Illinois is strong enough to protect itself, or whether it must be trampled 
to the ground at the dictate of half a dozen men, only one of whom was born on our 
shores.” Bulldozing through the central weakness of the prosecution’s case—that the 
identity of the bomb-thrower was a mystery—Ingham argued that the defendants were party 
to a conspiracy of “300 or 400 men” and as prominent anarchists, they should be “tried for 
the highest crime.”91   
 From Haymarket onward, contemporary views of anarchism grew beyond the 
attitudes discussed earlier. As Margaret Marsh writes, Americans increasingly “viewed 
anarchists as the harbingers of chaos.”92 While anarchism remained a part of the general 
labor tumult of the period, it was increasingly in the foreground, rather than being relegated 
to a supporting role. The theme that anarchism was foreign—through the emphasis on 
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“Herr” Most or identifying all but one of the anarchists on trial as not a native-born 
American—became increasingly prominent. So too did language that dehumanized 
anarchists as “bloody monsters.” Contemporaries also introduced a subtle note of religious 
iconography: anarchist violence was the “bloody fruit.” This subtext would become more 
obvious as anarchists increasingly became anthropomorphized snakes, emphasizing they 
were immoral as well as inhuman.93  
As Haymarket receded in the popular memory, replaced by other unsettling acts of 
anarchist violence, these negative representations proliferated and intensified. 
Contemporaries derided anarchism as “a movement of ignorance, counseled by desperados” 
rather than a socio-political philosophy. Anarchists were “foreign savages” and “bloodthirsty 
ruffians” whose “evil is one that will grow if it is not rooted out now.”94 In the months after 
the bombing of the French Chamber of Deputies in 1893, The Spectator declared that 
anarchists “declared war on the human race.”95 In August 1897, the month of Cánovas’ 
assassination, the magazine doubled down and accused anarchists of engaging in “a great 
conspiracy against society” and conducting “a policy of assassination.”96 By the time Leon 
Czolgosz shot McKinley in 1901, the attitude of the Haymarket prosecutors had become the 
norm. “It is anarchy,” Murat Halstead declared, “that is the foe of freedom, that is the 
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everlasting enemy of free government.”97 In 1902, James Beck quoted other writers who 
proclaimed that anarchism was a “hydra-headed monster of murderous malevolence… a 
venomous snake…” that was “in covenant with hell.”98 Public portrayals of anarchism 
became darker and more threatening as the violence associated with anarchists increased in 
frequency and provoked feelings of dismay.  
At the same time, however, many Americans recoiled at calls to meet anarchist 
violence with more violence and this set an outer boundary to what could be considered an 
acceptable response to the horrors Americans observed. Very often, this took the form of 
public expressions of faith in the law. Three days after the Haymarket bombing, the Chicago 
Times declared, “nothing will so effectually wipe out the stain… as a speedy trial of the 
instigators.” “These deplorable occurrences,” the St. Paul Pioneer Press cautioned, “warn the 
law-abiding majority to purify and strengthen the city government… to restrain lawlessness 
and punish crime with a strong hand, and to win for the legally constituted authorities the 
wholesome respect of the disreputable class.” “A Chicago jury,” the New York Commercial 
Advertiser confidently declared, “will doubtless give further expression to the public 
sentiment when the arrested leaders of the anarchists are put upon their trial for murder.”99 
Generations of scholars successfully framed the trial of Parsons, Spies, and their associates 
as “a misguided act of judicial murder” where “the visceral feelings of fear and anger 
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surrounding the trial ruled out anything but the pretense of justice.”100 Yet, the trial record 
revealed a more complex narrative. Empaneling the jury for the Haymarket trial took nearly 
half of the trial—21 days out of 54—and the presiding judge, prosecutors, and defense 
attorneys evaluated nearly 1000 men. That is not a show trial. Defense attorneys exhausted 
their prerogative and disqualified 160 jurors but Judge Gary also dismissed 589 more and 
denied less than ten percent of the defense team’s objections to jurors. While, as would be 
the case with nearly any infamous trial, it was difficult to find jurors who had not formed an 
opinion of the case, Illinois law only forbade those who had a “decided,” “positive,” or 
“fixed” opinion.101 This faith in the law’s ability to adequately punish violent anarchists 
continued through the turn of the twentieth century. The Minneapolis Tribune argued after 
McKinley’s assassination, “law is the opposite of anarchy” and, as a consequence, the most 
effective way to combat it.102 The Irish-American observed that the trial of Czolgosz, “though 
brief, was dignified, [and] observed all of the orderly forms of law demanded by justice.”103 
Successful prosecution leading to guilty verdicts for anarchists accused of violent acts—from 
the Haymarket anarchists, to Alexander Berkman, and Leon Czolgosz—may have been 
forgone conclusions, but as far as many Americans were concerned, their trials were held in 
accordance with popular attitudes about justice and the law.  
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Where such attitudes proved more complicated was when some proposed punishing 
anarchists for their writings or speeches alone. The idea that freedom of speech was not a 
license to say anything emerged as a response to terrorism in the early 1880s and was a 
prominent feature of the public and governmental debates throughout the period under 
consideration. Elihu Root, who would go on to serve as Theodore Roosevelt’s Secretary of 
State, expressed this argument while serving as the United States Attorney for the Southern 
District of New York. Following a series of dynamite attacks in London, Root gave a speech 
in New York where he declared, “Men may conspire here to commit wholesale assassination 
upon English soil, and it is no legal offense… The laws ought to be changed… This people 
has been foremost among the nations of the earth [sic.] in securing to every man liberty of 
speech and liberty of action; it should not be the last to punish those whose liberty of word 
and act degenerates into infamous crime.”104 Proponents of this position would justify 
themselves by arguing that distinguishing liberty from license was “the clear duty of the 
nation” and a “common sense” approach to securing the nation’s safety.105 Security, for 
those who adopted this position, was more important than liberty because without the 
former, there would be no opportunity to have the latter. “This is no time for sentimental 
concern about ‘liberty’,” Gunton’s Magazine declared in October 1901, “for those who want 
only the liberty to destroy.”106 Pushing the envelope further, Senator Julius C. Burrows 
published an article in the North American Review, where he lamented the failure to pass 
legislation that would have inhibited the ability of anarchists to spread their message. The 
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danger, to Burrows, was not that such restrictions could go too far but that “we shall not be 
able to go far enough because of our solicitous regard for the fundamental principles of 
popular government. Already we hear a cry that we must be careful, lest, in attempting to 
deal with the anarchists by drastic measures, we deal a blow at the foundations of our 
republican institutions, free speech and liberty of the press.”107 
A good many Americans were uneasy with where and how such a line could be 
drawn, however. Even while the Haymarket anarchists awaited their punishment, there was a 
vocal contingent—including prominent public figures such as the editor of Atlantic Monthly, 
William Dean Howells, and the attorney Clarence Darrow—who viewed the trial as a 
miscarriage of justice. Albert Parsons published “An Appeal to the People of America” 
following his conviction where he denounced the idea that his writings and speeches could 
be tied to a conspiracy that resulted in the bombing at Haymarket. Parsons, like the other 
defendants and the prosecution, believed that anarchism itself was on trial. As such, he 
refused to accept a commutation of his punishment that would necessarily entail an 
admission of guilt and appealed instead “not for mercy, but for justice.”108 When law 
enforcement officials attempted to use the “obscene literature” provisions of the Comstock 
Act to prohibit the distribution of anarchist publications through the mail, anarchists 
denounced the efforts and became a driving force behind the formation of the Free Speech 
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League.109 Some grounded their opposition to restrictive measures by arguing that they were 
counterproductive. An editorial in The Demonstrator declared that restrictive efforts had “done 
more to advertise and propagate anarchist doctrines than ten thousand lectures could have 
done.”110 Rather than anarchist violence attacking the repressive state in an effort to cultivate 
popular support, the repressive power of the state played into anarchist critiques and could 
gain them more adherents. Others simply worried that placing restrictions on the ability of 
anarchists to congregate in public or spread their message in print ran the risk of making 
“honest speaking and thinking a crime” and asked, “Are we ready to engage in such [a] 




The above discussion attempts to demarcate the boundaries within which American 
discussions of security in the face of the threat posed by anarchist terrorism took place. The 
political scientist W. Lance Bennett argues, “The underlying structure of public thinking is 
difficult to demonstrate because people are seldom able to articulate their inventories of 
social values or the plot outlines of the myths that give values their political application.”112 
In the face of an unprecedented wave of bombings and assassinations, Americans made clear 
that anarchist terrorism was a dual menace. First, the actual threat of violence posed an 
external security problem that needed to be addressed. However, many Americans believed 
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that by overreacting and making acceptable the passage of measures that would erode 
traditional values in the name of providing security, anarchist terrorism posed a second—
greater—threat to American society. The inability to resolve this tension shaped subsequent 
discussions over how Americans could best protect themselves from anarchist violence, 









CHAPTER 2: DOMESTIC RESPONSES TO ANARCHIST TERRORISM: 
PUNISHMENT, PROTECTION, AND POLICING 
 
 Two days before his fateful run-in with Leon Czolgosz, U.S. President William 
McKinley had an encounter that demonstrated how aware ordinary Americans were of the 
scourge of anarchist terrorism. Late in the evening of September 4, 1901, a special train 
carrying the president pulled into the Terrace Station in Buffalo, New York. Suddenly, an 
explosion startled the assembled crowd as a planned twenty-one-gun salute went disastrously 
awry. A Coast Guard officer responsible for the display situated the cannons too close to the 
tracks and the blast from the volley shattered several windows on the presidential train. In 
the immediate aftermath, several in the crowd exclaimed, “anarchist!” and, according to one 
account, attacked a gentleman who had been standing near the cannons.1 The presidential 
party escaped, unharmed but unsettled. That the assembled crowd immediately assumed that 
a pyrotechnic miscalculation was an incident of anarchist terror revealed how the fear and 
anticipation of this type of violence was ingrained in the popular imagination. Roughly 48 
hours later, that fear proved warranted. As the president greeted attendees inside the Temple 
of Music at the Pan-American Exposition, Czolgosz—the American-born son of Russo-
Polish immigrants and a self-professed anarchist—shot McKinley twice. Over the following 
days, newspapers kept an anxious public informed of McKinley’s condition. Unbeknownst 
to the presiding physicians, gangrene set in around McKinley’s stomach and pancreas and 
the president died on September 14, 1901.2   
																																																								
1 Mark Goldman, High Hopes: the Rise and Decline of Buffalo, New York (Albany: State University 
of New York Press, 1983), 5. 
2 In his study of McKinley’s medical care, Jack Fisher, M.D. concludes that the president 
died from severe fluid buildup rather than gangrene. Jack C. Fisher, Stolen Glory: The McKinley 
Assassination (La Jolla: Alamar Books, 2001).	
 79 
 In the hours and days immediately following Czolgosz’s attack, Americans 
demanded justice for McKinley and security from the threat of anarchism. They, however, 
could not reach a consensus about what either meant. Indeed, as this chapter argues, the 
simultaneous pursuit of both justice and security was paradoxical and often contradictory. 
Public officials and civil society worried about possible conspirators. How far, people 
wondered, did the conspiracy extend? Should the pursuit of justice and security include 
punishing, not only those who planned or executed an attack, but also those who publicly 
encouraged the spread of anarchism and preached propaganda by deed? Some, in the heated 
aftermath of Czolgosz’s attack, proposed pursuing justice through mob violence. A majority, 
however, argued that justice—for McKinley, Czolgosz, and Americans in general—should 
be found in a court of law. Beyond punishing anarchists who committed violent acts, 
Americans searched for ways to provide security and suppress anarchism generally. Yet, to 
many, foundational values like equality before the law or freedom of expression—principles 
that distinguished the United States from the old world—were the very values that anarchists 
took advantage of to spread their message. Given that concern, elected representatives and 
the American public alike questioned whether such ideals should be curtailed in the name of 
national security. Americans were not alone in grappling with such issues. They frequently 
looked abroad to other countries victimized by anarchist violence for effective solutions. 
Ultimately, the pursuit of justice for McKinley and security for society led Americans to 
debate how much they were willing to sacrifice in the name of security. 
  American reactions to anarchist violence and debates over how to punish the 
perpetrators while protecting society were colored by the emotional responses provoked by 
the violence. During the last two decades of the nineteenth century, citizens bore witness to 
the growing frequency of violent incidents and learned that other governments passed 
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restrictive laws that incentivized anarchists to flee to more liberal states. McKinley’s 
assassination, while traumatic, was also not unprecedented. Rather than ignite a new debate 
about security, it added more evidence to an ongoing argument that society was under siege 
and something needed to be done.3 Policies that, in more tranquil times, seemed contrary to 
fundamental American beliefs grew more popular as contemporaries sought greater security.  
This chapter analyzes that ongoing argument. The first section examines the legal 
questions raised by the prosecution of Leon Czolgosz as well as other anarchists arrested in 
the aftermath of McKinley’s assassination. As officials rounded up potential co-conspirators 
and ultimately tried and executed Czolgosz, they struggled to balance popular notions of free 
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speech and peaceful assembly—rights enshrined in the U.S. Constitution—with public 
security issues stemming from possible incitements to violence. The second section 
transitions from questions of justice to security as Americans grappled with how to protect 
public officials. Policymakers overhauled the manner in which presidents would be protected 
while civil society debated whether such measures excessively undermined the principle of 
popular government by elevating the protection of the president above the lives of ordinary 
citizens. Finally, Americans debated the best way to police anarchists to prevent future 
attacks. By their very nature, conspiracies are secret and present unique hurdles to those 
trying to uncover them. While federal and state officials experimented with, and advocated 
for, greater surveillance of anarchists, they encountered public opposition by groups and 
individuals who deemed the measures invasive or equally upsetting to social norms as the 
anarchist crimes they were designed to help prevent. The end result of this struggle to 
balance the demands of security against traditional values reflected the inability to find a 
middle ground common to many liberal governments.  
 
PUNISHING ANARCHIST CRIMES: THE PURSUIT OF JUSTICE 
 By the time McKinley died from his injuries on September 14, Leon Czolgosz had 
spent several days in jail in Buffalo undergoing questioning by authorities who tried to piece 
together his motives and uncover any accomplices. Thomas Penney, the District Attorney of 
Erie County [New York], led the interrogation in the hours following Czolgosz’s attack on 
McKinley. After some initial questions about Czolgosz’s own background, Penney spent 
most of his time asking leading questions designed to uncover the extent to which the 
assassin was part of a larger conspiracy. Immediately after asking where Czolgosz’s parents 
came from, Penney changed course and inquired whether he was familiar with the work of 
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the prominent anarchist thinker Peter Kropotkin or if he was a member of any anarchist 
groups. Underscoring the belief that Czolgosz must have been party to a larger conspiracy, 
Penney repeatedly belabored him, stating: “Have you ever taken any obligation or sworn any 
oath to kill anybody; you have, haven’t you; look up and speak; haven’t you done that?”4 Czolgosz 
admitted that he read anarchist publications, including Free Society, and listened to anarchist 
speakers, such as Emma Goldman.5 That being said, he stressed repeatedly that he decided 
on his course of action independently, a mere three to four days before McKinley’s arrival in 
Buffalo, and dismissed any notion that his actions were part of a conspiracy. Czolgosz 
dictated and signed a statement to that effect, which read: “I killed President McKinley 
because I done my duty. I didn’t [sic.] believe one man should have so much service and 
another man should have none. I planned this all out for two or three days; I had an idea 
that there would be a big crowd at the reception; I expected I would be arrested. I did not 
intend to get away.”6  
Czolgosz’s statement ran counter to how most contemporaries believed anarchists 
planned attacks. Barely a year prior to McKinley’s assassination, newspapers widely 
publicized how American officials worked with foreign powers to investigate a possible 
																																																								
4 Czolgosz, as he replied to each question along these lines, simply responded, “No, sir.” See 
"Report No. 153, Investigation Activities of the Department of Justice: A Report on the 
Activities of the Bureau of Investigation of the Department of Justice Against Persons 
Advising Anarchy, Sedition, and the Forcible Overthrow of the Government,"  (Washington 
D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1919), 66. Author’s italics. 
5 Free Society, published by Abraham Isaak and his family, was the pre-eminent English-
language anarchist newspaper in the United States. Candace Falk, ed., Emma Goldman: A 
Documentay History of the American Years, vol. Two: Making Speech Free, 1902-1909 (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 2004), 533-35, 51. 
6 "Report No. 153, Investigation Activities of the Department of Justice: A Report on the 
Activities of the Bureau of Investigation of the Department of Justice Against Persons 
Advising Anarchy, Sedition, and the Forcible Overthrow of the Government," 70-72.	
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conspiracy to assassinate the King of Italy that was hatched in Paterson, New Jersey. It was 
rumored that the assassin, an Italian immigrant to the United States named Gaetano Bresci, 
volunteered to assassinate King Umberto I during an anarchist meeting presided over by 
Errico Malatesta, the prominent anarchist editor. The Washington Post reported that in other 
meetings in cities around the United States, Malatesta preached murder and laid plans for 
not only the assassination of the King of Italy but heads of other foreign governments as 
well.7 The Trenton Evening Times [New Jersey] reprinted a letter by C. Luigi Alfieri, a self-
proclaimed member of the Paterson group, which he addressed to the editor of the Il 
Progresso Italo-Americano newspaper. The letter first repeated the story that Bresci was selected 
to kill Umberto I by drawing lots and next alleged that a second individual “was chosen to 
slay President McKinley.  Men were also named to assassinate President Loubet of France, 
Emperor William of Germany and the Empress of Austria.”8 President McKinley’s personal 
secretary, George B. Cortelyou, was so concerned for the president’s safety during the 
planned trip to Buffalo that he twice removed the public reception at the Temple of Music 
from McKinley’s calendar, only to be rebuffed by the president himself.9 When Czolgosz 
shot McKinley, people believed his action was part of “a deep-seated international 
movement among the anarchists” rather than the impulsive action of a disgruntled 
individual.10 
																																																								
7 “King Humbert Conspiracy,” Washington Post 12 February 1902: 1. 
8 “The Plot Details,” Trenton Evening Times 14 August 1900: 7.   
9 Miller, The President and the Assassin: McKinley, Terror, and Empire at the Dawn of the American 
Century, 4.	
10 “Anarchist Activity: Appears to be Widespread and Planned by Persons of Means,” The 
Daily Picayune (New Orleans) 16 September 1900: 20; “The London Anarchists: They Haunt 
the Quarter Where Karl Marx Once Lived,” Republican Herald (Phoenix) 30 August 1900 XI, 
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In matters both weighty and inconsequential, Americans believed that anarchist 
machinations would involve some degree of sinister conspiracy. Multiple newspapers printed 
a confession where Czolgosz supposedly revealed that his “craze to kill” was inspired by a 
lecture by Emma Goldman, whose words “set [him] on fire.” He acknowledged having a 
wide circle of anarchist friends, though he denied having any accomplices and went so far as 
to specify: “I am not connected to the Paterson group, or with those anarchists who sent 
Bresci to Italy to kill Humbert.” In his denial that he was part of an anarchist scheme, which 
the public would find hard to believe, Czolgosz nonetheless reinforced the idea that Bresci’s 
actions a year earlier were part of a conspiracy even if his own were not. Multiple 
newspapers, including major papers of record such as the Chicago Sunday Tribune and the New 
York Times perpetuated that narrative.11 The language of this story played right into how 
Americans perceived anarchism and violent anarchists: it preyed on their fears of a 
coordinated attack against society and, by describing Czolgosz’s motivations with evocative 
phrases, spoke to the raw emotions the violence provoked. The salacious details of 
Czolgosz’s supposed confession were fictional, however. Days after newspapers published 
this dramatized account, the Buffalo Evening News—which also published the trumped up 
confession—revealed that the statements were “fakes” while the original was “held sacredly 
as an official secret” and would remain that way until the trial.12  
																																																																																																																																																																					
no. 15: 2; “Untitled,” Morning Oregonian 6 September 1900: pg. 6; “Rise and Fall of Anarchy 
in World-Famed Paterson,” Washington Post 9 December 1906: A8. 
11 See “Statement by Assassin,” Iowa State Register [Des Moines] 8 September 1901, vol. 46, no. 
211: 1, 3. Similar or identical statements also appeared in: “The Assassin Makes a Full 
Confession,” New York Times 8 September 1901: 1, 2; “Confession of the Assassin; His 
Almost Toy Pistol,” Chicago Sunday Tribune 8 September 1901: 4; “Czolgosz Says He Had No 
Aid,” Chicago Sunday Tribune 8 September 1901: 4; “Leon F. Czolgosz, Cowardly Assassin, 
Makes Statement,” Buffalo Evening News 7 September 1901: 9. 
12 “ ‘Czolgosz’s Confessions’ Manufactured,” Buffalo Evening News 9 September 1901: 7. 
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Likewise, even mundane incidents triggered, and played upon, fears of anarchist 
machinations. For example, in May 1901, a Joseph Paita committed suicide in a boarding 
house in Pittsburgh after being “in his usual mood of depression and despondency.” This 
blossomed into a potential anarchist conspiracy when a newspaper reporter overheard a 
conversation about the suicide between a mail carrier and telephone operator. The mail 
carrier revealed that Paita wrote a letter to Emma Goldman, who he had previously gone to 
see lecture. After some further talk, the mail carrier wondered aloud whether Paita killed 
himself because he was afraid to perform some act for which he had been selected. This was 
another example of the standard framing narrative for reports on anarchist conspiracies: 
newspapers would reveal secret meetings where the drawing of lots was supposedly used to 
select individuals who would then be charged with assassinating a head of state. The 
eavesdropping reporter telephoned his paper and the story appeared as a brief mention in 
the late edition. A Pittsburgh-based correspondent of the New York Sun saw the story and 
subsequently ran it under the heading “DREW THE FATAL BEAD.”13 This gave birth to a 
short-lived and harmless, but illustrative, conspiracy.   
The assumption that a widespread anarchist conspiracy was behind the McKinley 
assassination had immediate and severe consequences for those anarchists accused of 
complicity in Czolgosz’s crimes. After Czolgosz mentioned in his interrogation that he read 
Free Society, the leading English-language anarchist newspaper, the Secret Service quickly 
contacted the Chicago police department. Officers proceeded to round up and arrest the 
paper’s editor, a Russian-born anarchist named Abraham Isaak, and a number of his 
																																																								
13 See “Stone to Hill, 15 May 1901” and “Mura to Stone, 10 May 1901” in RG 59, M 179, 
Roll 1102: Records of the Department of State, Miscellaneous Letters (Received), 1-15 May 
1901. 
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associates. Public accounts of the arrest employed language that explicitly and implicitly 
played on popular fears of conspiracies. In total, nine individuals were arrested at Isaak’s 
home when police found them “in the midst of an important meeting” and, according to the 
chief of the detective bureau, “some of the men… served terms in prison in their native 
countries for attempted crimes inspired by their anarchistic beliefs.” Police also confiscated 
anarchistic literature and pictures of Emma Goldman. Presented in this way, reports of the 
arrests subtly played on American fears of anarchist conspiracies and connections to criminal 
networks abroad. Those arrested were charged with “conspiracy to assassinate President 
McKinley.”14 Goldman, who was in St. Louis at the time, was shocked to find her name 
associated with the crime. Upon hearing that her friends had been arrested and that the 
Chicago police wanted to arrest her as well, she returned to the city by train and was arrested 
on September 10. After a series of delays, the Chicago police released Goldman and her 
associates who remained in custody on September 23 because the Buffalo police failed to 
provide any evidence of a conspiracy. In reality, both Isaak and Goldman suspected that 
Czolgosz may have been a police spy but even this was framed as “the most suspicious thing 
against them… with singular unanimity they all declare they took Czolgosz for a spy.”15  
																																																								
14 “Chicago Anarchists Raided,” New York Times 8 September 1901: 4. 
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While Goldman, Isaak, and his companions escaped significant punishment, the 
anarchist printer Johann Most was not so lucky. Another associate of Emma Goldman, Most 
was a well-known anarchist and his Revolutionary Warfare pamphlet helped ingrain the image 
of the anarchist bomb-thrower in the public mind. The day after McKinley’s assassination, 
Most’s journal, Freiheit, republished Karl Heinzen’s “Mord contra Mord (Murder against 
Murder),” which accepted tyrannicide as a means of historical progress. When Most heard of 
the events in Buffalo, he ordered the edition—which was printed in advance—pulled from 
circulation. Yet, the damage was already done. Police apprehended Most and charged him 
with violating Section 675 of New York’s penal code, which made it a misdemeanor to 
commit an action that would offend public decency in a way not addressed by other laws on 
the books.16 Most’s lawyer, the noted socialist Morris Hillquit, argued at trial that Heinzen’s 
piece was directed against monarchs, had been reprinted numerous times, and was more 
than fifty years old. Hillquit maintained that Most was being denied his right to freedom of 
the press and was being charged “not so much because of the fortuitous and ill-timed reprint 
of the hoary Heinzen article as for his general anarchist propaganda.”17 The presiding judge, 
Justice Hinsdale, rejected Most’s defense, declaring: “it was unnecessary to connect the 
article’s publication to McKinley’s assassination since anarchism was “the doctrine that the 
pistol, the dagger and dynamite may be used to destroy rulers” and merely advocating the 
																																																								
16 The code in question provided: “a person who willfully and wrongfully commits any act * 
* * which seriously disturbs or endangers the public peace * * * for which no other 
punishment is expressly prescribed by this Code, is guilty of a misdemeanor.” People v. Most, 
171 N.Y. 423, 427 (N.Y. 1902), asterisks in original. 
17 Morris Hillquit, Loose Leaves from a Busy Life (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1934), 
127. 
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crime was a crime in itself.18 Hinsdale found Most guilty and sentenced him to one-year 
imprisonment at the infamous Blackwell’s Island prison. Both the appellate division of the 
Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals rejected Most’s subsequent appeals. In a 
unanimous verdict, the justices of the Court of Appeals argued: “The publication of the 
defendant manifestly tended toward this result, for he held forth murder as a duty and 
exhorted his readers to practice it upon their rulers.”19 While the judges upheld the 
importance of the liberty of the press, they found that Most’s publications constituted an act 
that would endanger the public peace and argued that freedom of the press “does not 
deprive the state of the primary right of self-preservation.”20  
Most’s experiences showed the unique difficulties that authorities in liberal states 
with strong traditions of free speech had to confront: the line between expressions of 
approval for a violent action and incitement to violence was narrow and ill defined. Indeed, 
this was not the first time Most went to prison for something he published. On 19 March 
1881, following the assassination of Tsar Alexander II, Most printed an article about it in 
Freiheit, which was then being printed in London. He proclaimed “At last!” and lauded the 
attack on the tsar as “the most outstanding revolutionary deed in modern history.”21 On 
March 21, the German ambassador in London, Count George Münster, sent a confidential 
note to the Foreign Office about the article “inquiring whether, or to what extent, English 
																																																								
18 Sidney Fine, “Anarchism and the Assassination of McKinley,” American Historical Review 60, 
no. 4 (July 1955): 783-84. See also People v. John Most, 16 N.Y. Criminal Reports 1903, 105-
111. 
19 People v. Most, 171 N.Y. 423, 430 (N.Y. 1902). 
20 People v. Most, 171 N.Y. 423, 432 (N.Y. 1902). 
21 Folder 02: “Rocker, Rudolph --- ‘Johann Most,’ Typescript, pp 101-250,” p. 118-119. Paul 
Avrich Collection, Series I, Box 25: Rocker, Rudolph to Rudome, Jacques and Helen. Rare 
Books and Manuscripts Reading Room, Library of Congress, Washington DC. 
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legislation could afford the means of putting a stop here to these criminal proceedings 
[anarchist violence], which… not only grievously and directly endangered the lives of the 
European Monarchs, but also unsettled the foundations of all social and political order.”22 
While there was no official response, a few days later, six detectives broke into Most’s 
apartment, arrested him, and confiscated Freiheit’s typographical equipment. After appearing 
before a judge and being charged, Most reportedly declared “there could not be found in all 
London twelve men who would give their sanction to such a Bismarck-like assault on the 
freedom of the press in England.”23 Most’s confidence was misplaced: he was found guilty of 
libel and sentenced to sixteen months of hard labor. In May of the following year, after the 
assassinations of Lord Cavendish and Under Secretary of State Burke in Phoenix Park, two 
typesetters working for Freiheit were arrested, charged, and sentenced for laying the print for 
an article, written by Karl Schmidt that proclaimed the deed, “an inevitable result of English 
tyranny in Ireland and assured the Irish terrorists of the solidarity of the German 
revolutionaries.”24 Here, then, was evidence to contemporary observers that those who 
participated in the preparation or dissemination of such ideas could face consequences as 
well. The last English edition of Freiheit was published on 22 May 1882 and in early 
December Most boarded a trans-Atlantic steamer in Liverpool and set sail for New York 
City. 
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While the experiences of Isaak, Goldman, and Most stemmed from explicit—if 
highly dubious—ties to Czolgosz, other anarchists were targeted for abuse, vilification, and 
in some cases violent retribution simply for adhering to anarchist principles. On the night of 
McKinley’s assassination, a young man in New York urged a crowd to follow him to 
Paterson, New Jersey, to “burn up the whole —— place” and lynch anarchists in “the South 
Carolina method.” “If President McKinley dies,” the young man shouted, “there will be 
10,000 anarchists killed in Paterson to avenge his death.” More than 100 men followed him, 
though no newspapers reported what subsequently happened.25 In Paterson, the authorities 
were hardly more composed: Detective Henry Titus suggested that “the only proper way for 
the police to deal with these fellows is to go to their meetings armed with a sawed-off gun 
and shoot the speakers when they begin to rant.”26  
While the desire for security—which spawned out of the fear of a widespread 
anarchist conspiracy—was the clear priority during the arrests of Isaak, Goldman, and Most, 
when it came to Czolgosz’s trial, justice was the primary consideration. For Czolgosz, his 
only request during his interrogation was that his desire for a “fair trial” be written into his 
																																																								
25 “Wanted to Kill Anarchists,” New York Times 7 September 1901: 5. Similar exhortations to 
mob violence were made in cities large and small. In Chicago, one man in a public meeting 
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they please.” See “Searching Among Paterson Anarchists,” New York Times 1 August 1900: 1.	
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confession.27 While much scholarly analysis of the Czolgosz prosecution has focused on the 
injustice of the trial—largely focusing on the growing post mortem consensus that Czolgosz 
was mentally ill—contemporaries held it up as the purest example of the virtues of American 
justice. Writing in the Yale Law Review after the trial had concluded, LeRoy Parker declared, 
“It is universally considered that the whole proceedings… were conducted with the utmost 
dignity, order and decency.28 Before standing trial, two noted physicians examined Czolgosz 
to ascertain his mental state at the request of the Bar Association of Erie County.29 One of 
the physicians, Dr. Carlos F. MacDonald, had a far more liberal interpretation of legal 
insanity than was the norm, having previously written that a killer would not only need to 
know right from wrong, but would also need “the power to choose the right and avoid the 
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College, and Arthur W. Hurd, superintendent of the Buffalo State Hospital. 
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wrong.”30 MacDonald concluded, nonetheless, that Czolgosz “was in all respects a sane 
man—both legally and medically—and fully responsible for his act.”31  
 Czolgosz’s trial was as much about the public appearance of justice as it was about 
its pursuit. He was first indicted on Monday, September 16 and the trial scheduled for the 
following Monday, though it was moved from the County Court to the Supreme Court 
because the lower court could not preside over the trial of someone accused of a capital 
offense. Those high stakes similarly affected the outset of the trial on September 23. At his 
arraignment, Czolgosz answered the District Attorney’s charge with a plea of “Guilty.” The 
presiding judge, Truman White, immediately interjected, “That plea can not [sic.] be 
accepted in this Court. The Clerk will enter a plea of ‘not guilty’ and we will proceed with the 
trial.”32 It was, as Eric Rauchway notes, the only thing Czolgosz would say during the trial 
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and it was ignored.33 Given the high profile of the trial, the Erie County Bar Association was 
deeply concerned that Czolgosz have adequate representation. This was in part, because 
Czolgosz did not have the means—or apparent interest—to secure his own representation. 
But, perhaps more importantly, the Bar wanted to avoid a spectacle similar to the trial of 
Charles Guiteau, the last man to assassinate a president.34 Judge Emery, who presided over 
Czolgosz’s first indictment heeded the suggestions of the Bar and assigned two eminent, if 
long out of practice, lawyers: Loran Lewis and Robert Titus, both former judges and state 
senators, the former a Republican and the latter a Democrat.35 Neither was pleased with the 
assignment. Indeed, the first thing Titus did when the trial opened on September 23 was 
explained why they acted as defense counsel. “It was a duty,” he lamented, “which we owe 
alike to our profession, to the public and to the Court that we accept this assignment, 
unpleasant though the task is for us.”36 Jury selection was also difficult given that “each juror 
on qualifying said… that he had formed an opinion as to the guilt of the prisoner,” though 
they indicated that their positions could be changed by “reasonable evidence.”37  
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 The prosecution’s case was strong. Authorities had the murder weapon. The 
government’s expert witnesses testified that the gunshots, rather than any subsequent 
infection, caused McKinley’s death.38 Prosecutors had Czolgosz’s confession, which made 
clear his motive for the crime. Czolgosz himself professed his guilt at every opportunity and 
the alienists who had examined Czolgosz before the trial determined that he was sane. The 
district attorney did not raise Czolgosz’s mental fitness and Czolgosz’s lawyers called no 
witnesses on his behalf. 
 Despite the obvious weakness of the defense’s position, Loran Lewis offered a 
masterful defense of Czolgosz in his closing statement. “It is shown beyond any 
peradventure of doubt that it was at the defendant’s hand that he [McKinley] was stricken 
down, and the only question that can be discussed or considered in this case is the question 
whether the act was that of a sane person.” After eschewing the opportunity to call witnesses 
who might present evidence of Czolgosz’s unsettled mental state, Lewis made a purely 
rhetorical insanity defense. “Every human being,” Lewis stated, “has a strong desire to live. 
Death is a spectre that we all dislike to meet, and here this defendant, without having any 
animosity against our President… we find him going into this building, in the presence of 
these hundreds of people, and committing an act which, if he was sane, must cause his death. 
How, could a man, with some mind, perform such an act?” He did not stop there. 
Surprisingly, Lewis went so far as to ask the jury if they would not be happier if they found 
Czolgosz to be insane. Such a finding would “aid in uplifting a great cloud off from our 
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hearts and minds” because “If our beloved President had met with a railroad accident… we 
should all regret very much… but our grief would not begin to compare with the grief that 
we have now, that he should be stricken down by an assassin, if such were the case.” “If you 
could find that he met his fate by the act of an insane man,” Lewis concluded, “it would 
amount to the same as though he met it accidentally.”39 Lewis’ defense of Czolgosz was so 
brilliantly articulated that Titus scrapped his own remarks. 
 Lewis’ last-ditch defense of Czolgosz played on American fears about what it meant 
that someone might try to assassinate a president. Americans had long distinguished between 
the arbitrary power wielded by monarchs and a president elected by a popular vote and 
firmly believed that insulated them from this manner of crime. Following Guiteau’s 
assassination of President Garfield in 1881, William Smith summarized the views of his 
contemporaries when he declared, “it is not supposable by our people that a sane man would 
seek to destroy a President.” Admitting American assassins were motivated by the same 
impulses as assassins of monarchs “would be admitting that the President of the United 
States might become a tyrant.”40 Morris Hillquit’s defense of Johann Most’s freedom to 
republish “Mord contra Mord” centered on pointing out that the article was targeted at 
monarchs, not presidents. Further, in the 1890s when anarchists assassinated largely 
ceremonial figures such as King Umberto of Italy and Empress Elisabeth of Austria, public 
attention gravitated to the often desperate economic conditions of Europe’s poorest classes. 
Americans saw socialism and anarchism as having their origins in the miserable conditions of 
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Europe’s working poor and strenuously rejected any notion that industrial conditions in the 
United States were little better and could be an equally fertile breeding ground of 
discontent.41 Would it not be more satisfying, Lewis reasoned, that Czolgosz’s attack on 
McKinley was a historical accident rather than a symbolic rejection of the principles of 
American institutions and economic virtues? The beliefs of anarchists, he tried to prevail 
upon the jury in his defense, were less a threat to the orderly operation of the United States 
than if, in the thirst for vengeance, “our institutions will be set aside and overthrown.”42 
 Following Loran’s closing, the rest of the trial proceeded swiftly. Despite the clever 
defense, the jury would not be swayed and returned a guilty verdict in less than twenty-five 
minutes of deliberation. The court adjourned until sentencing on September 26. There, 
before the court, Czolgosz reiterated the main points of his confession: that he committed 
the crime of his own accord, without the planning and input of others. Czolgosz’s sentence 
was death, which would take place by electrocution one month after being sentenced, in 
																																																								
41 See, for example, a debate in Congress over the relative merits of free trade versus 
protectionism. Congressional Record, 53 Cong., Second Session, Vol. 26, Appendix II: 1342.  
In 1900, Harper’s Weekly attacked William Jennings Bryan—rumored to be a target for 
anarchist assassins himself—as “a contributing factor to the forces of anarchy” because he 
and politicians like him “preach the gospel of discontent,” which “contributes in some 
proportion, slight or considerable, to the anarchistic cause.” See “The Assassination of King 
Humbert,” Harper’s Weekly 11 August 1900: 740. For similar expressions, see: “The Attempt 
on the President,” Scientific American  85, no. 11 (14 September 1901): 162; “The Assault 
upon the President,” Outlook 69, no. 2 (14 September 1901): 106-108; “The Genesis of the 
Crank,” Medical News 79, no. 11 (14 September 1901): 423; “Put Down Mob Law,” Afro-
American Ledger [Baltimore] 10, no. 6 (14 September 1901): 4; “President McKinley,” Ohio 
Farmer [Cleveland] 100, no. 11 (12 September 1901): 186; “The Buffalo Tragedy,” Irish-
American [New York] 53, no. 36 (7 September 1901): 4; F.L. Oswald, “The Assassination 
Mania: Its Social and Ethical Significance,” North American Review 171, no. 526 (September 
1900). 
42 That extra-legal mob was, Lewis argued, “a more dangerous class of community than the 
anarchists about [which] we read so much.” “The People of the State of New York against 
Leon F. Czolgosz,” 23-24, 26 September 1901, 113-115.  
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accordance with the laws of the state of New York. On October 29, 1901, Czolgosz was 
escorted from his cell at Auburn Prison, where he had resided since his sentencing, to meet 
his end in the electric chair, the fiftieth person executed in such a way in New York. 
Accounts of his final moments varied, but what happened after his death was clear.43 
Following an autopsy, Czolgosz’s remains were buried and then dissolved with sulfuric acid, 
in an effort to remove the last physical traces of McKinley’s assassin.44 
Disposing of Czolgosz’s remains in this manner was an attempt to prevent his grave 
from becoming a memorial for future anarchists who could point to his grave as a 
monument to heroic action and possibly inspire others to commit similar acts. This was not 
a unique challenge. The way officials handled Czolgosz’s body following his execution 
paralleled how British officials handled an infamous, though unsuccessful, anarchist bomber 
a few years before. On 15 February 1894, some schoolboys were walking through 
Greenwich Park in south London when they heard a loud explosion. Rushing to the sound, 
the boys and a keeper from the Royal Observatory found a man, doubled over and severely 
wounded. The victim, a French anarchist named Martial Bourdin, had been carrying an 
explosive device that detonated and left him with severe abdominal injuries and missing his 
left hand. He was transported to a nearby hospital where he died shortly after and became 
the first and only victim of anarchist bombings in Great Britain during this period. Bourdin’s 
																																																								
43 “Assassin Czolgosz is Executed at Auburn,” New York Times 30 October 1901; “Humane, 
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Life of an Unknown Assassin: Leon Czolgosz and the Death of William McKinley,” Crime, 
Histoire & Sociétés 14, no. 2 (2010); Murat Halstead, The illustrious life of William McKinley, our 
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44 Charles Hamilton Hughes, “Medical Aspects of the Czolgosz Case,” Alienist and Neurologist 
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target was unclear: some suspected that he was going to send the bomb to a comrade in 
France where, three days earlier Émile Henry had set off a bomb in the Parisian café, Café 
Terminus; the anarchist paper, The Commonweal, claimed Bourdin was going to test the bomb 
in a deserted location when it detonated prematurely; and Col. Vivian Majendie, Her 
Majesty’s Chief Inspector of Explosives, told the inquest that he believed the target was the 
Observatory—the location of the prime meridian and, consequently, “the longitudinal center 
of the world.”45 
The legal issue in that instance, given Bourdin died of his injuries and failed in his 
intentions, was a deeply symbolic one: whether the coroner’s inquest would find a verdict of 
felo de se or not. Felo de se, which in Bourdin’s case would mean that he was killed while 
committing a felony, would allow the authorities greater leeway when it came to Bourdin’s 
burial. In the House of Commons on 20 February 1894, Charles Darling raised the very 
issue to the Home Secretary, Herbert Asquith. Darling was concerned “that the Anarchists 
of London propose to make it the occasion of a public funeral” but a finding of felo de se 
would provide the authorities with the cover to dispose of the body. Darling invoked events 
on the continent to justify official involvement in Bourdin’s burial. Preventing a public 
memorial was, he argued, an “action which the French Government found it necessary to 
																																																								
45 For the “longitudinal center,” see Maya Jasanoff, “The First Global Terrorists were 
Anarchists in the 1890s,” The International New York Times, 29 April 2016 [Online: 
www.nytimes.com/2016/04/03/opinion/the-first-global-terrorists-were-anarchists-in-the-
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take in the case of the Anarchist Vaillant,” whose execution prompted Émile Henry’s attack 
in Paris.46 Though Asquith dismissed Darling’s question as premature, the coroner ultimately 
came to the same finding and, on February 23, Bourdin’s body was buried in an unmarked 
grave in an unconsecrated part of St. Pancras cemetery. Along the procession, the police 
followed Asquith’s specific instructions and separated anarchists from an angry mob 
“protesting against Anarchy,” prevented an anarchist memorial by a man named Quinn at 
the graveside, and quickly dispersed the crowd following the burial in a manner befitting the 
French government’s handling of Vaillant’s funeral.47 Authorities on both sides of the 
Atlantic were keenly aware of the propensity of anarchists to make martyrs out of fallen 
comrades such as Bourdin, Valliant, and Czolgosz. Consequently, when possible, authorities 
employed burial methods—whether anonymous graves or, as in Czolgosz’s case, destroying 
the body entirely—to deprive anarchists of memorials that could subsequently be used to 
drum up support for their causes and, potentially, lead to more violent acts.  
 
PUNITIVE LEGISLATION: THE PURSUIT OF SECURITY 
 While Americans saw Czolgosz’s execution as justified, his death did not allay fears 
of anarchist violence nor did it satisfy the growing demand for security. Anarchist violence 
presented a challenge to the development of the American state by throwing its security into 
question. While there was broad public consensus that definitive action was needed, there 
was little consensus on what that action should be. While fear of anarchist violence drove 
																																																								
46 HC Deb 20 February 1894, vol 21, 850-851. 
47 See “The Anarchist Funeral,” The Times [London], 24 February 1894: 11; “The Inquest on 
Bourdin,” The Times [London], 27 February 1894: 13; “The Anarchists,” The Times [London], 
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extended discussions of how to protect public officials and suppress or expel anarchists, 
there were powerful voices that argued such an expansive role for the state was itself a threat 
to cherished principles such as freedom of speech.  
Artistic representations of how best to deal with the anarchist menace after 
McKinley’s death were emblematic of the desire for security supplanting demands for 
justice.48 The cartoons below, which were drawn by Leon Barritt and appeared in the New 
York Tribune a mere two days apart, demonstrate the divergence. Barritt’s “Put ’Em Out and 
Keep ’Em Out” appeared in print on September 10, 1901—a few days after McKinley was 
shot. In it, Columbia is dressed in the robes of “justice” and wielding a sword of “Law and 
Order.” She stands at the gates of “Civilization,” blocking the way of a disheveled anarchist 
armed with a dagger and a smoking bomb [See Figure 2.1]. For much of the nineteenth 
century, Columbia personified the United States. Frequently clad in classical white garments, 
she was a symbol of liberty, justice, and national unity.49 The anarchist represents an external 
threat that Columbia is keeping out. This stands in stark contrast with Barritt’s “In the 
Cradle of Liberty,” which the New York Tribune printed two days later [See Figure 2.2]. Here, 
many of the same ideals from the first image—Columbia, liberty, “law and order”—are 
depicted in a dramatically different fashion. No longer is Columbia the center of the image 
as guardian of justice. Instead, she is in the background, cowering in fear and clutching an 
infant, “Liberty.” Occupying the center is Uncle Sam, carrying a club emblazoned with the 
same “law and order” slogan as on Columbia’s sword. Yet his stance is aggressive, the raised 
club threatening the anarchist serpent that made its nest in the “Cradle of Liberty.” Though 
																																																								
48 The preceding chapter examines in greater depth how the figure of the dangerous 
anarchist, as represented in political cartoons, changed over time. 
49 Winifred Morgan, An American icon: Brother Jonathan and American Identity (Cranbury: 
Associated University Presses, 1988), 28. 
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both images underscored the notion of a strong state, the state’s role as a provider of 
security was different. In the first image, the state keeps anarchism—a foreign threat—out. 
In this second image, the anarchist is already inside and must be punished as a consequence. 
Though Uncle Sam never fully displaced Columbia in artistic depictions of state efforts to 
suppress anarchism, that the two ideas increasingly occupied the same public space offered a 
visual representation of evolving debates over security and the role of the state in protecting 




50 Coming on the heels of the successful Spanish-American War, scholars have also explored 
how gender factors into similar imagery. Masculine imagery, according to Kristin Hoganson, 
reinforced the notion that “war would forge a new generation of manly, civic-minded 
veterans” whose values “would return the nation to a political order in which strong men 
governed and homebound women proved their patriotism by raising heroic sons.” See 
Kristin L. Hoganson, Fighting for American Manhood: How Gender Politics Provoked the Spanish-
American and Philippine-American Wars (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2000), 11. On the 
relationship between martial rhetoric about the Philippines and the domestic sphere, see 
Alfred W. McCoy, Policing America's Empire: The United States, the Philippines, and the Rise of the 




 The rallying cry in Figure 2.2—“Liberty is Not License”—was significant to those 
Americans who advocated for a strong state response. The anarchist in Figure 2.1 was 
outside of civilization and, as stated in the caption, “Unworthy to enter within the pale.” In 
contrast, the anarchist snake in Figure 2.2 was already in the home; indeed it was in the 
“Cradle of Liberty” itself. Americans increasingly believed that anarchists took advantage of 
the liberty they found in the United States to subvert that for which the country—indeed, 
the civilized world—stood. As McKinley’s assassination demonstrated, violent anarchists did 
not just threaten foreign states and that added urgency to the growing calls for security 
domestically. In a petition to the House Judiciary Committee, the Suburban Press 
Association of New England argued, “While liberty of the press and free speech is ‘essential 
to the security of freedom,’ that liberty should not degenerate into license.”51 Echoing this, 
																																																								
51 “Resolution passed by the Suburban Press Association of New England in Massachusetts,” 
unknown date. Records of the United States House of Representatives [RG 233], 57th 
Congress, Committee on the Judiciary, Box No. 104, Folder HR 57A H14.1, Committee on 
the Judiciary. Washington, D.C.: National Archives. 
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the citizens of Plymouth, Pennsylvania petitioned their senators and urged, “that in our 
opinion the time has now arrived when the sacred and precious name of liberty, should no 
longer be permitted to be used as the synonym, of license for lawlessness, nor, a mawkish 
sentiment of sympathy for malefactors or their deeds.”52 Individuals and organizations used 
mass media as well as direct contact with their elected representatives to convey their belief 
that while they were supportive of foundational rights such as freedom of speech, the right 
of assembly, and equality before the law, an increasingly vocal contingent argued that these 
values were not the only ones at stake. The republic’s very survival was under threat. “All 
governments necessarily possess the inherent power of self-defence [sic.],” Edgar Aldrich, a 
U.S. District Judge in New Hampshire, wrote in December 1901. “The cry of the American 
people is not for vengeance,” he concluded, “but for clear and resolute repressive measures 
against violence and threatened violence.”53 Supporters of the “Liberty is Not License” 
position argued that a strong state and a government willing to sacrifice in the name of 
security was necessary to curb the threat of anarchist violence.  
 While it would make sense if McKinley’s assassination served as the starting point 
for a national discussion of how to provide security against the anarchist threat, efforts to 
craft legislation had been made since the early 1880s. Between the 47th and 60th Congresses 
[1881-1909], elected officials introduced at least 124 individual legislative measures—
																																																								
52 Petition of the citizens of Plymouth, PA praying for the enactment of legislation defining 
an attempt against the life of the President, Vice President, any member of the Cabinet or 
Judges of the Supreme Court of the United States, to be treason and punishable by death; 
Dated 7 Jan 1902. Records of the United States Senate [RG 46], 57th Congress, Petitions, 
Memorials, Resolutions of State Legislatures and Related Documents which were referred to 
committees, Committee of the Judiciary, SEN 57A-J39, Box 150, “1/7/1902 to 3/10/1902.” 
Washington, D.C.: National Archives. 
53 Edgar Aldrich, “The Power and Duty of the Federal Government to Protect Its Agents,” 
North American Review 173, no. 541 (December 1901): 747, 57.	
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including bills, resolutions, and joint resolutions—in an attempt to craft laws to deal, to 
some extent, with security issues stemming from anarchist violence [See Figure 2.3]. In 
broad terms, the measures can be grouped into four categories: protective and punitive 
measures relating to attacks on officials, the order of presidential succession, immigration 
restriction and exclusion, and the study of criminals, paupers, and “defective” classes.54 
While Republican members of Congress overwhelmingly authored these bills, members of 
each party played central roles in the most important, hotly debated pieces of legislation. 
Demonstrating how widespread this concern over the anarchist threat was, the various 
authors came from ten different states and represented every region of the country, not just 
those states with sizeable anarchist populations.55 A desire for security from the anarchist 
threat cut across sectional divides and party differences.  
																																																								
54 Bills falling under this last category, “Criminological Study,” began to be introduced during 
the 57th Congress and they included anarchists as subjects of observation by a potential 
laboratory to study “the criminal, pauper and defective classes.” While some iterations of the 
legislation omit anarchists, all bills pertaining to this issue have been included in this tally of 
legislative measures. 
55 The authors of the various pieces of legislation introduced into Congress came from the 
following states, in alphabetical order: Alabama, Georgia, Illinois, Michigan, New Hampshire, 
New Jersey, New York, Ohio, Oregon, and Pennsylvania. 
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 The high peak of anti-anarchist legislative measures from 1901 to 1902 obscures the 
underlying fear of anarchist violence that had been present for two decades. In the early 
1880s, anarchists were typically lumped in with other political radicals—chiefly nihilists and 
Communists. In 1881, a contributor to the Chicago Tribune prophesized that, “When Europe 
has emptied her discontents… in sufficient numbers upon our shores, there may be an 
explosion similar to that of the Communists in Paris.”56 Concern grew that more restrictive 
states were, by virtue of anti-anarchist legislation, pushing anarchists to move to states less 
able to surveil, punish, or expel them. In 1889, during the 50th Congress, representatives 
debating a bill to regulate immigration drew a connection between a German antisocialist law 
implemented in 1878 and the Haymarket bombing of 1886. Anarchists, according to the 
Congressional report, “principally lived in Germany” until the government “determined to 
get rid of them” by targeting their newspapers, limiting their freedom to gather, and 
prosecuting them. To escape, “they immigrated to England” where the cycle repeated—the 
																																																								
56 “The Immigration of Nihilists and Communists,” Chicago Daily Tribune, 29 April 1881: 4. 
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report’s authors eventually discussed Johann Most’s experiences. Due to laws limiting their 
freedom of action, “they came to the United States” where they proved to be “a lawless, 
turbulent class, and the whole county is familiar with their recent acts of violence.”57 While 
the number of migrating anarchists was miniscule compared to contract laborers or 
“undesirables” like paupers and the illiterate, press attention to restrictive laws passed as a 
response to anarchist violence abroad drew greater attention as incidents of violence grew 
both in number and frequency. In 1894, following the assassination of President Carnot, the 
French government passed a law targeting anarchist groups and newspapers. Between 1893 
and 1894, England, Germany, and Austria enacted laws targeting plots that used dynamite; 
France, Italy, Spain and Portugal subsequently passed similar acts.58 Francis Nichols, a 
contributor to the popular magazine, Outlook, gave voice to the sentiment that to be an 
anarchist in Europe was “equivalent to being a criminal punishable with imprisonment or 
exile.  For a man who has been known to actually advocate law destruction there is really but 
one escape, and that is America.”59 At the turn of the twentieth century, when anarchists 
felled sympathetic figures such as Empress Elisabeth of Austria, Umberto I of Italy, and 
William McKinley in quick succession, the idea of the anarchist as a dangerous, inhuman 
																																																								
57 States United, "Report No. 3792: Report of the Select Committee of the House of 
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Representatitves (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1889), 5. 
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59 Francis H. Nichols, "The Anarchists in America," Outlook, 10 August 1901, 859. 
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beast was ingrained in the American psyche.60 Reasoned voices trying to differentiate 
between philosophical and violent anarchists were overwhelmed by a growing chorus who 
exclaimed that “all anarchists are guilty of treason” and justified calls for action by appealing 
to “a higher law—that of self-preservation.”61 
 As with Barritt’s political cartoons, Americans were united in calling for something 
to be done, but were divided on what measures should be implemented. Organizations with 
a strong nativist leaning, such as the Junior Order of United American Mechanics [JrOUAM] 
undertook a nationwide campaign in which they petitioned for Congress to pass legislation. 
While the JrOUAM had long pushed for immigration restriction, their petitions now also 
called for laws “making it treasonable for anarchists to hold meetings… or circulating any 
literature relating to anarchy; also that it be deemed treasonable to make any attempt on the 
life” of a number of federal officials.62 By contrast, a petition from the citizens of Centerville, 
Pennsylvania, instead felt that “all self confessed [sic.] or proven anarchists be exiled. That 
not citizen of a foreign nation who is in sympathy with anarchism be admitted to our 
																																																								
60 See, for example, “Attempt to Assassinate the President,” Lafayette Gazette [Louisiana], 
September 14, 1901: 2; “War on the Reds,” Los Angeles Times, June 21, 1902. 
61 See, respectively “Letter from Charles. S. Sminck to Jas. M. Beck, 8 Sept 1901,” RG 60, A1 
72-B, Box 8, Folder 2: Year Files (Folded), 1884-1903, D.J. Central Files, 1901 – McKinley 
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62 Petition from citizens and organizations of New Jersey favoring enactment of stringent 
laws against anarchists (dated: 7 Jan 1902). RG 46, SEN 57A-J39, Box 150, “1/7/1902 to 
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Company, 1897), 59-63. 
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shores.”63 As with Barritt’s images, there was a clear split between those who wanted a 
federal government actively suppressing anarchists in the name of security and those who 
preferred measures designed to keep foreign anarchists out, but leave the question of 
domestic anarchists unexamined.64 Others believed the U.S. government should both 
suppress anarchists and keep them out of the country. Petitioners in California called for the 
government to “keep strict surveillance over all revolutionary and criminal anarchists of the 
country” while simultaneously endeavoring to find “an island in the Pacific Ocean” on 
which anarchists could be imprisoned.65  
 Legislative efforts to craft punitive measures regularly mandated that attacks on the 
president—and sometimes other prominent public officials—be punished as treason.66 The 
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great majority of petitioners pointed to Article 3, Section 3 of the U.S. Constitution, which 
defined treason as levying war against the United States or giving aid and comfort to those 
who did. As one petitioner to the Attorney General argued, “Generous and noble Wm 
McKinley was shot not as a citizen or an individual but because he was President of the 
United States and the assassin was levying war… to the extent of his ability.”67 Such an 
argument served twin purposes. First, it underscored the view that the president personified 
federal authority. Second, there was also an element of concern that if determining the legal 
punishment for such an attack was left up to individual states, an anarchist assassin “may get 
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off… with a small fine or a trifling jail sentence.”68 In a Congressional report evaluating the 
merits of one bill to protect the president and punish anarchist crimes, the authors warned, 
“Had the murder of President McKinley been committed in Wisconsin the assassin would 
have been imprisoned for life. Had the president lived his assailant [murderer redacted] 
could have been imprisoned in New York for ten years only.”69 The majority of Americans 
held the view that Czolgosz’s death was a triumph of the law—and by extension, the virtues 
of American society—over mob violence, but they expected Czolgosz to die for his crime 
nonetheless.70 On that point, there was practically no disagreement. Some argued that laws 
should go even further. The Western Association of California Pioneers was one of a 
number of petitioners to Congress who argued that anarchy was “wholly inconsistent with 
our advanced civilization” and that laws should punish not just the perpetrators of violence 
but “all persons, expressing by speech or influence the hellish doctrines of Herr Most and 
Miss Goldman, and all who accept their principles, deeming it better to muzzle a made [sic.] 
dog than to wait for its bite.”71  
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Legislatures and Related Documents which were referred to committees, Committee of the 
Judiciary, Box 150, “12/10/1901 to 12/12/1901.”	
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 Legislators debated passing protective laws against the backdrop of a national 
discussion over whether security was worth sacrificing American values, such as the freedom 
of expression and equality before the law. During the 57th Congress, the “Hoar Bill” [S. 
3653] mandated the death penalty for those who killed or attempted to kill the president, 
vice-president, and those in line to assume such duties. It extended the same punishment for 
attacks against foreign sovereigns and proscribed other punishments for conspirators. 
Though it passed the Senate, the “Hoar Bill” was heavily criticized by Senators Bacon and 
Burrows as tantamount to enacting class legislation because it allowed for greater 
punishments for attacks on high-ranking federal officials than it did for ordinary persons.72 
Others, such as Rep. Samuel Willis Tucker Lanham (TX-D), objected on the grounds that if 
you “surround our public officials with anything like royalty and you magnify the incentive 
of the anarchist to destroy them.”73 George Ray (NY-R) went even further with the parallel 
to European aristocracies. “This is in exact line with what was done in France. It is in exact 
line with the establishment of the old Swiss Guard. It is in exact line, and is indeed copied 
after the laws of Rome.”74 General Lew Wallace summed up the sentiment in his 
contribution to a roundtable on the threat of anarchism published in the North American 
Review, writing “ The ways of the great and good Emperor William are for Germany; our 
American skies are not favorable to them. We are satisfied to patronize his beet sugar, 
without imitating his style of mustache or borrowing his idea of a nickel-helmeted 
																																																								
72 Congressional Record, 57 Cong., First Session, Vol. 35, Part 3, 2995-3007; Fine, “Anarchism 
and the Assassination of McKinley,” 791. 
73 Congressional Record, 57 Cong, First Session, Vol 35, Part 6, 6250. 
74 Congressional Record, 57 Cong, First Session, Vol 35, Part 6, 6243. 
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bodyguard.”75 Even after making substantial revisions to the Hoar Bill, efforts to find 
compromise failed and the measure was quietly tabled in March 1903.  
One of the primary hurdles to passing legislation that would suppress anarchist 
ideology and punish violent attacks associated with it was rhetorical in nature. The American 
public as well as their Congressional representatives struggled to define anarchy in a way that 
would not overtly—and indefensibly, from a legal perspective—limit freedom of expression. 
“We believe in the personal liberty, and in the freedom of speech, and of the press,” a 
petition from the Fort. Wayne, Indiana branch of the Grand Army of the Republic 
professed, “but we do not believe that those principles should be constructed to protect and 
license brutality, anarchy, and assassination.”76 The tension between these two ideas was a 
longstanding problem. An 1894 bill that would provide for the exclusion and deportation of 
alien anarchists died in the House of Representatives in August of that year after a heated 
debate in which a representative from New York, John Warner, denounced it as “a bad bill” 
that was “more likely to make anarchists than punish them” because in drafting the bill no 
suitable definition of anarchism had been put forward.77 Even those who supported 
																																																								
75 General Lew Wallace, “Prevention of Presidential Assassinations,” North American Review 
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legislation, like those Congressional representatives who argued in favor of legislation 
mandating that attacks on the president be considered treason struggled with the larger 
implications of suppressing anarchist publications. “We are, to some extent, treading on 
unknown and untried ground,” they cautioned, “and it is wise to keep within constitutional 
limits.”78  
At the same time, there were also practical issues to consider. Passing legislation that 
imposed harsher punishment for attacks on public officials had no deterrent quality for an 
anarchist—or any political radical—who believed their action was worth any punishment. 
Czolgosz, after all, admitted to his interrogators that he did not intend to get away, nor did 
he really try. Further, he assumed that he would be killed as punishment for his crime. The 
same was often true of other anarchist assassins.79 As the Spanish Minister Plenipotentiary to 
the United States lamented, the death penalty in Spain did not significantly deter other 
individuals from committing similar outrages.80  
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The effort to pass protective legislation was fraught with, and ultimately undermined 
by, deeply held emotional concerns. Senator George Frisbie Hoar [MA-R], whose legislation 
failed to appease the concerns of his colleagues, confessed to “a terrible feeling of insecurity 
and danger to the Republic, nobody knowing how far the anarchists’ schemes might 
spread.”81 Other legislators who supported passing legislation, like Representative Dudley G. 
Wooten [TX-D], nonetheless worried that such legislation would only exacerbate the 
anarchist threat. “Body guards, police vigilance, the mightiest efforts of organized authority, 
which he [the anarchist] regards as organized despotism,” Wooten warned, “only serve to 
whet his appetite for official gore and nerve his courage to do and die in the most 
spectacular… manner possible.”82 Ignoring the specific subject of the legislation 
momentarily, there is nothing inherently surprising about legislative efforts coming to 
naught.83 But anti-anarchist legislation introduced during the last two decades of the 
nineteenth century was typically brought to the floor by individuals who were “always 
among the most influential in their respective houses… Hale, Hoar, Lodge, Milliken, 
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McMillan, McCreary, Owen, Washburn, Quay and others.” Yet their efforts continued to fail. 
In noting this, Senator Burrows postulated, “when the legislative efforts of such men as I 
have mentioned, made perseveringly, invariably meet with failure, there is almost room for 
believing that there is something besides mere accident to account for the disastrous result 
attending every attempt to pass preventive legislation against anarchists.”84 Legislators tacitly 
felt that none of the proposed legislation bolstered the country’s security enough to warrant 
the dramatic curtailing of civil liberties and all the complexities that entailed. While some 
outspoken Americans rejected potential limits on civil liberties in the name of security, most 
simply lamented the failure to find an acceptable balance between the two. McKinley’s 
traumatic death provoked a significant increase in the number of legislative efforts to address 
violent anarchism, but the feelings aroused did not sufficiently quiet the long-standing 
concerns that had scuttled earlier Congressional measures. Despite numerous efforts and 
despite the example of restrictive legislation passed in foreign states, Americans failed to 
reconcile that essential tension. 
 
POLICING ANARCHISTS: IMPLEMENTING DOMESTIC SECURITY MEASURES 
 With Congress reluctant to pass sweeping punitive legislation, those looking for 
security from anarchists increasingly pinned their hopes on policing.85 On this subject, 
scholars have mostly focused on the weaknesses of the United States. Richard Jensen and 
Mathieu Deflem pin American inability and unwillingness to participate in international 
efforts to suppress anarchism on the absence of a large, centralized police organization. “The 
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 116 
only federal agency,” Jensen writes, “that had a nationwide network and was available to 
carry out some kind of surveillance of the anarchists within the United States was the Post 
Office.” Elsewhere, he argues that Americans were “complacent” because they believed 
themselves “immune to anarchist ‘propaganda by the deed’.”86 It is indeed true that the U.S. 
government lacked the national—and transnational—investigative network of many of its 
European peers, although the presence of a national police agency did not, on its own, 
eliminate the problem posed by dangerous anarchists. Indeed some of the states with the 
most robust investigative infrastructures—for example, Italy, Spain, Germany, and Russia—
were hardly less susceptible to anarchist violence than those countries that lacked a national 
police force, such as the United States or Great Britain. Rather than focusing on the relative 
weakness of America’s federal law enforcement infrastructure, we need to understand how 
the threat of anarchism provided an impetus to develop the institutional capacity of 
American investigative agencies. At the same time, discussions about the merits of such an 
approach reveal how civil society and federal officials alike worried about the implications of 
employing undercover agents or using repressive police measures in the name of security. 
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 During the last two decades of the nineteenth century, concerns over the growing 
threat of anarchist terrorism overlapped with a movement to establish a federal police 
agency and promote greater cooperation between the country’s municipal police 
departments. While the events that ultimately led to the creation, in 1908, of the Bureau of 
Investigation go far beyond debates over the need to protect society from the anarchist 
menace, that those two things happened in close temporal proximity demonstrated several 
overlapping concerns.87 First, the transportation revolution of the late nineteenth century, 
during which time the means of travel became more affordable and dense networks of 
railroads and steamships proliferated, had a profound effect on crime. Members of civil 
society and government officials alike expressed their worries that the increasingly rapid 
nature of transportation would be a boon to criminals attempting to escape from justice by 
crossing jurisdictional, even international, boundaries.88 Secondly, most of the county’s 
municipal police departments lacked the manpower, mandate, and resources to conduct 
criminal investigations across borders. While banks and corporations could employ private 
policing options, such as the Pinkerton Detective Agency, the federal government prohibited 
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itself from employing private detective agencies after the fallout from the Homestead Strike 
of 1892 left three Pinkerton agents and five striking workers dead.89 Thirdly, efforts to 
promote greater police cooperation have been grounded in scholarly understandings of 
Progressives’ drive to bureaucratize, leading to what Regin Schmidt and others call the 
“administrative state.”90  
Police departments played an important role in this bureaucratizing effort. In 1893, 
47 police chiefs from around the country met in Chicago and formed the National Chiefs of 
Police Union. By their second annual meeting in 1895, the organization’s membership had 
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more than doubled and it changed its name to the International Association of Chiefs of 
Police.91 Largely, though not exclusively, through their efforts, Congress considered 28 
different attempts to pass legislation aimed at creating a national police agency under the 
federal government. As with protective legislation, however, these efforts met with criticism 
from elected representatives. Representative George E. Waldo [NY-R], as Timothy Weiner 
demonstrates, argued that such a police force would be “a great blow to freedom and to free 
institutions if there should arise in this county any such great central secret-service bureau as 
there is in Russia.”92 Ultimately the Bureau of Investigation, as Weiner points out, did not 
happen until Congress adjourned in June 1908 and the Attorney General did not notify 
Congress of its existence until December of that year.93 
 Despite this opposition, powerful voices contributed to an ongoing discourse about 
the utility of surveillance and monitoring as a way to extend security to as much of the public 
as possible. In the aftermath of Czolgosz’s attack on McKinley, Herman Schuettler, who 
would eventually rise to become the Chief of the Chicago Police Department, addressed the 
problem of anarchy in an article in the Chicago Daily Tribune, “How,” he asked, “can 
anarchists in their secret societies be watched so that the authorities can know in advance 
when they are plotting such crimes and so prevent them?” His solution was a professional 
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police force, one that could keep “eternal” watch.94 In another contribution to the December 
roundtable on anarchism published in the North American Review, Robert Pinkerton of the 
Pinkerton Detective Agency, argued that anarchists were like the “Mollie Maguires [sic.].”95 
“They have their outer and inner circles,” Pinkerton maintained. To break them up, “the 
right sort of person” was required: one that could blend into the group and be sufficiently 
motivated to undertake the work. Pinkerton believed that Bresci’s assassination of King 
Umberto in 1901 was a conspiracy and, he insisted, “Competent emissaries in the camp of 
the ‘Reds’ would have been informed of the plot… and the whole nest of murderers could 
have been nabbed before they had a chance to carry out their design.” While Pinkerton did 
not believe that Czolgosz was a part of a conspiracy, “A man on the inside could have 
landed information years ago that would have put Goldman, and the other preachers of 
anarchy who inspired Czolgosz, within the hands of the law.”96 Rather than wait for national 
legislation, Pinkerton advocated for using violations of local ordinances as the pretext for 
arresting intellectual advocates of anarchism, such as Goldman and Most. 
 An editorial exchange in the Washington Post in January 1904 showcased the two sides 
of the security debate. The Post’s editor compared the spreading of anarchist doctrines to a 
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“leprous taint” and argued that authorities had the right to censor the anarchist press 
because “the danger… lies in the effects of his teachings upon the minds of those less logical 
than his own.”97 For individuals like this editor, Pinkerton, and a vocal contingent of 
ordinary Americans, anarchists exploited the liberty they found in the United States and 
disseminated their poisonous ideology until weak individuals, like Czolgosz, took what they 
preached and acted on it. “In time of war,” Pinkerton argued, “the government does not 
hesitate to protect itself.” Anarchism, in his eyes, was “a condition that is more dangerous… 
because of the insidiousness of its character” and it only made sense to take the same kinds 
of precautions.98 The Reverend Alexander Kent, adopted the opposite position in his 
contributions to the Washington Post. Attempts to suppress the circulation of anarchist papers 
and opinions would make “honest speaking and thinking a crime” and he asked, “Are we 
ready to engage in such [a] campaign of suppression?”99 
 The answers to that question were mixed. In the two years following McKinley’s 
assassination, three states—New York, New Jersey, and Wisconsin—passed laws that 
addressed “criminal anarchy.” Advocating anarchist doctrines was a felony and defining 
anarchy as “the doctrine that organized government should be overthrown by force or 
violence, or by assassination of the executive head,” these states ignored anarchist 
commentary on social conditions by defining it solely in terms of the ideology’s violent 
outliers.100	Yet no other states adopted similar legislation.  
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 Czolgosz’s assassination of McKinley also shined a light on the role of the Secret 
Service Division of the Treasury Department because three agents stood within arm’s reach 
of the president and failed to stop the assassination.101 Beginning with its formation in the 
1860s, the Division’s primary objective was to “detect, arrest, and prosecute counterfeiters 
of the coins of the United States.” Over subsequent decades, the agency’s role expanded and 
agents for the service undertook investigations into sabotage, espionage, and intelligence 
investigations as circumstances required.102 Beginning during the second administration of 
President Grover Cleveland and at the president’s request, agents occasionally served in a 
protective capacity. This continued during the Spanish-American War when agents were 
stationed at the White House. Though the Service was not permanently assigned to 
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McKinley’s protection, they were intimately involved in his trip to Buffalo, largely because of 
persistent rumors that a cabal of anarchists was planning his assassination. In May 1901, a 
letter from the Acting Secretary O.L. Spaulding revealed that the Service had been in 
communication with postal inspectors, the Department of Justice, and Italian secret police 
interested in the goings-on of the anarchists in Paterson, New Jersey.103 In August, 
McKinley’s personal secretary, George Cortelyou, asked Chief John E. Wilkie whether there 
was any suspicious activity in Paterson and Wilkie assured him that nothing sinister was 
afoot.104 Nonetheless, the Service took additional precautions in advance of McKinley’s 
planned trip to Buffalo: on August 14, Wilkie dispatched agent Albert Gallagher to join 
George Foster in Canton, so they could accompany the president on the trip.105 Two days 
later, Wilkie directed another agent, Samuel Ireland, to travel to Buffalo directly. There, he, 
Gallagher, and Foster were directed to “promote the safety and comfort of the President and 
his party.”106 Two days before the presidential entourage would arrive in the city, the Acting 
Chief wrote to the city’s Superintendent of Police to remind him of the agents’ imminent 
arrival and reiterate their promise to cooperate with the local authorities.107 
 In the aftermath of the McKinley assassination, officials as well as the American 
public dissected the manner in which the president had been protected. Czolgosz managed 
to approach McKinley while concealing his revolver by wrapping his right hand in a 
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handkerchief like a bandage. This would have been suspicious except the day was quite hot 
and as Wilkie explained, “Handkerchiefs were much in evidence.” Even though Cortelyou 
and the agents present recognized that “conditions were exceptionally favorable for an 
attack,” Wilkie continued, “It was agreed that to attempt to force the crowd to approach the 
President empty-handed would produce a riot, and the President himself would not stand 
for it.”108 Press accounts also led to criticism of how the three agents positioned themselves 
around McKinley.109 The earliest reports explicitly acknowledged that James Benjamin “Big 
Jim” Parker, an African American waiter working at the exposition, was the first to strike 
Czolgosz, preventing him from shooting McKinley a third time.110 Parker’s role, however, 
was eventually minimized as the white secret service agents played up and explained their 
role in subduing Czolgosz both to the press and at Czolgosz’s trial.111 Lastly, the rush to 
escape blame for not protecting McKinley led to a breakdown in communication and 
cooperation between the Service and the Buffalo police. Buffalo police officers, according to 
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newspaper reports, refused to share information with the Secret Service agents in Buffalo; in 
response, Wilkie ordered the agents to “make no further attempts to hold any 
communication with the police. Keep away from them entirely.”112 
 Chief Wilkie made clear in testimony to Congress in 1910, “the origin of this whole 
business” of presidential protection was “the Buffalo tragedy.” “Previously,” he explained, 
“on occasions of public functions a detail was made of men to do guard duty, but Congress 
was not asked for legislation or an appropriation.”113 The Secret Service began providing full-
time protection for the President beginning in 1902, though it received neither the funds nor 
the authorization for this until Congress passed the Sundry Civil Expenses Act for 1907 [34 
Stat. 708, 1906]. While this undoubtedly represented a significant expansion of the Division’s 
duties, there was no corresponding enlargement of the Secret Service’s budget or manpower. 
The budget in the years following McKinley’s death held fairly steadily around $125,000 per 
year. While Wilkie received a number of letters from individuals motivated by McKinley’s 
death to apply to work for the Secret Service, he continually rejected them, citing the long 
waiting list—though he often expressed a vague hope that it would be possible to “materially 
increase the force” in the future.114  
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Not only did the McKinley assassination motivate the government to fund the Secret 
Service’s protective functions, the attack also fundamentally influenced how the Service 
would protect future presidents. The ways in which the Service adapted were clear three 
years later. In 1904, as President Theodore Roosevelt prepared to visit the St. Louis World’s 
Fair there were rumors that anarchists were targeting him for assassination. Recalling the 
criticism heaped on the Service for the agents’ positioning around McKinley, Wilkie gave 
explicit instructions about how agents should arrange themselves: it was “absolute” that a 
secret service agent occupy the seat alongside the driver in any carriage used by the 
President; in addition to the presidential carriage, another with agents would follow 
“immediately behind;” and both carriages would be within a protective square formed by a 
cavalry escort. Whereas three agents accompanied McKinley during his time in Buffalo, six 
agents would comprise Roosevelt’s detail and an additional agent was dispatched to “take up 
a special investigation among the anarchists.”115 McKinley eschewed concerns for his safety 
and relished his contact with the public. The most popular American president since Lincoln, 
he was known for his grip and willingness to shake hands, and once said, “They bring no 
problems with them; only good will. I feel better after the contact.”116 With Roosevelt, such 
direct contact with crowds would be limited. “It is not now contemplated,” Wilkie explained, 
“that there shall be any promiscuous handshaking.” Further, while the agents in the Temple 
of Music kept a close eye on McKinley’s person, Wilkie mandated, “the absolute necessity of 
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watching the crowd rather than the President.”117 This essential shift in focus—away from 
the President and toward the crowd where possible threats may lie—is a hallmark of the 
modern protective functions of the Secret Service, but it began after McKinley’s death. 
Wilkie also took covert steps to protect Roosevelt, which was a clear change from how the 
Service operated before.118 At a dinner that Roosevelt would attend during the Fair, Wilkie 
arranged that an agent be disguised as a waiter and stationed near Roosevelt. “The President,” 
Wilkie explained, “does not know him and will never suspect that we have a man there.”119  
Wilkie’s letter detailing the Service’s plan to protect President Roosevelt in 1904 also 
revealed one of the primary ways investigative agencies endeavored to protect society as a 
whole—through the use of secret informers and undercover agents. By tasking an agent with 
infiltrating the anarchist community in St. Louis—as was done earlier with the leading 
anarchist group in Paterson, New Jersey—the Service attempted to solve the greatest 
challenge to stopping clandestine activity. Plots, by their essential nature, are secretive. If an 
investigative agency such as the Secret Service or a municipal police department is going to 
uncover possibly nefarious planning, it is invaluable to have insight into the activities and 
discussions of the suspected group or individuals. Law enforcement certainly relied on tips 
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and warnings about potential anarchist plots, but this approach relied on waiting for 
independent sources to volunteer information.120  
In the last decade of the nineteenth century, the federal government gradually 
assembled such a network of informers and undercover agents and used them to become 
more knowledgeable about the anarchist movement in the United States. Chief Wilkie 
cooperated with the Department of Justice to identify individuals suitable to undertake 
special investigations.121 Between 1901 and 1902, the Secret Service compiled lists of 
anarchists in the United States and some abroad, organized by city of residence and 
occasionally included a few words about them like “very dangerous” or “coward.”122 In the 
wake of McKinley’s assassination, Assistant Attorney General Henry Hoyt drafted a letter 
with a list of known anarchists that was to be circulated to the various U.S. Attorneys offices 
around the country. “It is likely that the vague hints and reports of conspiracy to destroy life 
and property are greatly exaggerated,” Hoyt admitted in the letter, “but it is important to 
know whether the bond of union between these people is permissible in the eyes of the law, 
or should be dissolved because the connection in its nature and purposes transcends all civil 
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rights of free speech and action.”123 When the need arose, such as in the aftermath of 
Bresci’s assassination of Umberto or a rumored plot to blackmail the Hungarian premier, the 
Secret Service and State Department worked with their foreign counterparts as well as 
foreign undercover investigators to investigate subjects of mutual interest.124 
 Expanding the Secret Service’s responsibilities and their protective operations 
without a corresponding increase in the Division’s financial resources or manpower 
paralleled the failed efforts to pass punitive legislation in the last two decades of the 
nineteenth century. As much as Americans feared anarchist violence, there was also a deep 
unease over too closely emulating European responses to anarchism and leading to the 
president “seeking to crown himself as an imperial ruler.”125 The position of civil society, 
Senator Julius C. Burrows lamented in December 1901, was that “the President is simply a 
man… and entitled to no greater protection than the humblest citizen.”126 McKinley himself, 
despite numerous purported conspiracies against his life, maintained: “No one would wish 
to hurt me.”127 Czolgosz’s attack on McKinley forced Americans to reckon with the idea that 
individuals might attack a president without a personal grievance—attacking them for what 
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they represented rather than for something they had done personally. Consequently, 
Americans grudgingly acquiesced to the reality that greater protective measures were 
necessary while still expressing concern about the visible aspects of that protective 
infrastructure. President Roosevelt, like his predecessor, disliked an overbearing security 
presence, which he felt interfered with presidential business. Invoking Lincoln’s words, he 
wrote to Henry Cabot Lodge in 1906, “Though it would be safer for a President to live in a 
cage, it would interfere with his business.” Yet he admitted, given the “multitude of cranks,” 
the Secret Service was a “very necessary thorn in the flesh.”128 
 
 CONCLUSION: 
 The excoriations of anarchy made by Grover Cleveland, William McKinley’s 
predecessor, demonstrated the contradictory cultural milieu in which debates took place over 
how best to achieve justice and security from the dangers of anarchy. In memorializing 
McKinley, Cleveland depicted anarchy as a “monster” and argued, “Nothing can guarantee 
us against its [anarchy’s] menace except the teachings and practice of the best citizenship, the 
exposure of the ends and aims of the gospel of discontent and hatred of social order, and the 
brave enactment and execution of repressive laws.”129 For two decades, Americans bore 
witness to numerous incidents of anarchist terror. They grew increasingly alarmed as other 
states passed restrictive laws, forcing anarchists to move further to the west until they finally 
arrived on the welcoming shores of the United States. Yet, even after the shock of 
McKinley’s death, Americans struggled to balance Cleveland’s “teachings and practice of the 
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best citizenship,” which by definition included notions of political toleration, freedom of 
speech, and equality before the law, against his exhortation for the “enactment and execution 
of repressive laws.” Those solutions struck many as an insufficient remedy to the dangers 
that plagued American society—weakening, in the name of security, the very principles new 
security measures were designed to protect. 




CHAPTER 3: THE CHALLENGES OF INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION 
 
 In his first annual message to Congress following the assassination of his 
predecessor, President Theodore Roosevelt not only issued a fiery condemnation of 
anarchists, but he also called for an international effort to aid in their suppression. In issuing 
this call, Roosevelt gave hope to governments trying to engage the United States in a 
multilateral effort to suppress anarchist violence. President William McKinley’s assassination 
in September 1901 shattered the illusion that America’s geographic position and political 
institutions insulated it from the scourge of anarchy. Leon Czolgosz’s attack on McKinley 
was, Roosevelt argued, “aimed not at this President, but at all Presidents; at every symbol of 
government.… The Anarchist is everywhere not merely the enemy of the system and of 
progress, but the deadly foe of liberty.” Roosevelt followed this condemnation of anarchists 
and their beliefs with a series of domestic recommendations and a call for international 
cooperation. “Anarchy is a crime against the whole human race; and all mankind should 
band together against the anarchist,” he began before declaring that anarchist crimes should, 
like piracy and the slave trade, be “made an offense against the law of nations… so declared 
by treaties among all civilized powers.”1  
 Why then did the Roosevelt administration decline when representatives of Russia 
and Germany approached the American government about participating in a multilateral 
discussion to suppress anarchism? As the last two decades of the nineteenth century 
demonstrated, anarchist violence threatened liberal and conservative states alike. Yet 
international cooperation remained frustratingly elusive despite the shared danger, a 
common interest in its suppression, and the demonstrated failure of domestic legislation 
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alone to curtail it. Just as efforts to suppress anarchism domestically were stymied by the 
belief in freedom of speech and free assembly, attempts at international cooperation had to 
clear similar hurdles. In this case, strong support of the tradition of asylum as well as 
reservations about how other states might frame “political” offenses acted as a check on the 
push to cooperate internationally to suppress anarchist violence. The failure to arrive at an 
acceptable compromise—for government officials as well as private citizens who debated 
the merits of such efforts—led to the uneven implementation of international efforts: the 
U.S. government was at the forefront of adopting the political offense exemption and attentat 
clause in extradition treaties, yet it also rejected foreign invitations to participate in an 
international conference to suppress anarchism.  
This chapter analyzes how the American and British governments participated in the 
halting efforts to construct an international regime designed to counter anarchist terrorism 
and how civil society in each country reacted to these developments during the last decades 
of the late nineteenth century. I argue that in liberal states, such as Britain and the United 
States, suspicions over the motives of foreign powers played a critical role in determining 
how those governments responded to pressure to cooperate with international initiatives and 
how civil society responded to the resultant measures. Fear of anarchist violence drove 
sustained calls for international cooperation. When international security efforts focused on 
the prevention and punishment of crimes committed by anarchists, contemporaries largely 
supported these measures. Yet, the public and government officials also expressed fear that 
cooperation could threaten fundamental societal values.2 Those who rejected legislation to 
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repress anarchist publications or punish individuals for holding anarchist opinions argued 
that such measures undermined fundamental societal principles, such as asylum and free 
speech. Dealing with specific crimes involved deliberating concrete responses while dealing 
with the threat of anarchism, as an ideology, proved more troublesome. This struggle to 
differentiate between the ideology of anarchism and the crimes committed by individuals 
claiming its mantle helps explain why comprehensive international cooperation was difficult 
to achieve. 
 Over the years, scholars have significantly revised their positions regarding 
international efforts to suppress anarchism. The two major international conferences—the 
International Conference of Rome for the Social Defense Against Anarchists [1898] and the 
secret St. Petersburg Conference [1904]—were once forgotten, dismissed, or ignored.3 Even 
the head of the French delegation to the Rome Conference, Camille Barrère, famously 
dismissed the resolutions as not being worth “the paper they were written on.”4 Recent 
scholarship, however, argues that these conferences laid the foundation for modern 
international police cooperation, including Interpol.5 In this vein, most attention has been 
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paid to the provisions of the Rome Conference that addressed matters of practical policing, 
such as the adoption of the portrait parlé system of identification and the exchange of 
information between police bureaus.6 Scholars, including Mary Barton and Mathieu Deflem, 
could trace and assess these policies because they built on established patters and could be 
implemented through administrative decrees.7 The significance of the various legislative 
measures debated in these meetings has been harder to determine, given that many of the 
proposals encountered domestic hurdles to their implementation. Understanding why these 
efforts failed to gain traction despite widespread support for international cooperation 
generally reveals important insights into how tensions between security imperatives and core 
values of social and political liberalism shape collective security measures. This is all the 
more important in light of our greater understanding of the role these anti-anarchist efforts 
played in the development of core elements of international law and international 
organizations devoted to collective security.  
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 How the American and British governments as well as civil society in each country 
debated anarchism and its relationship to violence fundamentally shaped how those 
governments participated in efforts to suppress anarchist terrorism in the last decades of the 
twentieth century. The first section of this chapter examines how states adapted extradition 
treaties to address the problems posed by attacks on heads of state and of political offenders, 
more generally. In the United States, strong public criticisms of extradition treaties with 
Great Britain [1890] and Russia [1893] demonstrated that people seized on the broader 
implications of suppressive measures themselves, regardless of whether the treaty partner 
enjoyed close diplomatic relations with the country.8 People objected to otherwise standard 
articles in these agreements because they suspected that such provisions could be used 
against political refugees in the United States. The second section examines how states 
struggled to find common ground on what, exactly, qualified as an anarchist crime. It situates 
the Rome Conference in the context of anarchist violence and argues that arriving at a 
definition of anarchist offenses that could be acceptable to a diverse group of states was 
critical to getting governments to agree to attend and participate in multilateral efforts. While 
continental powers blamed Great Britain for the failure to arrive at a comprehensive effort, 
the British government itself did not stand in simple isolation from, or in strict opposition 
to, those states proposing cooperative solutions. Rather, British officials examined avenues 
of participation against the backdrop of popular support for the country’s traditional role as 
“a haven of refuge to victims of tyranny and persecution,” which an ex-attaché 
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acknowledged was “part and parcel of their national principles.”9 Finally, the third section 
examines how the British and American governments responded to a Russo-German 
initiative to suppress anarchism following the attempted assassination of the Prince of Wales 
in 1900 and the successful attack on President McKinley in1901. This initiative, which 
resulted in the secret St. Petersburg Conference [1904], explicitly referred to those two 
attacks to justify greater international cooperation. Yet, even though a British delegation 
participated in the Rome Conference and despite Roosevelt’s call for an international 
response to anarchist crime, neither government participated. Popular opinion in each 
country did not reject outright the need for collective security. But popular concerns about 
the nature of repressive measures were central to whether and in what ways the governments 
of Britain and the United States would engage with international anti-anarchist initiatives.  
 
EXTRADITION AGREEMENTS: BILATERAL COOPERATION AGAINST ANARCHISTS 
In early August 1881, newspapers around the United States published a notable 
exchange of letters between Henry Wehle, a lawyer in New York City, and U.S. Secretary of 
State James G. Blaine. On August 5, Wehle petitioned the State Department for a 
clarification on the possibility that his client, Leo Hartmann, could be extradited back to 
Russia upon the request of the Russian government, “when there is neither treaty nor statute 
in existence to authorize such arrest or extradition.”10 Hartmann was concerned about 
possibly being extradited because of his purported actions in Russia in the late 1870s. There, 
with the assistance of several members of the revolutionary Narodnaya Volya [the “People’s 
Will”], he claimed to have set off the bomb that derailed Tsar Alexander II’s train as it 
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approached Moscow on November 19, 1879.11 Following this failed assassination attempt, 
Hartmann fled to France, where he was arrested in Paris in 1880, although the French 
government refused to extradite him back to Russia. He subsequently traveled to Great 
Britain before continuing on to the United States in order to, as he stated, “gain the 
sympathy of the American people for those struggling for liberty in Russia.”12 Blaine’s 
response to Wehle’s inquiry, however, was curt: Hartmann was merely one of “A half million 
immigrants from Europe” likely to arrive that year and “no citizen of the United States… 
has the right to demand from any national tribunal its opinion in a hypothetical case.” “It 
may, perhaps be unnecessary to advise you,” Blaine scolded Wehle, “that the conclusions 
and decisions of the Department of State on important legal and diplomatic questions are 
not made prematurely public through the medium of newspaper interviews, nor in response 
to the attorneys of interested parties.”13 
The public debate over whether the American government could or should extradite 
Hartmann back to Russia presaged the struggle that would preoccupy governments in the 
late nineteenth century. Was his attempted assassination of the Tsar a crime or an act that 
“rid the world of a monster and brought one step nearer the liberty of the people,” 
wondered the author of an article in the newspaper, Truth [New York]? If it were the latter, 
as Hartmann and his supporters argued, then would he not deserve the protection given to 
other failed revolutionaries? The Italian revolutionary Giuseppe Mazzini, the same author 
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pointed out, “has a bust in Central Park” despite his “justification of the murder of 
sovereigns for the good of the people.”14 In an interview with a reporter from the Chicago 
Tribune, Hartmann asked rhetorically, “Where have we recourse in crushing out the tyranny 
and oppression which overwhelm and keep down our people.” The public in liberal states 
such as the United States had the luxury of recoiling in horror at these attacks. Theirs was “a 
government of the people ostensibly,” but in Russia, Hartmann argued, “We are slaves to an 
absolute monarch…. Let us whisper Constitution? Let us ask for a constitutional 
government… and we are spotted and hastened to Siberia or hanged.”15 Hartmann cast 
himself as one more in a line of failed revolutionaries deserving protection from the 
repressive machinations of an autocratic government.  
Like its British counterpart did earlier in Hartmann’s odyssey, the U.S. government 
had to grapple with strong public support for traditions of political toleration and asylum 
and weigh it against the considerable attention given to the plight of the victimized Russian 
government. Hartmann’s arrival in the United States came during President James Garfield’s 
ultimately unsuccessful struggle to survive the injuries inflicted by his own assassin. How 
would Americans react, one contributor to the New York Herald asked, “if the wretch 
[Charles] Guiteau, who under the plea of a political necessity attempted to kill our President, 
had escaped to England or France or Russia, and they had refused to extradite him on the 
specious ground that it was a “political” crime?”16 In Chicago, the same city in which 
Hartmann found a receptive audience, people also pushed back. As a contributor to the 
																																																								
14 “A Hero Assassin,” Truth [New York City], 11 April 1881: 2. 
15 “Leo Hartmann: His Opinion of the American Republic – Eternal Hostility to Despots – 
His Travels Around,” Plain Dealer [Cleveland], 20 August 1881: 3. 
16 “The Right of Asylum,” New York Herald, 3 August 1881: 9.  
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Daily Inter Ocean [Chicago] lamented, “With the President [Garfield] still suffering from an 
assassin’s bullet, it was an impertinence for Hartmann to come to this country. It was 
offensive beyond endurance.”17 Contemporaries also recalled John Surratt’s flight in the 
wake of President Abraham Lincoln’s assassination and his subsequent arrest and extradition 
from Egypt as another example of the perils of recognizing such attacks as “political.”18 
Though he was an autocrat, Alexander II was popular in the United States and his 
assassination in March 1881 meant that the tsar was hardly a distant, anonymous figure upon 
Hartmann’s arrival. Public commentary following Alexander II’s assassination focused on his 
emancipation of the serfs and his supposedly “liberal instincts.” These tributes reinforced a 
pervasive, powerful myth about the similarities and shared sympathies between the Tsar and 
President Lincoln, the Tsar Liberator and the Great Emancipator.19 That both were the 
victims of assassins further reinforced this myth. Consequently, public discussion was torn 
between sympathy for the murdered Tsar and the country’s obligations to a friendly nation 
on one hand and a strong desire to preserve the traditional freedom political exiles found in 
the United States on the other. Asylum was necessary to protect “exiles who have been 
hounded out of their own countries by police or soldiery for upholding the rights of 
citizenship or engaging in revolutionary movements,” a contributor to the New York Tribune 
																																																								
17 See “Hartmann and Public Opinion,” Daily Inter Ocean [Chicago], 12 August 1881: 4. 
18 “Aspects of the Hartmann Case,” New York Tribune, 5 August 1881: 4. 
19 See “What the Nihilists Have Done,” New York Times 14 March 1881: 4; “Expressions of 
Sympathy,” New York Times 15 March 1881: 2; “In Memory of the Czar,” New York Times 21 
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argued, “But it may be only prudent to draw a line somewhere between the political 
revolutionist and the political assassin.”20  
During the nineteenth century, the U.S. government joined its peers by turning 
increasingly to extradition treaties in their attempts to draw such a line. A revolution in 
transportation made it easier for criminals to avoid capture. Governments, in turn, had to 
cooperate to counter the increased mobility of criminals since laws ordinarily stopped at the 
border.21 Extradition, as defined by Marjorie Whitman, is “the process by which persons 
charged with or convicted of crime against the law of a State and found in a foreign State are 
returned by the latter to the former for trial or punishment.”22 The Jay Treaty [1795], a treaty 
of amity, commerce, and navigation between the United States and Great Britain contained 
the first modern extradition agreement for each country.23 Though it lacked many of the 
defining features in subsequent agreements, Article 27 of the treaty contained the seed 
principles that future extradition treaties would develop: the expectation that a prima facie 
case be made before extradition would be granted, that requests would be handled through 
diplomatic channels, and that costs would be affixed in specific ways. Though the earliest 
extradition treaties were brief in length and fleeting in duration, a sustained increase in the 
																																																								
20 “A Correspondent,” New York Tribune, 6 August 1881: 4. 
21 See, generally, Katherine Unterman, Uncle Sam's Policemen: The Pursuit of Fugitives Across 
Borders (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2015). For a discussion of the emergence of 
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1794, Yale University: The Avalon Project [http://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_century/jay.asp; 
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signing and ratification of extradition treaties began in the 1840s and continued through the 
end of the century.24 These treaties were a remarkable diplomatic achievement: treaties were 
signed between the United States and countries on every continent and with countries with 
vastly different legal systems.25 American extradition treaties often built upon one another, as 
Daniel Margolies notes, with “new terms… overlaid…. The structure and language in each 
varied in small but very significant ways.”26  
Though the principle of extradition dates to ancient times, the political offense 
exception arose from the political tumult and violence of the nineteenth century.27 It was to 
the protection offered though this principle that Hartmann implicitly appealed. In the United 
States, the proliferation of modern extradition treaties coincided with increased provisions 
																																																								
24 As time passed, certain other principles supplemented those first laid down in the Jay 
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France [1843, 1845, 1858], Mexico [1861], the Orange Free State [1871], the Ottoman 
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2011), 183.  
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Practice of Extradition from Antiquity to Modern France and the United Stats: A Brief 
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for the protection of political offenders [See Figure 3.1]. Uprisings such as those in 1848 
reinforced the belief that political offenders opposed autocratic regimes in the name of 
nationalism or self-determination. The political offense exception, therefore, reflected 
increasing support for individual and collective freedom as well as popular sovereignty.28 
Consequently, proponents of liberal republicanism argued that political offenders deserved 
protection. First introduced in an extradition treaty between France and Belgium signed on 
November 22, 1834, the political offense exception represented a notable departure from 
tradition as, through the Early Modern period, extradition was typically geared toward the 
return of political enemies to a desiring sovereign.29  
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England (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1979), 219. See also Charles Cheney Hyde, 
“Notes on the Extradition Treaties of the United States,” American Journal of International Law 
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 The political offense exception is remarkable in that, from the mid-nineteenth 
century onward, it was widely adopted by countries across the political spectrum, yet it 
remained essentially undefined.30 Definitions, as the leading American jurist John Bassett 
Moore wrote in 1891, “are of little practical value, since the question whether a particular act 
comes within that category [of a political offense] is pre-eminently circumstantial.”31 Over 
time, however, the political offense exception in practice came to encompass two different 
categories: first was the “pure political offense,” which covered sedition, treason, and 
espionage;32 second, the “relative political offense” included elements of a common crime 
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but committed with a political purpose.33 According to the legal scholar Lassa Oppenheim, 
the key question, particularly as it related to anarchist offenses, was “how to sift the chaff 
from the wheat, how to distinguish between such political criminals as deserve an asylum, 
and such as do not.”34 
 The process of refining the political offense exception accelerated after the 1850s 
and, as Moore alluded, small linguistic shifts in the treaties dramatically shaped how 
governments could apply the exception. Article V of the Treaty of Extradition between the 
United States and France [1844] introduced the notion of the “pure political offense” to 
American extradition treaties. “The provisions of the present Convention shall not be 
applied… to any crime or offense of a purely political character.”35 Twelve years later, the 
Convention of Amity, Commerce, Navigation, and Extradition between the United States 
and the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies [1856] introduced relative political offenses. Article 
XXIV of the convention qualified the political offense exception: fugitive criminals would 
not be surrendered for an offense of a political character, “unless the political offender shall 
have also been guilty of some one of the crimes enumerated” in an earlier article and 
included offenses such as murder, forgery, or robbery.36 This raised the prospect, however, 
that political offenders could be extradited given that their crimes often fell under the 
category of crimes covered.  
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The idea that a requested state should have the discretion to determine what crimes 
were or were not protected as political offenses was a reflection that a political crime was 
rarely clear cut and governments could have conflicting reasons for pursuing or sheltering 
political offenders. Implicit in this were concerns over the possible erosion of sovereignty. 
Most individuals affected by these treaties were émigrés to the countries where they were 
detained. Yet the requested country may have radically different views on whether the act 
was a criminal offense or, for example, the exercise of what in the requested country would 
be free speech. Extradition treaties also depended, in part, on the notion that foreign states 
made requests for fugitive criminals in good faith: that a government making a request 
would prosecute the fugitive criminal for the crimes indicated in the request and not, if said 
criminal was surrendered, for crimes exempt or absent from the extradition treaty under 
which the requested state delivered them.37 Treaties between the United States and Belgium 
[1882] and Luxembourg [1884] reveal how this evolving consideration appeared in 
extradition treaties. Surrender, in these two treaties, would not take place “If it be made to 
appear that extradition is sought with a view to try or punish the person demanded for an 
offense of a political character.”38 As the nineteenth century progressed, the determination 
of whether or not a fugitive would be extradited or if their claim to the protections of the 
political offense exception would be upheld increasingly devolved to the requested state, as 
Figure 3.1 demonstrates.  
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The updated extradition treaty signed between the United States and France [1911] 
demonstrated the full significance of the shift in how governments framed the political 
offense exception. Article VI of the treaty not only held that a fugitive criminal would not be 
extradited “if he proves that the requisition for his surrender has… been made with a view 
to punish him for an offense of apolitical character” but also provided that “If any question 
shall arise… the decision of the authorities of the Government on which the demand for 
surrender is made shall be final.”39 Language like this was increasingly standardized in 
extradition treaties, regardless of the governments involved—whether republics, 
constitutional monarchies, even autocratic regimes. In less than seventy years, the political 
offense exception evolved from a clear, defined set of circumstances to something that 
mirrored the inherent fuzziness of political revolutionaries in the late nineteenth century.  
From the 1880s onward, as anarchist violence entered and increasingly occupied 
public consciousness, government officials and the civil society increasingly worried about 
the ambiguous nature of crimes committed for political reasons. Was someone who robbed 
a bank to finance their still nascent uprising a political criminal or a simple bank robber? 
What of someone who kills a government official hoping that their act sparks an open 
rebellion and no such uprising occurs? Anarchists presented a unique challenge to how 
governments would implement the political offense exemption. Political radicals sought to 
alter society whereas anarchists – popular opinion alleged – simply sought to destroy it. This 
set anarchists apart from Social Democrats, Socialists, trade unions and other groups who 
suffered formal and informal repression in the late nineteenth century. Before anarchist 
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violence peaked in the 1890s, even those not won over to a revolutionary or anarchist’s 
cause could nonetheless argue for their protection based on the strong tradition of asylum in 
the United States. In the Hartmann case, even if an element in the government and in 
popular opinion would favor a Russian request for his extradition, an editorial from the 
newspaper Truth [New York] made clear, “Compliance will raise a popular storm that 
nothing will allay. Americans do not propose to have the machinery of our government used 
to catch or harass political refugees from tyrannical governments, whether the refuges are 
accused of killing one tyrant… or ten thousand soldiers in the carnage of revolutionary 
conflict.”40 Anarchists, however, did not limit their attacks to autocratic states. In November 
1900, The Daily Picayune [New Orleans] observed that despite “the general betterment” of 
people globally, “the almost complete extinction of arbitrary power wielded by monarchs” 
did not diminish the number of assassinations. “As a matter of fact, attempts upon the lives 
of monarchs and rulers seem to have increased, rather than to have diminished in recent 
times.”41  
The universal undesirability of anarchists meant that governments had incentives to 
find ways to exempt them from the protection offered by the political offense exception 
rather than risk losing in the court of public opinion. To do this, American and British 
interpretations of the clause developed what became known as the incidence test.42 In 
October 1890, the Swiss government requested that the United Kingdom arrest and return 
Angelo Castioni to stand trial for the murder of a certain Luigi Rossi. In September 1890, 
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Castioni had participated in a successful uprising against the government of Ticino, a Swiss 
canton, and during an attack on the municipal palace, he shot Rossi, who had been a 
member of the canton’s government. Sir Charles Russell, the counsel for Castioni, brought 
up two competing definitions of “offenses of a political character” made by members during 
an 1886 debate in the House of Commons over what would ultimately become the 
Extradition Act of 1870. On one hand, Russell offered John Stewart Mill’s proposed version 
of an uprising test, which stated that “Any offense committed in the course of or furthering 
of civil war, insurrection, or political commotion” could be interpreted as possessing a 
political character; on the other hand, Russell also raised the definition by Justice James F. 
Stephens, who argued “fugitive criminals are not to be surrendered for extradition crimes if 
those crimes were incidental to and formed part of political disturbances.”43 The judges on 
the bench for Castioni’s trial, including Justice Stephens, agreed with Russell and argued that 
“the reasonable presumption is that he [Castioni], at the moment knowing nothing about 
Rossi, having no spite or ill-will against Rossi, as far as we know, fired that shot – that he 
fired it thinking it would advance, and that it was an act which was in furtherance of… the 
very object which the rising had taken place in order to promote, and to get rid of the 
government;” hence the crime was a political offense.44 The justices narrowed future 
interpretations of offenses of a political character when they argued that a broad 
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“commotion” test would “introduce a dangerous doctrine; for it would give immunity from 
extradition to persons who, without any political object in view, joined in a rising for the sole 
purpose of gratifying personal malice, or for the sake of plunder.”45 
Three years after In Re Castioni introduced the incidence test, Judge William W. 
Morrow introduced it into the American legal tradition from the U.S. District Court for the 
Northern District of California. In 1890, General Antonio Ezeta and his brother Carlos 
helped to overthrow the government of El Salvador. In 1894, during a revolution against 
their rule, Ezeta and his co-defendants summarily executed soldiers for refusing to defend 
the government, committed public executions, mutilated the corpses of suspected rebels, 
and robbed the International Bank of Salvador and Nicaragua – calling it a “forced loan.” 
They subsequently fled the country on a U.S. naval ship that took them to San Francisco.46 
Under the terms of the Salvadoran-American Extradition Treaty [1874], the new 
government of General Rafael Antonio Gutierrez requested their surrender citing the crimes 
committed during the two revolutions. Before Judge Morrow, the lawyers for Ezeta argued 
that with one exception, all the acts charged stemmed from “acting against revolutionary 
forces in the field; that the crimes or offenses were therefore of a political character and, 
under the treaty, not subject to extradition.” The counsel for the Salvadoran government 
countered that it was not Morrow’s duty to “determine this question.” Instead, the counsel 
argued that Judge Morrow’s role was “limited to the examination of the criminality of the 
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accused.” It was, in the view of those lawyers, up to the executive branch of the American 
government to “properly determine whether the offenses were of a political character or 
not.”47 After considering the arguments, and going into a detailed discussion of In re Castioni, 
Morrow ruled on behalf of the defendants, declaring: “The testimony shows that they [the 
offenses Ezeta and his co-defendants were charged with committing] were all committed 
during the progress of actual hostilities between contending forces… against the active 
operations of a revolutionary uprising. With the merits of this strife I have nothing to do.” 
The crimes, Morrow lamented, may have been of “the most atrocious and inhuman 
character, and still the perpetrators of such crimes escape punishment as fugitives beyond 
the reach of extradition. I have no authority, in this examination, to determine what acts are 
with the rules of civilized warfare, and what are not.”48 
The same year of Morrow’s decision, British judges refined the incidence test in their 
ruling in the case In re Meunier. The French government requested the arrest Théodule 
Meunier, a self-professed anarchist, for detonating two bombs: one in an attempt to destroy 
the Loban barracks in March 1892 and another at the Café Véry on April 25, 1892. In the 
second bombing, which he timed to coincide with the trial of the infamous anarchist, 
Ravachol, the blast killed two people and injured many others.49 In this case, the presiding 
judges agreed with the prosecution in denying that Meunier’s crime was a political offense. 
The British government extradited Meunier back to France where he was found guilty and 
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sentenced to a lifetime of hard labor. In dismissing the defense’s claim that the bombing of 
the barracks should be considered a political offense, Judge Cave further revised the 
precedent of In re Castioni. Cave argued: “in order to constitute an offence of a political 
character, there must be two or more parties in the State, each seeking to impose the 
Government of their own choice on the other…. In the present case there are not two 
parties in the State, each seeking to impose the Government of their own choice on the 
other; for the party with whom the accused is identified by the evidence, and by his own 
voluntary statement, namely, the party of anarchy, is the enemy of all Governments.” 
Anarchists, in Cave’s view, directed their efforts “primarily against the general body of 
citizens. They may, secondarily and incidentally, commit offences against some particular 
Government; but anarchist offences are mainly directed against private citizens.”50 The 
Meunier decision then denied the benefit of the political offense exception to terrorists—
people who deliberately kill or injure innocent people for symbolic reasons.51  
While these cases had far-reaching effects on how the political offense exception 
would be applied to anarchist crimes, their importance also stems from what they reveal 
about popular attitudes toward violence. This was debated in visceral, emotional terms. 
Dynamite was an imprecise weapon and infamous anarchist attacks on heads of state, James 
Angell argued, were “in all civilized lands… considered utterly unjustifiable, even in time of 
																																																								
50 In re Meunier [1894], 2 Q.B. 419. 
51 Cantrell, “The Political Offense Exemption in International Extradition: A Comparison of 
the United States, Great Britain and the Republic of Ireland,” 786; Pyle, Extradition, Politics, 
and Human Rights, 107; Caroline Emily Shaw, "Recall to Life: Imperial Britain, Foreign 
Refugees and the Development of Modern Refuge, 1789-1905" (University of California, 
Berkeley, 2010), 151; S. Prakash Sinha, Asylum and International Law (The Hague: Martinus 
Nijhoff, 1971), 180-81. 
 
 153 
open war.” Offenders of this sort were hostes humani genris [sic.], enemies of mankind.52 
“Among enlightened nations,” Thomas M. Cooley declared in the same issue of The North 
American Review, “the fact has come to be recognized that all offenses that are evil in 
themselves and do not derive their criminal quality from local policy and statutes, are so far 
injurious to the world at large that all are concerned in their punishment.”53 Contemporary 
writing was loaded with these emotive, extreme descriptions: civilization needed to unite 
against the evil threat of “bloody-handed assassins, and bomb-throwing conspirators, and 
the worst type of revolutionary fanatics.”54 The illustrious lawyer Frederic Coudert, in a 
paper presented at the third annual meeting of the American Society of International Law, 
argued that this was the “distinction” that separated a George Washington or a Lajos 
Kossuth from “objects of universal execration like Wilkes-Booth, Guiteau, Czolgolz [sic.]… 
whose monstrosities shocked the civilized world.”55 Julian Mack, who was named a federal 
judge in 1910, echoed this sentiment, arguing that anarchistic crimes were “not directed 
against one country alone and its political conditions, but directed against human society in 
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general.”56 The public in the United States and Great Britain recoiled in horror at the 
indiscriminate use of terror by anarchists like Meunier; lawyers, government officials and 
judges agreed.57 Cave’s ruling in the Meunier decision merely codified what was already widely 
accepted: because anarchists denied the validity of any and all government, they were not 
engaged in a struggle to impose their own kind of rule. Consequently, governments would 
not protect their criminal offenses as political ones.  
After 1856, governments increasingly incorporated the attentat or Belgian clause into 
extradition treaties alongside the political offense exception. The attentat clause stipulated 
that “An attempt against the life of the head of a foreign government, or against that of any 
member of his family when such an attempt comprises the act either of murder or 
assassination, or of poisoning, shall not be considered a political offence or an act connected 
with such an offence.”58 While it similarly arose out of the milieu that spawned the political 
offense exception, the attentat clause was developed as a way to limit it. The origins of the 
clause date to September 1854, when two Frenchmen named Célestin and Jules Jacquin 
attempted to assassinate Emperor Napoleon III by detonating a bomb under a rail line as his 
train traveled between Lille and Calais. They later escaped to Belgium where the Belgian 
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Court of Appeal denied the French government’s extradition request, ruling that the crime 
fell under the political offense clause of the Belgian Law of 1 October 1833 and the Franco-
Belgian extradition treaty of 1834. Reaction to this was swift and governments began to 
insert language into their extradition treaties to prevent repeat situations in the future. While 
the U.S. government was slow to incorporate the provision into its extradition treaties, it 
first appeared in a U.S. treaty in 1882 and quickly became a standard feature of American 
agreements [See Figure 3.2]. 
 
 The attentat clause was designed to reassure a wary public – and equally wary heads of 
state – that an assassin would not be able to escape justice purely by arguing that their crime 
was political because they attacked a head of state or member of their family. Inserting the 
clause into extradition treaties had the effect of allaying concerns such as those raised by 
Hartmann during his time in the United States: what if the assassin targeted a sympathetic 
figure? What if Guiteau had escaped and claimed that his attack on President Garfield was 
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political? In Great Britain, Sir Kenelm Digby, the Under Secretary of State at the Home 
Office, referenced In re Castioni to support his argument that, “The fact that the object of the 
crime was a foreign Sovereign might indeed be an element in proving the political character 
of the crime, but if it were the sole evidence it seems to me very improbable that any English 
Court would on that ground alone refuse extradition.”59 Context here was as important as it 
was for Hartmann’s critics in 1881. In this case, an Italian anarchist assassinated Elisabeth, 
Empress of Austria in Geneva in mid-1898. Like Alexander II in 1881, Elisabeth was a 
popular and sympathetic figure and her murder, unlike the tsar’s, lacked the pretense that the 
crime had a larger political purpose behind it. Digby, then, assured those who believed the 
attentat clause would ensure justice for attacks on such public figures. Public officials in the 
United States echoed this idea as well. In 1885, following an attack in London by members 
of the Irish opposition, Elihu Root, then serving as a United States District Attorney, gave a 
speech in New York, stating: “Men may conspire here to commit wholesale assassination 
upon English soil, and it is no legal offense… The laws ought to be changed… This people 
has been foremost among the nations of the earth [sic.] in securing to every man liberty of 
speech and liberty of action; it should not be the last to punish those whose liberty of word 
and act degenerates into infamous crime.”60 
 Yet not all heads of state were created equal and that reality was a potentially 
significant problem for liberal governments, such as those in Britain and the United States. 
“It is impossible to suppose that the murder of the Empress of Austria would have been 
regarded as a political offence,” Digby continued while also cautioning, “It is, of course, a 
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different question whether an English Court would have regarded the murder of the 
Emperor of Russia as a political offence.”61 The crux of the issue was the clause’s 
universality; “protecting,” as Christopher Pyle laments, “all heads of state, no matter how 
richly they deserved to be shot.”62 This was Hartmann’s argument in 1881 about the 
revolutionaries who preceded him and for those who would come after him. Hartmann and 
his defenders argued against the machinery of government being used to punish an attack 
that, they claimed, was made in an attempt to liberate the oppressed Russian people. The 
same issue remained in 1893 when the public debate over a proposed extradition treaty with 
Russia centered on not depriving Russians who used non-lethal attacks on the Tsar of 
asylum while acknowledging that Americans, by virtue of their laws, were “bound not to be 
accessories to designs on the Czar’s life.”63 
While Figures 3.1 and 3.2 demonstrate how quickly and extensively the U.S. 
government incorporated the political offense exception and attentat clause into its 
extradition treaties, it did not always occur unopposed. In the 1880s and 1890s notable 
conflicts over these provisions erupted over treaty negotiations between the United States 
and Great Britain [1890] and Russia [1893]. The treaty with Britain was a supplement to the 
Webster-Ashbuton Treaty [1842] and representatives of both countries sought to modernize 
the treaty by expanding on the relatively short list of crimes eligible for extradition in the 
original treaty. Negotiations on a new treaty were arduous – taking over twenty years of 
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intermittent diplomacy – and centered on the issue of speciality, as it pertained to both 
ordinary and political crimes.64 While the British government denied that Irish terrorism was 
a political issue, many Americans had a hard time separating the motivations of Irish 
terrorists from their acts of violence, which they often attributed to British misrule.65 The 
new treaty with Russia followed a similar path to development. U.S. Secretary of State 
Hamilton Fish first proposed a treaty in 1873 but it was quickly shelved because, as Thomas 
Bayard wrote, the “Russian government desired to introduce into the treaty various minor 
offenses, which were unacceptable to this Government.”66 Russian representatives resumed 
negotiations on extradition treaties with both the United States and Britain in the 1880s in 
the wake of Alexander II’s assassination, which aroused sympathy in both countries, and the 
Haymarket bombings and trial in the United States, which coincided with what the Russian 
government described as an increase in Russian criminals finding refuge in the United 
States.67 
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The governments of Great Britain and Russia in the late nineteenth century may not 
have had much in common, but popular opposition to extradition treaties negotiated with 
them focused on many of the same issues. While both treaties were based on the extradition 
treaty with Belgium [1882], which had entered into force practically unnoticed, 
contemporaries reacted with alarm when identical terms were applied to Britain and Russia. 
Article 2 (11) of the Belgian treaty declared “wilful [sic.] and unlawful destruction or 
obstruction of railroads which endangers human life” a crime subject to extradition. While 
this became increasingly standard in American treaties after 1882, it provoked alarm in the 
Irish-American community in the United States. While Americans had interest in an 
extradition treaty that would make it easier to pursue financial criminals who escaped across 
the border into Canada, the British wanted to prevent the United States from remaining a 
safe-haven for Irish terrorists. Daniel Margolis argues that the failure to pass a treaty in 1886 
and the subsequent passage of one in 1890 was due to “changes in extradition relations that 
were quite apart from any concerns over terrorism or the definition of crime,” it is notable 
that this clause, which excited so much opposition in 1886, was removed from the 1890 
version of the treaty and was not added into an extradition treaty with Britain until 1931.68 
Regarding the treaty with Russia, which was signed in 1887 and contained the same list of 
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crimes as the Belgian treaty, outrage was directed at the attentat clause contained in Article 
III.69 The agreement sparked a firestorm of resistance from immigrant groups to the social 
and literary elite. A mass meeting in Chicago to protest the treaty in 1893 drew a crowd of 
five thousand Polish immigrants and Polish-Americans. One speaker decried the Tsar as “a 
self-willed despotic monster” that had “extended his bloody hand to America,” while 
another declared the treaty as “entirely opposed to American ideals.”70 Protests and 
opposition also came from prominent figures like Elizabeth Cady Stanton, Charles F. 
Adams, William Dudley Foulke, and George Kennan, cousin to the American diplomat 
George F. Kennan as well as from organizations, such as the Society of American Friends of 
Russian Freedom and the Society for the Abrogation of the Russian Extradition Treaty.71  
Despite the failure of opponents of these treaties to prevent their entry into force, 
the opposition to these agreements revealed a great deal about American efforts to draw a 
line between protecting and punishing political offenders. For the Anglo-American 
Extradition Treaty [1890], opposition to listing dynamite offenses was significant enough 
that the treaty was revised to remove what was increasingly a standard feature of American 
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agreements with other countries.72 Conflicting opinions about Irish terrorism endured and 
fundamentally shaped extradition matters between the two countries for a century: into the 
1980s the United States would resort to deportation, rather than extradition when it came to 
cases of Irish Republican Army members.73 The Russian-American Extradition Treaty 
endured an even more peculiar fate. Though the attempts to pressure the U.S. government 
to nullify the treaty failed, the treaty itself disappeared. Unlike other lapsed treaties, it is 
unclear that it was ever abrogated as provided for in Article 11. The State Department’s 
Treaties in Force series simply lists it as “Obsolete” and the treaty was removed from the series 
in 1941.  
Over the last two decades of the nineteenth century, American officials and civil 
society wrestled with how to draw a line between political crimes that deserved protection 
and crimes of terror, which did not. Despite widespread sympathy for the plight of Irish 
Republicans or Russian émigrés and exiles, most Americans recoiled in horror at the acts of 
violence committed by anarchists and other terrorists. In attempting to devise protections 
for political radicals while rejecting safe haven to violent criminals, government officials and 
the public at large began to articulate their views on international terrorism. Yet they never 
spoke with one voice. An editorial published in the San Francisco Chronicle captured the 
dilemma: Most Americans would not mind if a Russian nihilist killed the Tsar but, he asked, 
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“as a matter of simple justice what is the difference” between that, a Fenian assassinating 
Queen Victoria, or an American anarchist assassinating the president?74 The growing body of 
extradition law demonstrated that, from the government’s position, there was no difference. 
If some, such as the contributor to the San Francisco Chronicle, focused on the victims of 
assassination, others emphasized the extreme violence and ease with which it could spread. 
“Murders committed in France or Germany,” Thomas Cooley wrote to increasingly wary 
readers, “do not merely shock the public mind” in those countries. They also affect “the 
public of Great Britain and America, and do something toward rendering life less secure the 
world over.”75 Bilateral efforts, like purely domestic legal reforms, would not be sufficient to 
address the transnational threat of anarchistic terrorism.    
 
THE ROME CONFERENCE: MULTILATERAL COOPERATION AGAINST ANARCHISTS 
Beginning in the 1880s, anarchist violence quickly exploded in a cycle of terrorism, 
reaction, and revenge throughout the 1890s, years often described as “the decade of the 
bomb” or the “decade of regicide.” In March 1892, the infamous French anarchist François 
Ravachol set off several bombs around Paris that targeted the police, prosecutors, and judges 
in response to what he and other sympathizers viewed as the harsh treatment of anarchists 
who had participated in a May Day demonstration. In December 1893, the anarchist 
Auguste Vaillant detonated a bomb in the French Chamber of Deputies as an act of revenge 
against the government, which had recently guillotined Ravachol. Vaillant’s own subsequent 
execution inspired Émile Henry’s bombing of the Café Terminus in Paris as well as the 
Spanish anarchist Sante Caserio’s assassination of French President Sadi Carnot in June 
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1894.76 In November 1893, a Spanish anarchist set off two bombs in the Liceu Opera House 
in Barcelona in retaliation for the earlier execution of anarchists blamed for an insurrection 
in Jerez in southern Spain. In June 1896, a bombing during a religious procession in 
Barcelona prompted the government to declare martial law and police arrested, imprisoned, 
and tortured numerous anarchists in the Montjuïc fortress in the city. In August 1897, the 
Italian anarchist Michele Angiolillo assassinated Prime Minister Antonio Cánovas del Castillo 
at a resort in northern Spain in an act of revenge. In September 1898, in Geneva, the Italian 
anarchist Luigi Lucheni used a sharpened file to stab Empress Elisabeth of Austria, who 
succumbed to her injuries the same day.77 In Italy itself, in 1894, the press blamed anarchists 
for bombings near the parliament in Rome as well as for explosions near the Ministries of 
Justice and War. In July 1900, following the harsh suppression of bread riots in Milan in 
1898, the anarchist Gaetano Bresci returned to Italy from the United States and assassinated 
King Umberto I in Monza. Three months prior to the attack on Umberto I, a young Belgian 
anarchist tried unsuccessfully to kill the Prince of Wales, the future Edward VII, while the 
prince waited for his train in Brussels. In Britain, police arrested a group of anarchists in 
Walsall and charged them with making explosives in 1892 and, in February 1894, the French 
anarchist Martial Bourdin died when an explosive device he was carrying detonated outside 
the Royal Observatory in Greenwich Park, London. Finally, in September 1901, the self-
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professed anarchist Leon Czolgosz assassinated U.S. President William McKinley at the Pan-
American Exposition in Buffalo, New York.78  
When confronted by such acts of violence, vulnerable governments enacted 
repressive laws that targeted anarchists. In the 1880s and early 1890s several European states 
passed laws against the criminal use of explosives, including: Britain [1883], Germany [1884], 
Austria [1885], Belgium [1886], and Switzerland [1894]. England and Switzerland, whose 
respective dynamite laws made it a crime to plot a murder or explosion either domestically 
or internationally, are notable because those countries were widely seen as havens for 
European anarchists.79 Germany, in 1878, passed a series of restrictive Anti-Socialist laws, 
due in part to two failed attempts to assassinate Kaiser Wilhelm I, and the Reichstag 
subsequently renewed those laws four times before they expired in 1890.80 Similarly, the 
French government passed the Lois scélérates between 1892 and 1894, which overturned 
freedom of the press laws passed by the Third Republic. The laws repressed most anarchist 
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publications, punished those who discussed propaganda by deed even if no crime occurred, 
and placed limits on publishing the proceedings of anarchist trials. Spain, Italy, Denmark, 
Bulgaria, Sweden, and Argentina all similarly passed laws to curb propaganda by deed.81 
While the U.S. Congress passed no anti-anarchist statutes, New York, New Jersey [both 
1902], and Wisconsin [1903] passed laws punishing “criminal anarchy.”82 In acts that 
contributed to the diffusion of anarchists and their ideas, governments often paired 
restrictive laws with expulsions of troublesome anarchists. Though it was an exaggeration, 
the journalist Francis Nichols captured the spirit of the age when he argued that to be an 
anarchist – particularly in Europe – was “equivalent to being a criminal punishable with 
imprisonment or exile. For a man who has been known to actually advocate law destruction 
there is really but one escape, and that is America.”83  
Contemporaries were acutely aware of the transnational nature of many of the most 
egregious crimes. A Spanish anarchist stabbed Carnot to death; an Italian anarchist, who 
traveled to Spain via London and Paris, shot Cánovas; an Italian anarchist stabbed the 
Austrian Empress to death in Switzerland; an Italian, who had immigrated to the United 
States, returned home to shoot Umberto I; a Belgian anarchist attempted to assassinate the 
heir to the English throne before fleeing, first to France and then to Switzerland; indeed of 
all the assassinations in the “decade of regicide,” only an American anarchist shooting the 
																																																								
81 The measures themselves varied. Some targeted the abuse of explosive materials, others 
banned membership in anarchist organizations, and others placed limits on anarchist 
publications with a specific eye to their incitements to violence. 
82 Criminal anarchy was defined as “the doctrine that organized government should be 
overthrown by force or violence, or by assassination of the executive head.” Sidney Fine, 
“Anarchism and the Assassination of McKinley,” American Historical Review 60, no. 4 (July 
1955): 793. 
83 Francis H. Nichols, "The Anarchists in America," Outlook, 10 August 1901, 859. 
 
 166 
U.S. president was devoid of any immediate transnational connection. More troubling to 
many, anarchists did not just direct their attacks against reactionary regimes. In his 
comparative study of assassins published in 1881, William Smith lamented the recent 
assassination of U.S. President James Garfield and expressed concern that the same impulses 
that drove the assassins of monarchs might also motivate American assassins. “The royal 
world abroad,” he stated, “whose peoples have their own assassins to contend with, must 
not be furnished reason to conclude, that, in America the assassin is moved by the same 
impulses…. This would be admitting that the President of the United States might become a 
tyrant” – or be indistinguishable from one.84  
To confront the transnational anarchist threat, governments had to find common 
ground and respond collectively in a way that would satisfy both the security concerns and 
domestic conditions of countries across the political spectrum. Counterterrorist literature, 
which typically focuses on the post-1970 period, highlights a number of collective action 
problems.85 Defensive measures taken by a government can shift attacks to less-protected 
areas, leading nations to work at cross-purposes. Preemptive measures, such as infiltrating a 
terrorist group, provides a public good to all threatened countries, but the burden can often 
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fall on a prime-target nation to shoulder the burden.86 Multilateral cooperation, to be 
effective, should involve the largest number of interested parties as possible, but that 
magnifies collective action problems while also increasing potential hurdles due to domestic 
cultural differences, constitutional constraints, and more.87 These same issues plagued the 
international community a century earlier. Examining how domestic, cultural norms shaped 
international anti-anarchist efforts sheds light on the attempts of the international 
community to explicitly define terrorism, devise measures to counter it, and link concern 
over terrorism with a general call to improve collective security.88  
Governments most aggrieved by terrorism—and by attacks on their political elites, 
more specifically—made the most strident calls for international cooperation. In the wake of 
Alexander II’s assassination, the Russian government joined with the governments of 
Germany and Austria-Hungary to call for a conference in 1881 to promote cooperation 
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against assassins and exclude assassination or attempted assassination from the list of crimes 
exempted from extradition due to their political nature.89 In November 1893, mere days after 
the bombing of the Liceu Opera House in Barcelona, the Spanish ambassador in London 
inquired as to whether “England would be disposed to enter into arrangements for common 
international action against anarchists.”90 Similar calls also came from the governments of 
France [1892], Belgium [1893] and Austria-Hungary [1894].91 While none of these efforts 
came to fruition, some countries negotiated bilateral agreements to share intelligence 
regarding the movements of anarchists or to explicitly allow for the extradition of those 
individuals who attempted to assassinate heads of state.92  
Critics and proponents of international cooperation alike focused on the British 
government’s reluctance to engage in such efforts as an essential reason for their failure to 
																																																								
89 “Anarchists and Socialists: A Russian Circular Asking an International Conference,” The 
Globe and Mail [Toronto], 25 April 1881: 2; “News in Brief,” Plain Dealer [Cleveland, OH], 22 
April 1881: 2. 
90 “Draft: Sir H. Wolff, N. 164,” 22 November 1893, HO 45/10254/X36450, National 
Archives, Kew Gardens, United Kingdom.  
91 Bernard Porter, The Origins of the Vigilant State: The London Metropolitan Police Special Branch 
before the First World War (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1987), 40, 111. See also, “The 
European Powers and Political Refugees,” The Manchester Guardian, 30 December 1890: 8; 
“Agreement Against Anarchists: Russia Initiates a Movement to Have them Extradited as 
Criminals,” Washington Post, 27 September 1896: 5. 
92 For example, Russia reached agreements with Germany, Austria-Hungary, and Romania to 
share information on suspected persons whose movements could pose a security threat. The 
French government, for its part, periodically forwarded police bulletins and other 
notifications of the movement of dangerous anarchists. Russia also negotiated extradition 
agreements with Prussia and Bavaria, which allowed for the extradition of “all individuals 
who had made an attack on the life, the body, or the honour of a monarch or a member of 
his family, or who had committed any kind of murder or attempt to murder” and Russia’s 
extradition treaty with Spain [1888] did not prevent the extradition of political criminals at 
all. See, respectively, Fredric S. Zuckerman, The Tsarist Secret Police Abroad: Policing Europe in a 
Modernising World (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2003), 58; Jensen, The Battle against 
Anarchist Terrorism: An International History, 1878-1934, 79; Oppenheim, International Law: A 
Treatise, 522-23.  
 
 169 
occur as proposed. In May 1881, the British ambassador in Berlin wrote to Foreign Secretary 
Granville, “As regards the Nihilist Conference, you have successfully nipped it in the bud. 
France and Italy will hold with us, and Bismarck will advize [sic.] Russia to make the most of 
the French offer to negotiate new extradition Treaties.”93 British refusal of the Spanish 
government’s request in 1893 was, in diplomatic and legal circles, believed to torpedo that 
initiative, though Richard Jensen demonstrates that other European governments were also 
reluctant to participate. “The Spaniards,” he quotes the Austrian Foreign Minister as saying, 
“made a mess of it” because their proposal for a general conference to discuss anarchists was 
too vague.94 Jensen concluded that European states’ failure to take concerted action “lay in 
the fact that here, as in so many other fields, national self-interests and rivalries edged out 
international concerns” while Hsi-Huey Liang answered his question of whether Europe, by 
the 1890s, “had already reached the point where the sovereign states had become so closely 
linked… that their defense was now a collective necessity” with an emphatic “no.”95 
Defenders of Britain’s reluctance to participate in these initiatives frequently pointed 
out that the country would not be pushed to participate by foreign pressure and claimed that 
popular opinion, which was deeply preoccupied with maintaining the country’s reputation as 
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an asylum for political offenders, limited what could be done cooperatively.96 There was “no 
doubt” that an anti-anarchist conference would be convened at the behest of the Russian 
government in 1881, yet in the Globe and Mail’s estimation, the English government would 
decline to attend because “public feeling is decidedly opposed to the subversion of the right 
of asylum at the demand of a second holy alliance.”97 The Foreign Office similarly made its 
reservations to Spain clear following the Spanish government’s 1893 proposal for an anti-
anarchist conference: “In the first place, it was not easy to draw a clear line between 
anarchism and other forms of more or less extreme opinion. In the next place, legislation 
would be required, and all legislation of this kind was regarded with the most jealous 
suspicion.”98 A year earlier, in a series of minutes exchanged between the Home and Foreign 
Offices regarding the French reaction to a series of bombings around Paris, one writer 
offered that the French experience was similar to that which the English experienced 
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between 1882 and 1884 and that “this class of crime will never [be] satisfactorily dealt with 
until some international agreement” was made. “The difficulty,” according to the 
respondent, “is as to the exception of political offenses.”99 And in 1904, in a commentary on 
a Parliamentary debate over an immigration bill, an “ex-attaché” argued that it was “part and 
parcel of their national principles” that the United Kingdom was a “haven of refuge to 
victims of tyranny.”100 The British government, contrary to popular perception, did not stand 
in simple isolation from its continental peers, simply shunning cooperation in the name of 
protecting national self-interest or outright rejecting the need for collective security. Rather 
than ascribe to the simplistic equivalence that anarchism was a crime, the British public and 
policymakers grappled with a sophisticated differentiation between anarchism as an ideology, 
regardless of the distaste many held for it, and crimes committed by individuals claiming the 
mantle of anarchism – or those who had such a mantle thrust upon them.  
The debate over whether to cooperate with continental efforts to suppress 
anarchism centered, understandably, on domestic differences of opinion on the ideology of 
anarchism and its complex relationship to violence. In observing the goings on in Britain in 
the wake two anarchist plots in 1894, the New York Times greatly oversimplified and miscast 
the debate as: “The plain question for the English is whether the right of asylum… for 
political offenders against foreign governments is or is not to include Anarchists. There can 
be no doubt what the answer would be to the question stated in this form.”101 This was an 
incorrect assessment because it assumed there was a consensus that anarchism was 
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inextricably linked to violence, which was not true. For example, in discussing how to 
respond to the Uruguayan Chargé d’ Affaires’ inquiry as to Britain’s dynamite laws, the 
Foreign Office stressed that “to be an Anarchist is not an offence against English law, any 
more than it is to hold any other theory with regard to social or political questions.” The 
laws were concerned with punishing those who “attempt to enforce their views by crime.”102 
The Foreign Office explicitly maintained a position that the crime and ideology were 
separate, and the latter was not punished as the former; the Home Office echoed this 
position and so did newspapers, such as The Chronicle.103  
Others rejected out of hand the idea that adopting anarchist beliefs was not a crime. 
Lord Salisbury concisely expressed this position in a July 1894 debate in the House of Lords. 
“My whole case,” he declared, “is that everything has changed since the days of Kossuth, 
Mazzini, and Garibaldi. It is no longer a case of liberty against despotism. It is no longer a 
question of giving a harbour of safety to those who, in the vicissitudes of politics, have failed 
to carry their own ideals into effect.”104 Social Democrats, Socialists, trade unions and other 
groups who, as a writer in The Guardian [Manchester] tried to make clear in a contrast with 
anarchism, “at least aim at a reconstruction, partial or entire, of society; the anarchists alone 
seek simply to destroy it.” For people who subscribed to the view that anarchism was 
antithetical to society, rather than that it was adopting a different view of society, “It may be 
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necessary for our own defence, and for our justification in the sight of Europe, to suffer 
some abridgement” of liberties like asylum.105 Whether or not Britain should cooperate in a 
continental congress that would devise ways to suppress anarchism, or what shape Britain’s 
cooperation would take, floundered on the division over whether anarchism was an ideology 
offering a different view of social or political orientation, or if it was inextricably linked to a 
violent threat to society, broadly conceived. It was impossible for British representatives to 
participate in an international congress on anarchism and find common agreement with 
reactionary governments like Russia, Germany and Austria-Hungary when domestic 
consensus was so elusive.  
While calls for an international gathering to suppress anarchism had quieted by the 
mid-1890s, Luigi Lucheni’s assassination of Elisabeth, Empress of Austria and Queen of 
Hungary, on 10 September 1898 gave a renewed push to those advocating such a 
conference. That an Italian who was born in France committed the attack against an 
Austrian in Switzerland demonstrated forcefully that an international response was 
necessary. Elisabeth herself was also a uniquely sympathetic target, which also played a role 
in garnering support for an international congress: she was a woman, widely hailed for her 
beauty, highly regarded for her charity and kindheartedness, uninterested in the pomp of 
courtly life, and beset by personal tragedies such as the suicide of her only son, Crown 
Prince Rudolph.106 Further underscoring the urgency was the recognition that Elisabeth—
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and indeed Lucheni’s intended target, Henri of Orléans, claimant to the French throne—did 
not exercise any political power of their own. As Lucheni emphasized in court, Elisabeth was 
a symbolic target. “If it had been the Empress I wished to kill, I should have gone to 
Montreux, not to Geneva,” he declared in response to the prosecutor’s inquiry whether 
“You had then, no grudge against the Empress of Austria?” Responding to another of 
Lucheni’s interjections, the public prosecutor commented that “the prisoner’s doctrine 
appeared to be that which no one who did not work should be allowed to live;” Lucheni 
simply responded, “that’s right.”107 Prior assassinations may not have evoked such wide 
sympathy because they could be tied, directly and indirectly, to the political positions of and 
actions taken in the name of those murdered. There was nothing like that with the attack on 
Elisabeth. It was, as the historian Alex Butterworth writes, “envious retribution; the last 
resort of the hopeless, the damaged and the dispossessed.”108  
Consequently, the reaction from continental governments was swift. Five days after 
Elisabeth’s assassination, the Italian Minister of Foreign Affairs Admiral Felice Napoleone 
Canevaro sent a circular dispatch to the foreign diplomatic missions in Rome that 
condemned the lax punishment of anarchists in Switzerland – which one Italian paper 
dismissed as “that Liliputian Republic [sic.]” – and gauged the interest of other European 
powers in an international congress.109 By September 29, little more than two weeks after 
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Elisabeth’s assassination and with the support of the Austro-Hungarian foreign minister, 
Canevaro sent a formal proposal for an anti-anarchist conference to every Italian embassy 
and legation in Europe. The expressed purpose of the conference was to draft “international 
measures as may appear best calculated for the suppression of anarchist associations and the 
prevention of anarchist outrages.”110 Every European government accepted the Italian 
invitation. 
Even representatives from Britain, whose government had always resisted prior calls 
to cooperate in an international conference, indicated that they would accept the Italian 
invitation. In part, this was due to the geopolitical situation in which Britain found itself. 
That same September and October, a war scare broke out when British and French forces 
met in a standoff over the headwaters of the Nile River, known as the Fashoda Crisis. At the 
same time, tensions with the Boers were rising over the British influence in South Africa. 
Given these geopolitical realities, the government in Rome, which enjoyed cordial relations 
with its British counterpart and with its ties to Germany and Austria in the Triple Alliance, 
was simply far more likely to get an affirmative reply from the British Foreign Ministry than 
the governments behind previous efforts. Of additional concern was that the weight of 
opinion toward the freedom anarchists and other political exiles had in Switzerland shifted 
significantly in the wake of Elisabeth’s assassination. While Britain was far more influential a 
European power, contemporary observers noted that Britain and Switzerland were seen as 
the havens for displaced anarchists. Given that all the other invited powers declared their 
intention to attend, it was in the British government’s interests to attend. Under the 
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circumstances, the British minister to Belgium warned the Home Office that any British 
delegation should expect an “attaque à fond,” “a determined attack from the great majority of 
the Continental Powers in regard to the freedom, which was allowed in England, to foreign 
refugees.”111 In that climate, as Lord Salisbury stated frankly in an exchange with the British 
minister to Switzerland, Sir Frederick St. John, “if the Powers generally determined to 
assemble in Conference to consider the subject, we could not refuse to take part in their 
deliberations.”112 Another critical factor was the position of Queen Victoria and her 
relationship with Salisbury, the conservative Prime Minister who had been in the opposition 
when the government had received and spurned the previous continental overtures. While in 
1881 the Queen expressed horror at the state of the law and the limits on extraditing 
someone who assassinated a fellow sovereign, the death of Elisabeth in 1898 was an acutely 
personal blow.113 Consequently, after Lord Salisbury replied affirmatively to the Italian 
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invitation on October 27, he informed Victoria of the decision and noted that it was “in 
accordance with the view Your Majesty expressed.”114  
Yet, while these factors may have been sufficient to get the British to agree to send a 
delegation, Salisbury as well as the popular press were both quick to point out that 
attendance did not guarantee acceptance of any resolutions arising from the conference. In 
his exchange with Minister St. John, Salisbury revealed that while Britain may have to attend, 
he was not anticipating anything of significance being agreed upon. “But we should do so 
with no very sanguine hope of arriving at any important result” given that, he went on, 
“great objection would be felt to any attempt to meet the dangers of the anarchist conspiracy 
by restraining or encroaching upon the liberty of the rest of the community.”115 In a dispatch 
for Minister Canevaro, Salisbury sounded a similar note. The sympathies of Her Majesty’s 
government, he assured Canevaro, lay fully “with the general feeling of condemnation and 
abhorrence… excited throughout the civilized world.” Salisbury, however, was quick to 
return the line of argument that had defined the British government’s attitude for almost two 
decades. British laws, as the prosecutions of the 1890s demonstrated, were “adequate.” He 
further continued to differentiate between anarchist ideology and the crimes committed by 
those claiming its mantle. “The subversive tenets which are professed as the motives for 
these crimes do not in any way tend to mitigate their atrocity,” Salisbury assured before 
reminding Canevaro that “The Italian Government are no doubt well aware of the principles 
traditionally accepted here with regard to the individual freedom of all persons… whatever 
opinions they may hold, so long as no substantial evidence of crime or criminal intention can 
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be produced against them.”116 The Times [London] echoed that caution. “Among the people 
of the United Kingdom,” the paper declared, “there is no feeling of tolerance for the 
wickedness of wretches” like Lucheni. Yet, as the editorial continued, “British justice must 
proceed on its own lines;” While every country had the obligation, the paper maintained, “to 
punish unsparingly the crimes of revolutionary conspirators, and to keep a careful watch… 
upon suspected Anarchists, but to proscribe a whole class as such, without proof of their 
guilt, would be neither fair nor practicable.”117 
 On 24 November 1898, Foreign Minister Canevaro convened the opening session of 
the International Conference of Rome for the Defense of Society Against the Anarchists. 
Whereas prior calls resulted in minimal interest, this time every country in Europe 
participated in the conference: fifty-four delegates representing twenty-one states.118 As was 
widely reported, the programme’s objectives included: defining anarchist crime and 
determining whether it was a common or political offense, finding consensus on issues 
regarding extradition, deciding on possible measures against the anarchist press, and 
formalizing international police cooperation.119 To accomplish these objectives, the 
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conference broke up into two committees, one tasked with legislative issues and the other 
with administrative matters. A sub-committee, formed out of the representatives of both 
committees, set out to address the problems of expulsion and extradition. Though all of 
these issues had bedeviled states affected by anarchist violence since the first attempts to 
convene a congress in 1881, Canevaro in his opening message expressed hope that “wisdom 
and the spirit of conciliation” in the face of “the danger which threatens the whole society” 
would be sufficient to overcome the “numerous and serious difficulties” that were up for 
discussion.120 
Everything about the delegations attending the conference pointed to challenges that 
had thwarted earlier efforts at cooperation. Though anarchism was a global problem, 
Canevaro deemed it necessary to limit the invitations to European states to increase the 
chances of arriving at a consensus. As he explained to William Draper, the American 
ambassador to Italy, it was “because of the difficulties which might be encountered under 
our form of government if repressive legislation should be agreed upon. The line of 
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invitation was, therefore, drawn so as to include only European powers.”121 Not only did 
assumed divisions over concluding a secret treaty and fears that “anarchist” might be defined 
to include political offenders influence Canevaro’s decision to exclude the United States, but 
it also caused some contemporaries to state incorrectly that Britain declined to attend the 
conference out of similar concerns.122 The makeup of the delegations themselves hinted at 
how past failures loomed over the conference. The sensitivity and weight of the 
deliberations necessitated the attendance of some of Europe’s most highly regarded 
diplomats and legal scholars, including: Camille Barrère of France, Monaco’s Hector de 
Rolland, and Sir Philip Currie of Britain. In addition to diplomats and representatives from 
various ministries of justice or the interior, high-ranking police officers from Germany, 
Austria-Hungary, Belgium, France, Britain, Russia, and Sweden and Norway also attended. 
Further, some of the police officials, such as François Charles de Latour of Belgium and M. 
Sloutchevsky of Russia, had established working relationships from prior international 
conferences, such as the recently concluded Fifth International Prison Congress [1896]. The 
clear hope, then, was that prior relationships and skilled diplomacy could smooth over 
enough of the differences that existed between the conference’s liberal and conservative 
participants that the attendees could put past failures behind them and unite to confront the 
pressing anarchist threat.  
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At the outset of the Conference, the delegates devoted much of their energies to the 
most obvious challenge: crafting a definition of anarchism that would be acceptable to the 
range of states participating in the meeting. Aleksandr Nélidov, the Russian ambassador to 
Italy, pushed for the Conference to adopt the position that “anarchism cannot be considered 
as a political doctrine.”123 This was in line with the belief of conservative states that 
extradition treaties should not protect anarchists because of any political implications in their 
crimes. States such as Russia, Germany and Austria-Hungary sough to define anarchism 
itself as a crime, rather than an ideology. As Baron Marius Pastti-Angeli, the Austro-
Hungarian ambassador to Italy, expressed to his British counterpart in a confidential note: 
“The passage from ‘the theoretical Anarchist’ to ‘the Anarchist of deed’ is a natural evolution 
that most often depends only on the temperament of the individual.” In memorializing and 
making martyrs of the Haymarket anarchists, Ravachol, Caserio, and others, Socialists or 
other groups approve of anarchistic crimes, “which they attribute to modern society,” even 
if they do not actively adopt similar measures.124 Yet such a position was untenable 
domestically in more liberal states and many of the delegates from those countries favored a 
definition authored by the Advocat Général of Monaco, Hector de Rolland, and supported 
by the French and Swiss. The definition ignored the political aspects of anarchism in favor 
of a focus on the act of violence itself. Anarchism was “every act having for its object the 
destruction by violent means of any social organization [toute organization sociale]” and an 
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anarchist as anyone who commits such an act.125 The definition, which carried by a vote of 
ten to eight, deliberately ignored the question of political intent yet was broad enough that 
attacks against any form of social organization could fall under the “anarchist” umbrella. As 
such, Lord Salisbury advised Currie that it would be “exposed to grave criticism” as “the 
term ‘social organization’ equally applies to either a Monarchy or a Republic.”126 
The mobility of anarchists and the ease with which they could circulate their ideology 
made devising a workable definition of anarchist crime essential. Were anarchist violence 
localized, it would be irrelevant to the Spanish or Russian governments, whose countries 
suffered numerous acts of terror, what the British government thought of “theoretical 
anarchism.” Anarchists and their ideas, however, were highly mobile. Britain could suffer 
very few incidents of anarchist violence, while being a hub from which anarchists could 
disseminate their work, which could then inspire an attack elsewhere. Other countries, such 
as the United States, could be places where disaffected immigrants found in anarchism a way 
to channel their social frustrations into violent crimes elsewhere, whether after returning to 
their home county or during their travels to a third-party destination. It was to this problem 
of anarchist mobility that the delegates then turned.  
The administrative committee at the Conference, which convened its first meeting 
on December 1, tackled the pressing issue of expulsion. First, anarchists were not evenly 
distributed. Governments loathed admitting dangerous anarchists expelled from other 
countries and they were equally opposed to harboring more of them. Only Great Britain 
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lacked the power to expel. Sir Howard Vincent, the British delegate to the committee, 
expressed concern that formalizing expulsion procedures could mean that, more than ever, 
London would be a place “in whose dark corners the discontented, the exiled, the outcast… 
may assemble for revolutionary and criminal plotting… which result in the hypnotizing of 
weak and ill-balanced minds.”127 In examining the expulsion procedures of Continental 
states, Vincent, expressed that “the law and practice of expulsion as now enforced are in 
direct opposition to international comity” because states had an interest in expelling 
anarchists but were dis-incentivized from promptly sharing that information, lest the 
receiving county protest or return the expellees.128 States, then, had powerful incentives to 
want other states to promptly notify them regarding the expulsion of dangerous anarchists, 
but they had equally powerful incentives not to do so if they were the expelling state.  
The second concern related to the struggle to differentiate between “theoretical 
anarchists” and other political dissenters from “anarchists of deed” who committed crimes 
deserving of punishment. Leopold Viguié, the Director of General Security for the French 
Minister of the Interior, revealed that expellees were given the chance to choose a 
destination, should their own country subject them to military laws upon their return, and 
the usual reply of such individuals was “En Angleterre,” to England.129 A Russian proposal, 
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which potentially undermined this kind of policy, caused a great deal of resistance in the 
committee. The amendment, which ultimately passed in a close vote, called for negotiations 
between governments prior to an expulsion so police officials could then arrest the expellee 
when they arrived. Viguié argued that expulsions could not cover for the improper 
extradition of political offenders.130 The Russian proposal did little to assure the 
representatives of more liberal governments that the real target was dangerous anarchists and 
not that the whole proceeding was simply a cover for conservative states to more fully clamp 
down on all political dissenters. Ultimately, the committee agreed on a series of measures: 
states were to create central bureaus with the authority to surveil the anarchists in their 
territory; authority should be given to those bureaus to disseminate useful information to the 
equivalent agencies in other states; and the bureaus should adopt portrait parlé as the uniform 
means of criminal identification.131 While these measures did build on established 
relationships, the pledge to share timely information regarding dangerous anarchists – 
particularly ones who might be in transit between states or expelled from one and sent to 
another – did little to meaningfully address the troubling realities of expulsion.  
The issue of extraditing anarchists to prosecute or punish them for crimes they 
committed was the other major agenda item of the conference. On December 13, the 
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Russian Ambassador Nélidov pushed for an amendment declaring, “Assaults on life or 
liberty of Sovereigns and Chiefs of State or their families shall be in every case included 
among the acts giving rise to extradition.”132 This was an attempt to enshrine the attentat 
clause from bilateral extradition treaties into an international accord. The Russian proposal 
came in tandem with a German resolution brought up to the same sub-committee that 
asserted, “anarchist acts shall not be regarded as political” and that acts, which were crimes 
in both concerned countries, would make the offender vulnerable to extradition.133 In an 
attempt to secure the acceptance of these principles by liberal governments, the Russian 
ambassador pressed Lord Salisbury to have the British delegation at the Conference accept 
the proposals by revealing that even the Swiss government was prepared to accept them.134 
Currie, in a telegram to the Foreign Office, argued that the Russian and German delegations 
misunderstood the British position. “It is argued by some foreign authorities, though we 
believe incorrectly,” he wrote, “that according to our law the murder of a Sovereign is 
necessarily a political act, and that the assassins of the Emperor of Russia or Empress of 
Austria could not have been given up if they had fled to England.”135 While the Conference 
approved these resolutions, the British maintained their objection that all attacks on a head 
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of state were apolitical, “without reference to the circumstances attending the commission of 
the offence.”136  
Though Britain was the only invited party not to sign the Final Protocol, Sir Philip 
Currie gave a speech before the close of the conference in which he pledged British support 
for much of what delegates discussed over the preceding month. He announced that the 
cabinet was preparing an extension of the Law of Explosives to cover cases in which 
criminal explosions were to take place in a foreign country and to add offenses connected to 
the criminal use of explosives to those covered by extradition treaties. The government, 
Currie assured the delegates, would also incorporate clauses regarding assassination into 
British extradition treaties, “making it clear that the exemption therein in favour of crimes of 
a political character should not apply… to the crime of willful murder, whether of a 
Sovereign, a Chief of State, or any other individual.” Finally, Currie also added that, as 
recommended by the legislative committee of the conference, the British government would 
study ways in which existing laws could better impede the distribution of documents inciting 
people to commit crimes of violence.137 These concessions, Currie relayed in a message to 
the Foreign Office, had the approval of the Russian, German, and Austrian ambassadors 
who viewed Currie’s statement as “the most important result obtained by the 
Conference.”138  
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Ultimately, while the Rome Conference achieved some notable results, its broader 
conclusions highlighted the challenges of cooperation. Administratively, Richard Jensen 
argues that the adoption of portrait parlé and the push for greater police cooperation were the 
foundation of future efforts of inter-European cooperation.139 In other fundamental ways, 
however, the Conference’s broader goals failed. The delegations from Germany, Russia, and 
Austria hoped that more liberal states would accept their view that anarchism itself was the 
crime to be dealt with, but this remained out of reach. While the Acte Finale of the 
Conference expressed this idea, the British deemed it inconsequential.140 While some, such as 
Sir Howard Vincent, argued that the greatest successes came from secret proceedings, their 
very secrecy prevented governments from trying to build a domestic consensus that would 
support propositions that might increase security at the expense of cherished principles.141 
Finally, rather than construct a consensus, the Conference exacerbated tensions between 
allies with divergent political views and the fact that the vote of each delegation was given 
equal weight gave a false impression of consensus.142 None of these issues were truly settled. 
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Instead, they reemerged in the wake of the assassinations of King Umberto I of Italy and 
U.S. President William McKinley and the resulting efforts to call a new international 
congress. 
 
THE ST. PETERSBURG PROPOSALS AND THE FAILURE OF MULTILATERAL 
COOPERATION: 
 Encouraged by President Roosevelt’s address to Congress after McKinley’s 
assassination, the representatives of Russia and Germany forwarded a proposal to the U.S. 
State Department that outlined measures that sympathetic states could jointly adopt to 
contain the anarchist threat. Sent nine days after Roosevelt’s message to Congress, the 
confidential promemoria from the German minister plenipotentiary, Baron Theodor von 
Holleben, repeatedly emphasized the theme of shared risks and responsibilities. Given the 
recent attacks on McKinley as well as other chief magistrates, the promemoria stated, it was 
“terribly evident that a struggle against the menace of anarchy is an urgent necessity for all 
governments and a duty whose performance cannot be postponed.” At the same time, the 
ease with which anarchists could move across borders made it “evident that concerted action 
… cannot be really successful unless the uniform and strict enforcement of the measures 
that may be adopted … can be secured by an international understanding.” The proposal 
then laid out a number of suggested measures, including: rigorous surveillance conducted by 
central bureaus in the various countries, the exchange of information on the movement of 
anarchists, regulations on expulsion of non-native anarchists, strengthened penal code 
provisions against anarchists and the subversive press, and finally legislation offering a 
																																																																																																																																																																					




“more complete and precise definition of anarchistic crime in all its aspects.”143 In many 
ways, then, the Russo-German proposal echoed Roosevelt’s message, which called 
anarchistic speeches “essentially seditious and treasonable,” suggested deportation and 
provisions for “punishment of those [anarchists] who stay,” and most importantly, argued 
that “treaties would give to the Federal Government the power of dealing with the crime.”144   
 The timing and contextual examples in the Russo-German proposal reflected a 
perception from conservative European statesmen that more liberal governments like the 
United States or United Kingdom would only join these kinds of international efforts when 
those countries also fell victim to the same kinds of anarchist violence that had wracked the 
continent. A proposal similar to the one delivered to the State Department was first 
circulated to European governments in 1900 after the attempted assassinations of the Prince 
of Wales, the future Edward VII, and Mozaffar ad-Din Shah Qajar, the Shah of Persia. 
Indeed, Kaiser Wilhelm II of Germany was so moved by the attack on the Prince of Wales 
that in a bedside meeting with the British ambassador, Sir Frank Lascelles, the Kaiser 
emphasized his hope, “that this attempt would convince Her Majesty’s Government that 
those countries which had passed severe laws against the anarchists were in the right, and 
which, however, were rendered almost nugatory by the asylum which these desperate 
characters found in England.” “It would be a good thing,” Lascelles recorded Wilhelm II as 
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saying, “if this incident induced Her Majesty’s Government to take some serious measures 
against the anarchists.”145  
The version of the promemoria circulated to the governments of Europe in October 
1900 reflected this concern: it explicitly referenced the two attempted assassinations as well 
as the successful attack on King Umberto I of Italy, also in 1900, and the document’s 
authors maintained that “the experience of many years has proved that the isolated efforts of 
governments are not sufficient to extirpate the evil; this would require joint efforts, based on 
international conventions.” While the Russian and German governments recognized the 
potential difficulty of making the advocacy of anarchistic doctrines a penal offense, one 
could not “remain an indifferent spectator of the revolting events that have recently 
disrupted the civilized world.”146 Though the UK government declined the overture, the 
Russian and German representatives in the country re-sent the proposal in November 1901 
after the death of President McKinley in September. In this second attempt, the 
representatives reframed the proposal as an invitation to join “a discussion of the measures 
which might be taken to counteract the designs of the Anarchist Societies which now 
infested so many communities,” and explicitly invoked the attack on McKinley as the 
impetus behind this new push.147  
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 The principle difficulties the American and British governments had with the Russo-
German proposal centered on the part that called for a strengthening of the penal code with 
regard to anarchistic doctrines and publications. In the United Kingdom, both the Home 
and Foreign Offices agreed that such “proposed legislation is impossible in this country” and 
communicated that to Baron Hermann von Eckardstein, the First Secretary of the German 
Embassy in London.148 The American response to the Russo-German proposal was similar. 
While the Department of State’s memorandum on December 16, 1901, relayed the 
President’s “cordial sympathy with the views and the purposes therein set forth” and 
repeated extracts from Roosevelt’s address to “assure all governments of civilized peoples of 
the President’s earnest desire to adopt every practicable means to eradicate this deadly 
growth from our body politic,” the key word was “practicable.” After all, the memorandum 
stated, the President could only adopt “such administrative measures as are within his 
constitutional power to cooperate with other governments to this end” and could only “urge 
upon Congress the adoption of such measures for the suppression of anarchy as may be 
found acceptable to the national legislature.”149 As was the case in matters of extradition or 
multilateral conferences, the British and American governments rejected—however 
politely—initiatives that targeted the ideology of anarchism as the crime rather than specific 
criminal acts.  
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 Though their initial efforts were stymied, the Russian and German governments 
recast and softened the language of their proposal. On April 9, 1902, representatives of these 
governments delivered a revised proposal to the Foreign Office and the U.S. State 
Department received the same draft agreement on May 1. Notably absent from this revised 
proposal were the most problematic items: legislation targeting the subversive press, changes 
to the penal code, and a push to define anarchism legally were all abandoned. This was a 
significant concession as those legal recommendations formed the core of conservative 
governments’ anti-anarchist program. It was, in many ways, an admission by those two 
conservative powers that despite two decades of efforts and first-hand experiences with 
anarchist attacks on heads of state, the governments of the United States and Britain would 
continue to adhere to their strict focus on punishing crimes, rather than the ideology that 
underpinned the offense. Instead, the proposal suggested interested powers agree on 
regulations for the expulsion of non-native anarchists, for their transfer back to their home 
countries, for the establishment of central bureaus whose mission would be to collect 
information about anarchists and their whereabouts, and finally that for reciprocal 
obligations to share intelligence on the movement and plans made by anarchists.150  
Though states like Switzerland and Greece indicated their support for this revised 
proposal, the United Kingdom and United States governments did not. The Foreign Office, 
after repeated consultation with the Home Office and Metropolitan Police, declined on June 
16 in a memorandum sent to the German Ambassador, Count Paul Metternich, and copied 
to his Russian counterpart, Baron Egor Egorovich Staal. The memorandum began by 
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making clear that “His Majesty’s Government are sincerely desirous of co-operating… in so 
far as the institutions and circumstances of the country will permit, and within the limits thus 
imposed upon them, they will be ready to give their assistance towards the arrangements 
proposed.” Even though the second proposal omitted troublesome issues like press 
restrictions or penal consequences for anarchist beliefs, British authorities were still 
concerned about the potential impingements on freedom of speech, the “circumstances of 
the country.” While there was no such national bureau, the Metropolitan Police and other 
local constabularies were both capable and willing to render reciprocal assistance and 
investigate anarchist plottings, “in view of the limitations of their powers imposed by the 
laws of this country.” These reservations were in addition to British frustration, also 
expressed by the memorandum’s authors that in the past the courtesies proposed in the draft 
had not been forthcoming from other governments toward the British. “His Majesty’s 
Government,” the memorandum concluded, “desire to lay stress upon the importance of 
keeping these arrangements as secret as possible, and would, for this reason, prefer not to 
enter into formal or publicly-avowed arrangements on the subject.”151  
The response of the United States government was, likely, even less satisfying: on 
May 5, 1902, John Hay forwarded to the Senate Committee on the Judiciary the initial 
promemoria from December 1901, the State Department’s response to that overture, and 
“an identical memorandum submitted… on the 1st of May.”152 In acknowledging the receipt 
of the documents, Senator George Hoar (R-MA) responded on behalf of the subcommittee 
charged with overseeing anti-anarchist measures, did not substantially respond to any of the 
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issues raised. He instead seized upon the second proposal’s comment that “measures to be 
taken for the prevention of anarchical crimes had received but inadequate consideration” 
and pointed out his prior suggestion that “some convenient island should be set apart by the 
agreement of all civilized nations to which anarchists should be deported.” Whether 
intentional or accidental, the State Department’s attitude demonstrated a deliberate 
misreading of the second Russo-German proposal. Removing the penal component from 
the first proposal was an attempt to make cooperation more palatable to states like the 
United States, where concern for any possible restriction on political speech triggered public 
resistance. In refusing to acknowledge that the Russo-German position had softened, the 
government sent a signal that it would continue to pursue its own course.  
 
CONCLUSION: 
 Critics of the American and British position on suppressing anarchist crimes made 
numerous charges. Some argued that the principles that were readily adopted such as the 
attentat clause or the inclusion of dynamite offenses in extradition treaties were “not much 
comfort” because they punished, rather than prevented, anarchist crimes.153 Others alleged 
that reluctance to suppress anarchism was due to individuals “being governed more or less 
by their international prejudices and hatreds” which led them to “regard with greater 
leniency crimes committed in other lands in whose defense political reasons are alleged.”154 
Still others contended that the issue at stake was not one government or another, “but of 
protecting human society and civilization itself against a new form of assault.”155 Even 
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suggesting that anarchists might deserve the same protections extended to other political 
refugees was “an absurdity and a monstrosity when it is extended so as to include rabid 
animals.”156 Britain and America erred by rejecting international measures, the critics alleged. 
“Anarchists will be found as long as England and America agree to shelter and protect them. 
Let those two doors be closed upon them and they will disappear from the face of the 
earth.”157  
 During the last two decades of the nineteenth century, the governments of Britain 
and the United States, along with civil society in both states, grappled with the threat posed 
by adherents to anarchism who committed acts of terror around the world. Rather than buy 
into the position adopted by conservative European states that anarchism itself was the 
crime and cooperation was required to suppress it, the public and policymakers alike 
struggled to maintain a sophisticated differentiation between the ideology of anarchism and 
any crimes committed by anarchists. In each country, government officials and private 
citizens weighed the need to protect political offenders and preserve cherished national 
principles against their desire to punish those who committed attacks against public officials 
and threatened society as a whole with acts of terror. In failing to fully embrace the position 
championed by their conservative peers, neither government nor their populations rejected 
calls for international cooperation. What they did do was weigh the need for greater security 
against the concern that such measures might pose a greater threat to society than the violent 
acts they were supposed to protect against. This debate was central to whether and in what 
ways the governments of Britain and the United States would cooperate with international 
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anti-anarchist initiatives. In the search for common ground, contemporaries struggled to 
come to an agreement on what made an anarchist’s political offenses apolitical. This struggle 
to differentiate between the ideology of anarchism and the crimes committed by individuals 









CHAPTER 4: ANARCHIST EXCLUSION IN THE UNITED STATES, 1887-1903 
 
 On 7 August 1900, barely a week after Gaetano Bresci assassinated King Umberto I 
of Italy, the American Consul at Naples, A. Hower Byington, dispatched a telegram warning 
the U.S. Department of State that two anarchists were traveling from Italy and one of them 
was supposedly plotting to assassinate President William McKinley. Over subsequent days, 
Baron Saverio de Fava, the Italian minister to the United States, shared information about 
the suspected assassin’s identity and criminal background forwarded from the Italian prefect 
in Naples. According to an anonymous letter received by the Neapolitan police, the anarchist 
Natale Maresca was crossing the Atlantic to “do a fine stroke” and, the letter advised, should 
be arrested immediately upon his arrival in the United States.1 Officials in both countries 
treated the plot with appropriate concern given the recent action by Bresci, who had 
immigrated to the United States roughly five years earlier only to return home to murder the 
king, and the breathless coverage in American newspapers of purported secret anarchist 
meetings where members drew lots to assassinate prominent heads of state.2 Consequently, 
when the trans-Atlantic steamer Kaiser Wilhelm II arrived in New York on 18 August, secret 
service agents detained Maresca and his traveling companion, Michele Guida, until the two 
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could appear before local immigration officials. In a hearing, a Board of Special Inquiry 
determined that Maresca should be returned to Italy while Guida, who was initially excluded 
as a person likely to become a public charge, was admitted.3  
 Using the experiences of Maresca and Guida as an opening to examine how 
anarchist exclusion emerged over time fits into a growing trend aimed at bridging the divide 
between scholars of immigration and of diplomacy.4 William Preston, Jr., whose research on 
the suppression of radicals remains critical to studies of anarchist exclusion, dismisses the 
significance of the anarchist movement in America after the Haymarket bombing of 1886 
and argues that the Immigration Act of 1903—colloquially known as the Anarchist 
Exclusion Act—was a consequence of “nativism lying latent during the good times of 
McKinley [that] responded quickly to the fears awakened by his death.”5 More recent studies 
of the 1903 Act build on Preston Jr.’s work and emphasize domestic issues of free speech or 
																																																								
3 This information was personally shared with Baron Fava, per his original request, on 
September 27. See “23,391-I: Acting Secretary of the Treasury to Sec. of State, 26 Sept 1900,” 
RG 59, M179: Records of the Department of State, Miscellaneous Letters (Received), Roll 
1083 (19-30 September 1900). 
4 Donna Gabbacia, in her 2010 keynote at the Society for Historians of American Foreign 
Relations’ annual meeting, issued a call to increase the dialogue between these two sub-
disciplines. Donna R. Gabaccia, Foreign Relations: American Immigration in Global Perspective 
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(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1963), 21, 34. 
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frame anarchist exclusion as a unilateral measure in contrast with multilateral efforts 
employed elsewhere.6 Critically, however, as Mae Ngai states, “Immigration policy not only 
speaks to the nation’s vision of itself, it also signals its position in the world and its 
relationships with other nation-states.”7 Discussions of transnational immigration control 
became important features of both scholarly discourse and popular debate in the wake of the 
terrorist attacks of 2001, and, as Erika Lee notes, “reflect the new global era of migration 
and migration policy.” While the current effort to internationalize immigration policy may 
indeed exemplify, as Lee argues, “the latest development in immigration law,” it is not 
unprecedented.8 Similar discussions about immigration policy, security, and civil liberties also 
shaped debates between the mid-1880s and early 1900s when an unprecedented wave of 
attacks against heads of state fed rumors of wide-ranging conspiracies and reports of 
anarchist outrages in cities far and wide spread fear. 
This chapter examines the debates around anarchist restriction that eventually 
resulted in the passage of the Immigration Act of 1903 [32 Stat. 1213] and argues that 
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U.S. Deportation Policy since 1882 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2012), 1-3. 
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domestically oriented conceptions of national security are both challenged and constituted 
by transnational and international processes and currents. Over the last two decades of the 
nineteenth century, individuals in public forums, state governments, and the offices of the 
federal government considered immigration control as part of an interdependent web of 
other measures aimed at curtailing what they perceived to be the anarchist threat to society. 
As such, anarchist exclusion was more than a sudden nativist eruption sparked by Leon 
Czolgosz’s assassination of President McKinley in 1901 and, further, it was intricately tied 
into the country’s foreign relations. Anarchists, like any other group of immigrants, were 
fully enmeshed in a vibrant transnational network and those individuals advocating measures 
to restrain—and, ultimately, restrict—their activities were cognizant of how that reality 
complicated their efforts. Contemporaries understood that successfully restricting anarchists 
at the gates required cooperation beyond the country’s borders, and exclusion, when it finally 
took shape, was the result of nearly twenty years of evolving debate. If the “master theme of 
immigration politics,” according to Roxanne Lynn Doty, is “the fear that we are losing 
control of our way of life,” then understanding how the fear of anarchist violence helped 
shape the contours of the domestic and diplomatic debates over anarchist restriction is 
critical as these old questions of transnational immigration control reemerge.9           
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 Broadening our understanding of security in the late nineteenth and early twentieth 
centuries expands the scholarly discussion of national security beyond the predominant, 
post-1945 emphasis on formal institutional mechanisms used to coordinate military and 
political affairs.10 In their recent examinations of the intellectual genealogy of national 
security, Andrew Preston points to Franklin D. Roosevelt’s physical and normative framing 
of “home defense” as the birth of modern national security complex while Eli Jelly-Schapiro 
takes a broader view, writing, “Despite the reciprocal emergence of security thinking and the 
modern state, the absolute saturation of social and political discourse within security rhetoric 
is a twentieth-century phenomenon.”11 These views are rooted in an understanding of the 
institutional weakness of nineteenth century governments compared to their modern 
successors. As Michael Sherry notes in his magisterial study of American militarization, “A 
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term like ‘national security,’ implying broad and continuous efforts to defend a country, as 
yet had no place” in the years prior to the lead-up to World War II, but this widely accepted 
position presumes a view of national security built on formal institutions and continuity, 
rather than a more fluid debate over what constitutes a security threat.12 Yet Melvyn Leffler’s 
widely accepted definition of national security as encompassing “the decisions and actions 
deemed imperative to protect domestic core values from external threats” has no such 
institutional constraints; indeed, Leffler argues that national security has “been an enduring 
element of the American diplomatic experience,” not just the result of the security realities 
of the atomic era.13 In debating how to address the anarchist threat, public figures and 
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private individuals weighed responses such as employing undercover agents, expanding 
federal power to punish attacks on officials, or restricting press freedoms—all hallmarks of 
modern national security policies—while others challenged such solutions on the grounds 
that they undermined perceived core values like freedom of speech, the right to judicial 
review, or equality before the law. Examining the emergence of anarchist restriction in this 
context highlights the fluid nature of “core values” and how shifting assessments of 
“threats”—both internal and external—can shape policy outcomes.    
 Superficially, the detention and subsequent exclusion of Maresca stands as a 
testament to what could be accomplished by the cooperation of governments dedicated to 
countering the threat posed by supposedly violent anarchists. Detaining Maresca and Guida 
depended on successfully sharing information across three countries – the United States, 
Italy, and France, where the American consul was when he first received word of the 
threat—in a mere eleven days, from 7 August to their arrival in New York on the eighteenth. 
The relevant information also had to cross several different branches of government: in Italy, 
the Ministries of the Interior and Foreign Affairs; in the United States, the departments of 
State, Justice, and the Treasury, which oversaw both the Secret Service Division and the 
Office of the Commissioner of Immigration. For the prompt dissemination of information 
about Maresca, the Italian ministries relied upon the Neapolitan police and officials in the 
Department of State relayed important intelligence to the offices of the governor of New 
York as well as the chiefs of police in both New York City and Washington, DC.14 Once 
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immigration officials detained Maresca and Guida, they convened a board of inquiry that had 
the power to determine whether or not the two would be permitted to enter the country or 
be returned to Italy. While the detection, detention, and eventual deportation of Maresca 
appears at first glance to be a remarkable success, closer examination reveals the myriad ways 
in which the movements of anarchists posed serious challenges to the mechanisms of 
immigration control and the relationships between governments struggling to curtail the 
threat of violence. 
 By the time of Maresca’s arrival at New York in August 1900, the U.S. government 
had been working diligently for nearly two decades to establish the mechanisms to keep 
people like him out. The legislation passed since the 1880s, in addition to increasing the 
number of excluded classes, accelerated the process of consolidating power over 
immigration in the hands of the federal government, what Keith Fitzgerald referred to as a 
“national policy network for front-gate immigration.”15 The Immigration Act of 1891 
established the Office of the Superintendent of Immigration under the office to the Treasury 
Department and funded it through the collection of immigrants’ head tax.16 The Act also 
provided for the opening of federal immigration stations, with the first opened at Ellis Island 
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in New York Harbor on 2 January 1892. At these stations, Immigrant Inspectors collected 
arrival manifests from incoming ships and also served on Boards of Special Inquiry that 
oversaw exclusion cases. Reflecting a concern with the protection of American workers and 
wages, the Act of 14 February 1903 transferred the Bureau to the newly created Department 
of Commerce and Labor. 
 The general intent of the legislation enacted over this period of time was to 
centralize control of immigration and to increase the amount of information about potential 
immigrants and travelers at the disposal of the new immigrant inspectors. Abroad, consular 
agents interviewed those who claimed American citizenship to ascertain the accuracy of their 
claims before providing passports for travel. The burden of determining the suitability of 
immigrants was shifted to the transport agencies, the shipping and railroad lines. Masters of 
vessels were required to deliver their manifests, which provided extensive details about the 
individuals on board: their full names and ages, marital status, occupation, literacy, and 
nationality, as well as information about who paid for their passage, how much money was 
in their possession, and more details about their intended destinations.17 The collection of 
such information, done at penalty to the transport agency if they brought immigrants who 
would be ineligible or if they failed to supply the appropriate information, was essential to 
the processing of immigrants by the immigration agents. 
 Maresca’s experience, however, reveals some of the many flaws inherent in such 
mechanisms. He was detained and ultimately deported not because he was a violent 
anarchist plotting to assassinate the president of the United States, but because he had a 
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criminal record and was therefore excluded under the existing immigration laws.18 The letter 
revealing his designs on McKinley’s life was actually the second letter written in an attempt to 
stop his emigration from Italy. The person behind the warnings, a former newspaper 
reporter named Pedretti, had written an initial letter declaring that Maresca, a recent parolee 
with a history of violent assaults, was going abroad armed. When this failed to have the 
desired result, Pedretti wrote the second letter detailing Maresca’s supposed intentions.19 As 
the Commissioner of Immigration at New York, Thomas Fitchie, bitterly concluded when 
reporting a similar episode in 1901, “the Italian Government is anxious to be rid of an 
undesirable character and relies on our inability to ascertain the real facts, which, under 
ordinary circumstances we would be unable to do, being dependent on the immigrant’s own 
admission.”20 More than a decade earlier, Edmund Stephenson, who was also then serving in 
the same post, advanced a similar argument when asked about an 1891 bill [H.R. 13175] to 
exclude anarchists: “Now, how can you tell, when there are three or four hundred people 
landing here, of their previous history in their own country?”21 As numerous observers of 
immigration were quick to note, even the information supplied by a ship’s master could be 
highly questionable, as “Frequently, immigrants are thoroughly coached as to what answers 
they shall give to the questions before leaving the port of embarkation; and in other cases 
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they are coached during the voyage.”22 Ultimately then, detecting and determining that 
Maresca’s immigration to the United States was a potential threat entirely depended upon 
the receipt, by the Neapolitan police, of two anonymous letters or his own admission.  
 When the United States did exclude anarchists through the Immigration Act of 1903, 
the effort to determine whether or not someone was an anarchist continued to depend on 
the admission of the individual being questioned. Three years after the initial passage of the 
Act, the editors of The Nation highlighted the continuing problem, writing, “If anarchists 
were all of one race; if they looked alike and had a distinctive dress or loudly proclaimed 
their tenets and their plots, it would be easy enough to hold them in check. But murder in 
the heart cannot be read on the face.”23 Unless contradictory evidence was brought forward 
all potential immigrants had to do to avoid being debarred as anarchists was to deny that 
they held those beliefs and did not believe in the violent overthrow of the government of the 
United States, or of any and all government.24  
 The responsibility for detecting and, it was hoped, preventing the immigration of 
undesirable aliens to the United States often fell upon consular officers who had to negotiate 
both the official bureaucracy and the vagaries of interviewing individual applicants. In the 
case of Italy, Maresca’s identification and the timely transmittal of the relevant information 
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was unusual; far more common were issues of mistaken identity, concerns over fraudulent 
naturalization papers, and the challenge of balancing thorough investigations with the 
realities of limited time and financial means.25 A great deal was known about Maresca’s 
movements in time to effectively locate and identify him. The State Department sent word 
to the Secret Service of Maresca’s probable departure locations and had the exact date, 
August 3. By August 11, the head of the Service, John Wilkie, was able to forward to William 
Hazen, the agent in New York, that Maresca was a steward on the Kaiser Wilhelm II and, two 
days before his arrival, they had his physical description forwarded by Ambassador Fava.26 
Without that, all authorities would have had with was a physical description: “twenty-nine 
years old; dark; heavily built; dark brown hair and eyes; height, one meter sixty-four 
centimeters; scar near ear.”27 
The experience of Joseph Centanni, an Italian immigrant who was naturalized as an 
American in 1888, sheds light on the perils of mistaken identity. After living and working in 
Marseille for nearly two years, he was arrested in October 1896 by the French police, on 
behalf of Italian authorities, for the murder of an architect in Naples, Italy. By January, 
																																																								
25 It was largely for these reasons that attempts to include provisions for extensive “consular 
inspections” were generally shelved. For a thorough accounting and detailed analysis of the 
debates from the Congressional Record, see Hall, Immigration and Its Effects upon the United 
States, 280-88. 
26 See, respectively, “No. 6428 [Telegram]: Wilkie to W.P. Hazen, Post office building, New 
York,” 8 August 1900; “No. 6473 [Telegram]: Wilkie to W.P. Hazen, Post office building, 
New York,” 11 August 1900. U.S. Secret Service [hereafter RG 87]: Correspondence, 1863-
1950; Letters Sent, 1899-1914, Box 7, Volume 7 (Letter Nos. 6,001 – 7,000; June 26 – Sept. 
28, 1900), National Archives II, College Park, MD. 
27 “No. 6516 [Telegram]: Wilkie to W.P. Hazen, Post office building, New York,” 15 August 
1900. RG 87: Correspondence, 1863-1950; Letters Sent, 1899-1914, Box 7, Volume 7. The 
problems of such an imprecise physical description easily lent themselves to numerous cases 
of mistaken identity or intentional fraud. The latter was a pressing concern of the consulate 
in Naples in the late 1890s. 
 
 209 
though Centanni had been brought to Italy and the issue of mistaken identity was cleared up, 
he was still confined because an Italian inspector refused to release him on the principle that 
Centanni was a “socialist.” By 1898, in response to Centanni’s continued efforts to get an 
indemnity from the Italian government, the American consul at Naples, A. Hower Byington, 
reported back to the State Department on his efforts and detailed the limitations he faced: 
the consulate had no diplomatic status, so everything would have to go up the chain of 
authority to the ambassador before being sent to the Italian Minister of Justice; such cases 
were “a very common occurrence”; proof was difficult to acquire outside of hiring, at great 
cost, a private detective agency; and just in forwarding all the relevant materials to the local 
Italian prefect, the consulate had incurred expenditures totaling $50, a significant expense.28  
 Ultimately, the results highlight the poor performance of the mechanisms of front-
gate immigration with regard to keeping out anarchists and criminals more generally. As the 
1904 report of the Commissioner-General of Immigration revealed, of the 7,994 immigrants 
excluded at the seaports of the United States that year, only one was an anarchist and only 35 
were classified as convicts – a microscopic percentage of the 812,870 alien arrivals that 
year.29 Even after the provisions against anarchists were strengthened by the Immigration 
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Act of 1907 [34 Stat. 898], the results scarcely improved. Between 1904 and 1910, a mere ten 
anarchists had been debarred and deported, never more than five in a single year. The 
number of criminals, though it generally increased, was also relatively insignificant.30 Due to 
the fundamental challenges associated with identifying potential anarchists, the editors of The 
Nation were some of the many voices that anticipated the difficulties and dismissed the 
suggestion of their exclusion as “impossible,” “rubbish,” and “a pious wish.” “But how to 
find out if he [a potential immigrant] has those principles,” they asked, “By the very 
hypothesis, [an anarchist] is a man who will stop at no crime. He would kill every 
Government official cheerfully, and lay whole cities to ashes without the quiver of an eyelid; 
yet it is supposed that he will have scruples about lying or perjury!”31  
 That Maresca, a “known” anarchist with a violent history, was even allowed to 
emigrate from Italy, a friendly government, highlights the fundamental challenge involved 
with excluding such “undesirable” persons. In a letter to Attorney General Philander Knox, 
Doctor N.G. Burnham identified what to do with anarchists as “the engrossing problem of 
modern time” and argued that the solution lay “with well organized concerted action at 
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home and abroad,” because “the responsibility rests upon all nations and people alike.”32 Yet 
the frequent newspaper notes of the deportations of anarchists from Europe were a near 
constant reminder that cooperation was elusive. Congressional inquiries and public 
commentary often highlighted the 1878 German antisocialist law, which aimed to curb the 
growth of the Social Democratic Party though various restrictive measures, because this law 
and others like it were often passed in the wake of violent incidents involving anarchists or 
other political radicals, who would then cross borders in an attempt to escape police pursuit 
or political persecution.33 In 1894, following the assassination of President Carnot, the 
French government passed a law targeting anarchist groups and newspapers. Between 1896 
and 1898, 190 anarchists were expelled from France. Between 1893 and 1894, England, 
Germany, and Austria enacted laws targeting the criminal use of dynamite; France, Italy, 
Spain and Portugal subsequently passed similar acts.  In Switzerland, previously a haven for 
European anarchists, a law was written that made it a crime to plot a murder or explosion 
either domestically or internationally.34 As the journalist Francis Nichols noted, to be an 
anarchist – particularly in Europe – was “equivalent to being a criminal punishable with 
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imprisonment or exile.  For a man who has been known to actually advocate law destruction 
there is really but one escape, and that is America.”35 
The problem was an obvious one: anarchists were not evenly distributed and 
governments of countries that suffered a disproportionate number of bombings or attacks 
were understandably reluctant to keep those individuals at home or take them back after they 
had departed. For example, in 1892, having received word that the French government was 
preparing to expel suspect foreigners in the wake of a dynamite outrage in Paris, the Belgian 
government requested that only their own subjects be conducted to the Franco-Belgian 
border and that, in each case, the local authorities should receive timely notice. In spite of 
the request, however, two Italians and an Austrian had been sent across the border after 
French police provided them with third class rail tickets. In response, the Belgian 
government returned the two Italians to France, but the Austrian was expelled to 
Luxembourg. In reporting these events back to the Marquis of Salisbury, the British 
representative in Brussels, Martin Gosselin, wrote, “My informant admitted that in the latter 
case, if it was necessary to get rid of the man, it could not be expected that the French govt. 
charter a ship for the purpose of conveying him to an Austrian Port; and that the Belgian 
auths. had been in some embarrassment as to what to do with him, but he considered that 
with regard to the 2 Italians … the action of the French auths. was absolutely inexcusable.”36 
The Foreign Ministries of multiple European countries would occasionally send – or were 
asked to send – the State Department lists of anarchists being deported to the United States, 
																																																								
35 Francis H. Nichols, "The Anarchists in America," Outlook, 10 August 1901, 859.  
36 “No. 55, Confidential: Mr. Gosselin to the Marquis of Salisbury,” 12 April 1892. Home 
Office [hereafter HO]: Registered Papers, Supplementary, 144/587/B2840C, National 
Archives, Kew, England. The file highlights a number of similar occurrences.   
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but as was also the case with information shared with the British Home and Foreign Offices, 
the information was frequently late and often incomplete.37         
 When it came to the issue of anarchist migration, there was often a deep disconnect 
between official offers of cooperation and how governments actually conducted their affairs. 
The U.S. Consul General in Vienna, Edmund Jüssen, reported back to Washington in the 
wake of the Haymarket bombings that he was “in a position to give your department the 
specific and particular assurance that the police authorities of Austria-Hungary have 
promised expressly to co-operate most willingly … and will give American consuls all the 
information required with reference to the character and antecedents of any subject of the 
monarchy.”38 Yet that same year, Jüssen also reported back to the Department of State, “It is 
quite natural that it [the Austrian government] feels no regret to get rid of the ultra-socialists 
and anarchists.”39 Richard Bartholdt, the editor of the St. Louis Tribune, testified before 
Congress three years later and confessed his own doubts about the feasibility of consular 
investigation into the anarchistic beliefs of migrants because “European governments will 
give certificates much more readily to men they want to get rid of than to those who are 
																																																								
37 See “Ministére de l’Intérieur, Direction de la Sûreté générale, État Signalétique des 
Anarchistes Éstrangers Expulsés de France, No. 4 – Juin 1894 [Filed by Dept. of State 28 
August 1894],” RG 59, M53: Notes from the French Legation in the United States to the 
Department of State, 1789-1906, Roll 26: 5 January 1893 – 18 December 1895; 
“Unnumbered: Draper to Sherman,” 9 September 1897, RG 84: Records of Foreign Service 
Posts, Diplomatic Posts, Italy, Vol. 0024: Serial No. 81: Despatches to Secretary of State, 
Mac Veagh and Draper, November 17, 1896 to February 1, 1898, Volume 17; HO 
144/587/B2840C. 
38 “Reports of Diplomatic and Consular Officers” in H. Rpt. 3792, 50th Congress, Second 
Session: 100. 
39 S. Rpt. 13: “Foreign Immigration.” 55th Congress, First Session. Washington, D.C.: 
Government Printing Office, 1897: 4. 
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valuable to the country abroad.”40 Though he was opposed to anarchist restriction, Herman 
Raster, as part of that same testimony before Congress on H.R. 13175, had a telling response 
to Herman Stump’s [D – Maryland] question if it would be “a friendly act” to send a 
convicted anarchist to some other country. “Why ought we to be so over-generous and 
assume duties for other nations that they do not for us?” Raster asked. “Take Vienna, for 
instance, or take Germany, France, Italy, and those other nations; they are friendly allies, but 
that does not prevent them from sending back the people they do not want. The papers 
publish the list, sometime fifty, sometimes ten or twenty, giving the names of people who 
have been expelled out of Austria. The nations take no offense at that. They all act in the 
same manner.”41  
 With regard to immigration from Italy, the continued flow of excluded classes of 
immigrants was a larger problem than the occasional anarchist. The Italian Foreign Ministry 
and Baron Fava were deeply concerned with alleviating the immigration issues that were a 
persistent point of contention in otherwise tranquil relations with the United States.42 In 
1896, Stump, then serving as the Commissioner-General of Immigration, went on a specific 
mission to Italy where he met with the Prime Minister, Minister of the Interior, and Foreign 
Minister in an effort to provide what Treasury Secretary John Carlisle called “the fullest 
possible explanation relating to the interpretation of the immigration laws of the United 
States.” The major point of the visit was to come to an explicit understanding that Carlisle’s 
successor, Lyman Gage, summarized as explaining, “that among others, persons who had 
																																																								
40 H. Rpt. 3472, 51st Congress, Second Session: 778. 
41 Ibid., 646-57. 
42 See “Fava to Stump, 10 September 1896” and “Kingdom of Italy, Minister of the Interior, 
General Direction of Public Security, 8 November 1896” in S. Doc. 9: Mission to Italian 
Government, 54th Congress, Second Session, RG 59, M179, Roll 1095. 
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been convicted of murder or other grave offenses should not be provided with passports to 
enable them to emigrate to the United States.”43   
Despite such intentions, each country had grievances against the other for sending 
inadmissible immigrants. In the months after Maresca’s arrival, Pellegrino Lepore, another 
Italian immigrant with a violent criminal background, went through the same immigration 
station at Ellis Island. Detained due to a case of pneumonia, he later gave “unsatisfactory” 
answers and was subsequently taken before the Board of Special Inquiry where it came up 
that he had served eight years in prison for murder, was granted a passport by Italian 
authorities who were fully aware of his past, and was sufficiently destitute that the passport 
charge of two lire—equivalent, at the time, to 35 cents—was remitted.44 Nor were U.S. 
officials innocent of this practice. That same year, the Italian government inquired into the 
background of Alfredo Cabrino who, when in Paterson, New Jersey, had been investigated 
as a possible murder suspect. In another, unrelated matter, Cabrino had been arrested, 
brought to court for assault and battery and, after being released on bail, fled the country. By 
way of finally informing both the Governor of New Jersey and the Department of State as 
to Cabrino’s past, Eugene Emley, the Prosecutor of Pleas for Passaic County, concluded by 
stating, “I have no official knowledge of the case after that. I did not call [bail]. … I did not 
consider the crime of sufficient importance to put the County to the expense of detective 
																																																								
43 See, respectively, “Carlisle to Stump, 6 October 1896” in S. Doc. 9: Mission to Italian 
Government, 54th Congress, Second Session and “No. 25,732: Gage (Treasury) to Secretary 
of State, 27 February 1901,” RG 59, M179, Roll 1095.  
44 See “Fitchie to Commissioner-General of Immigration, 25 February 1901,” RG 59, M179, 
Roll 1095; “Transcript of meeting of the Board of Special Inquiry, held at the U.S. 
Immigration Station, Ellis Island, New York --- in the matter of Pellegrino Lepore,” 23 
February 1901; “Gage to the Secretary of State,” 27 February 1901, RG 84: Records of 
Foreign Service Posts, Diplomatic Posts, Italy, Vol. 62: Serial No. 117: Instructions from the 
Department of State, Meyer, December 28, 1900 to December 31, 1901, Vol. 29.  
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work and extradition proceedings. I really think our community and the ends of justice here 
are best served in Cabrino’s continued absence.” The last sentence was subsequently 
bracketed with a note saying, “omit.”45 
 Little more than a year after Bresci’s assassination of Umberto, American fears of 
anarchist assassination were realized when the self-professed anarchist Leon Czolgosz fatally 
shot President William McKinley at the Pan-American Exposition in Buffalo, New York on 
6 September 1901.46 In December of that year, newly installed President Theodore Roosevelt 
used part of his first annual message to Congress to outline an approach to counter the 
anarchist threat. Equating anarchism with “picking pockets or wife-beating” while also 
drawing a direct connection between the assassinations of Umberto and McKinley, 
Roosevelt forcefully suggested that Congress should “take into consideration the coming to 
this country of anarchists. … They and those like them should be kept out of this country.”47 
																																																								
45 “Emley to Voorhees, 2 December 1901,” RG 59, M179, Roll 1119. 
46 Unlike Bresci, who was an Italian immigrant to the United States, Czolgosz was a first 
generation American citizen of Polish background. Following the assassination, Czolgosz’s 
statement to the police, which was widely published, brought Bresci back into national news.  
Though the sincerity of Czolgosz’s anarchistic beliefs was widely doubted, he acknowledged 
a wide circle of anarchist associates but flatly denied any conspiracy: “I am an anarchist. I am 
a disciple of Emma Goldman. … I am not connected with the Patterson [sic] group, or with 
those anarchists to kill Humbert.” See “Career of Assassin,” Washington Post 8 September 
1901: 1.   
A little more than a year later, a new rumor that connected the Paterson group to a possible 
attempt on President Theodore Roosevelt circulated, but was quickly discredited.  See “Mrs. 
Dexheimer Guarded,” New York Times 20 November 1902: 6. For a discussion of doubts 
about Czolgosz’s anarchistic sympathies, see L. Vernon Briggs, The Manner of Man that Kills 
(New York: Da Capo Press, 1983 [1921]), 316-31; Eric Rauchway, Murdering McKinley: The 
Making of Theodore Roosevelt's America (New York: Hill and Wang, 2003), 83-111; Alice Wexler, 
Emma Goldman: An Intimate Life (New York: Pantheon Books, 1984), 103-12.	
47 Though Roosevelt would acknowledge that the process of industrial development and the 
growth of cities and corporations “aroused much antagonism,” an anarchist was “not the 
victim of social or political injustice. There are no wrongs to remedy in his case. The cause 
of his criminality is to be found in his own evil passions and in the evil conduct of those 
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The President went on to lay out a multifaceted approach that incorporated the range of 
measures debated over the preceding two decades: immigration reforms should be 
exclusionary and also contain provisions to allow for deportation; federal rather than state 
courts should have jurisdiction over any individual who made an attempt, successful or not, 
on anyone in line of succession to the presidency and the punishments for such attacks 
should be correspondingly harsh; lastly, anarchy “should be made an offense against the law 
of nations. … It should be so declared by treaties among all civilized powers.”48 That same 
month, the Spanish Minister to the United States, a retired general, and a U.S. District Judge 
wrote a series of articles investigating these issues for the North American Review, the country’s 
oldest literary magazine.49 Despite presidential endorsement of all of these measures, and an 
implicit understanding that they were complementary initiatives, only immigration restriction 
and deportation became codified into federal law.  
 When eventually signed into law, the Anarchist Exclusion Act represented the first 
federal law since the Alien and Sedition Acts [1798] to authorize the exclusion or 
deportation of foreigners based on ideological beliefs and associations.50 Yet as part of a 
																																																																																																																																																																					
who urge him on, not in any failure by others or by the State to do justice to him or his. He 
is a malefactor and nothing else.” Theodore Roosevelt, “First Annual Message to the Senate 
and House of Representatives,” 3 December 1901. 
48 Theodore Roosevelt, “First Annual Message to the Senate and House of Representatives,” 
3 December 1901.  
49 Edgar Aldrich, “The Power and Duty of the Federal Government to Protect Its Agents,” 
North American Review 173, no. 541 (December 1901); Duke of Arcos, “International Control 
of Anarchists,” North American Review 173, no. 541 (December 1901); General Lew Wallace, 
“Prevention of Presidential Assassinations,” North American Review 173, no. 541 (December 
1901). 
50 Technically, as William Preston, Jr. points out, anarchists were the second because of the 
prior exclusion of polygamists. However, he goes on to argue, “the anarchists were the first 
to be restricted for beliefs and associations that supposedly made them a threat to the 
security and welfare of the country. The anarchists were the first radical group to come 
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long-standing effort to address the problem of anarchist violence generally, and assassination 
in particular, the Act was one of 122 individual legislative measures—including bills, 
resolutions, and joint resolutions—put forward between the 47th and 60th Congresses [1881-
1909]. These measures can be grouped into four broad categories of legislation: protective 
and punitive measures relating to attacks on officials, the order of presidential succession, 
immigration restriction and exclusion, and the study of criminals, paupers, and “defective” 
classes.51 Though immigration legislation was one of the last kinds of measures to appear, 
the category represented nearly 24 percent of all legislation [See Figure 4.1].52 While 
Republican members of Congress overwhelmingly authored these bills, members of each 
party played central roles in the most important, hotly debated pieces of legislation. Further, 
the various authors came from ten different states and represented every region of the 
country.53 From the first mention of anarchists to the 1903 Act, only the 56th Congress did 
not introduce any legislation to specifically address the anarchist threat, either from the 
standpoint of immigration restriction or suppression and punishment. During the 57th 
																																																																																																																																																																					
under fire.” Preston Jr., Aliens and Dissenters: Federal Suppression of Radicals, 1903-1933, 309, n. 
67. 
51 Bills falling under this last category, “Criminological Study,” began to be introduced during 
the 57th Congress and they included anarchists as subjects of observation by a potential 
laboratory to study “the criminal, pauper and defective classes.” While some iterations of the 
legislation omit anarchists, all bills pertaining to this issue have been included. 
52 The percentage jumps to 45 percent when strictly limited to the sixty-four bills and 
resolutions that explicitly touch on anarchism or anarchists. These records were culled from 
the indices of the Congressional Record and then cross referenced using the printed versions 
located in RG 287 (Records of the Government Printing Office) and the Committee records 
from the Center for Legislative Archives at the National Archive, Washington, DC. Bills that 
underwent significant revision—for example, some bills were substituted whole—count as 
only one entry.  
53 The authors of the various pieces of legislation introduced into Congress came from the 
following states, in alphabetical order: Alabama, Georgia, Illinois, Michigan, New Hampshire, 
New Jersey, New York, Ohio, Oregon, and Pennsylvania. 
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Congress [1901-1903] alone, there were nearly twenty individual bills that addressed the 
anarchist threat explicitly and a host of others that were implicitly connected to anarchist 
violence.54   
  
That restriction emerged as a possible solution to the anarchist threat was not 
surprising given how popular attitudes toward immigration and the government’s role in 
protecting or limiting it evolved as the nineteenth century drew to a close. The diplomatic 
tradition of the United States, enshrined in treaties of amity and commerce, emphasized the 
free movement of peoples and goods. For example, the Burlingame Treaty of 1868 [16 Stat. 
739], which formalized friendly relations with China, proved a serious impediment to those 
advocating for Chinese exclusion because the contracting Chinese and American parties 
“recognize the inherent and inalienable right of man to change his home and allegiance, and 
																																																								
54 Of the bills and resolutions introduced, the most significant, in chronological order, were 










Figure 4.1: Legislative Measures to 





also the mutual advantage of free migration and migration.”55 As proponents of increased 
restriction gained a following in the latter part of the century, they typically framed their 
arguments in the context of security and shifted the focus away from this older model of 
treaties and toward unilateral action. In endorsing the Scott Act of 1888, which imposed 
restrictions on the movements of Chinese laborers, President Grover Cleveland invoked 
“the admitted and paramount right and duty of every government” to protect “prosperity.” 
Other proponents of Chinese restriction stressed that the Chinese immigrants were 
“unassimilable” and represented a threat to the economic and, consequently, social wellbeing 
of American laborers – an argument later extended to other immigrant groups.56  
While the 1882 Chinese Exclusion Act was, as Roger Daniels stated, “the hinge upon 
which the ‘golden door’ of immigration began its swing to a nearly closed position,” 
																																																								
55 Article V, 16 Stat. 740. Whether Congress had a right to restrict Chinese immigration, in 
light of this agreement, was critical in debates over the “Chinese Exclusion Act” of 1882 and 
the 1888 Exclusion Act [the Scott Act]. See Congressional Record, 47th Congress, First Session, 
Vol. 13, Part 2, 1517-1519, 1702-1707; Congressional Record, 47th Congress, First Session, Vol. 
13, Part 3, 2040-2044; Congressional Record, 50th Congress, First Session, Vol. 19, Part 9, 9052-
9053. 
56 Quoted in Beth Lew-Williams, “Before Restriction Became Exclusion: America's 
Experiment in Diplomatic Immigration Control,” Pacific Historical Review 83, no. 1 (February 
2014): 49. Arguments along these lines can be traced back to Emer de Vattel’s Law of Nations 
[1758]: It was the “natural liberty” of a state to justify admission of foreigners and “every 
nation has a right to refuse admitting a foreigner … when he cannot enter it without 
exposing the nation to evident danger.” Emer de Vattel, The Law of Nations; or Principles of the 
Law of Nature, Applied to the Conduct and Affairs of Nations and Sovereigns, trans. Joseph Chitty 
(Philadelphia: T. & J.W. Johnson & Co., Law Booksellers, 1883 [1758]), 107.  
On the issue of immigration control as a sovereign right, see Doty, “The Double-Writing of 
Statecraft: Exploring State Responses to Illegal Immigration,” 180-82; Erika Lee, 
“Immigrants and Immigration Law: A State of the Field Assessment,” Journal of American 
Ethnic History 18, no. 4 (Summer 1999): 89-90; Lew-Williams, “Before Restriction Became 
Exclusion: America's Experiment in Diplomatic Immigration Control,” 27-28, 47-50; 
Charles J. McClain, In Search of Equality: The Chinese Struggle against Discrimination in Nineteenth-
Century America (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1996), 197; McKeown, Melancholy 
Order: Asian Migration and the Globalization of Borders, 177. 
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restriction quickly grew to encompass other groups: criminals, paupers, and contract laborers 
soon followed.57 By the early 1890s, those suffering from a “loathsome or contagious 
disease,” the mentally disturbed, prostitutes, and polygamists were also among those groups 
who found themselves on the outside.58 At this point the established trend was to keep out 
those deemed deficient and socially threatening: “not to restrict immigration,” as one House 
Committee report read in 1891, “but to sift it, to separate the desirable from the undesirable 
immigrants and to permit only those to land on our shores who have certain physical and 
moral qualities.”59 Though it was contested by opponents of restriction and by those 
concerned about potential diplomatic, economic, and reputational consequences, the 
Supreme Court affirmed the right of the Federal government to exclude potential 
immigrants in the cases Chae Chan Ping v. United States [130 US 581] in 1889 and Nashimura 
Ekin v. United States [142 US 651] in 1892. As the decision in the Ping case read, “The power 
of the government to exclude foreigners from the country whenever in its judgment the 
public interests require such exclusion has been asserted in repeated instances, and never 
denied by the executive or legislative departments.”60 
																																																								
57 Roger Daniels and Otis L. Graham, Debating American Immigration, 1882-Present, ed. James T. 
Patterson, Debating Twentieth-Century America (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 
Inc., 2001), 8. 
58 Hutchinson, Legislative History of American Immigration Policy, 1798-1965, 66, 80-81. 
59 H. Rpt. 3472: “Report of the Select Committee of the House of Representatives to Inquire 
into the alleged violation of the laws prohibiting the importation of contract laborers, 
paupers, convicts, and other classes together with the testimony, documents, and consular 
reports submitted to the Committee.” 50th Congress, Second Session. Washington, D.C.: 
Government Printing Office, 1889: 2. 
60 Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 US 606, 607 [1889]. In Nashimura Ekin v. United States 
[142 US 651], the Justices wrote, “It is an accepted maxim of international law that every 
sovereign nation has the power, as inherent in sovereignty and essential to self-preservation, 
to forbid the entrance of foreigners within its dominions or to admit them only in such cases 
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 The national debate over anarchist exclusion was grounded, in part, on an insistence 
that anarchists were “foreign.” An April 1881 article in the Chicago Daily Tribune discussing 
the “alliance against Nihilists and Communists” proposed by the Russian government 
highlighted the broad contours of the national debate. In the last decades of the nineteenth 
century, people argued that anarchists were being driven to the United States as a 
consequence of restrictive measures increasingly being passed across Europe. “Looking into 
the future,” the article’s author posited, “when Europe has emptied her discontents … in 
sufficient numbers upon our shores, there may be an explosion similar to that of the 
Communists in Paris.” Until that point arrived, however, the author argued that while 
anarchists could “poison the minds of foreigners,” the native born citizens and property 
owners formed a solid bulwark against unrest and, should an explosion of violence happen 
in the United States, the conservative population would rise and “put it down in blood.”61 
This article, and others like it, ignored the long-established tradition of individualist 
anarchism in the United States – which drew upon the writings and speeches of William 
Lloyd Garrison, Henry David Thoreau, Josiah Warren, and Benjamin Tucker, among others 
– and instead focused on social anarchism more closely tied into the arrival of German 
radicals escaping the 1878 antisocialist law introduced by Otto von Bismarck.62  
																																																																																																																																																																					
and upon such conditions as it may see fit to prescribe.” 142 US 659 [1892]. The landmark 
Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 US 698 [1893] affirmed the right to deport in similar terms. 
61 “The Immigration of Nihilists and Communists,” Chicago Daily Tribune, 29 April 1881: 4. 
62 Kenyon Zimmer argues, “It was American conditions that usually forged migrants into 
anarchists, rather than European ones.” Kenyon Zimmer, "'The Whole World is Our 
Country:' Immigration and Anarchism in the United States, 1885-1940" (University of 
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Though the ardent belief that anarchists were foreign went largely uncontested, there 
was more ambiguity when contemporaries debated the degree to which anarchists could do 
substantive harm to American society and institutions. Anarchists were a relatively minor 
subset of the new immigrants and many public commentators had more faith in what the 
author of an article in a religious journal identified as “our institutions, and the opportunities 
of such a country.”63 While many lamented the social threat posed by anarchists, others 
countered with the argument that the process of coming to America and becoming steeped 
in its values had a potentially transformative effect on anarchists and other social 
malcontents. Though never the uncontested narrative, this logic could nonetheless be easily, 
and consistently, traced back to the early 1880s. “There is patriotism, conservatism, and 
vitality enough in this country to take good care of its Government and its institutions,” the 
Chicago Daily Tribune declared in that 1881 article. Moreover, the author maintained that 
equally fundamental principles were at stake by admitting such potential discontents: “it is a 
chance that must be taken because the right of asylum for political offenses cannot be 
denied.”64 As Paul Wolff, the correspondent for the New York Staats-Zeitung, later discussed 
in his observations to Congress, the key was “good institutions,” noting: “I know that a 
good many socialists have become very good citizens here, and have entirely given up their 
ideas. … A good many anarchists … have done the same; in fact, if you go down to the very 
foundation, … an anarchist is only a Democrat who went to the extreme. … But these 
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people, when they come here, change their theoretical ideas to something more practical.”65 
In 1894, the same year that Gaetano Bresci came to the United States, a congressional debate 
over free trade concluded that anarchism would not gain a foothold in the United States 
because “socialism and anarchism had their origin in the industrial parts of Europe and the 
cause of it can easily be traced to the miserable condition of the working people.”66    
The same kinds of arguments over the potential danger of anarchists weighed against 
traditional American values and institutions that played out in newspapers, sermons, and 
other forums also appeared in Congressional investigations on the subject. In 1889, a bill “to 
provide for the removal of dangerous aliens” was the focus of an extensive series of hearings 
by a select committee from the House of Representatives.67 At the outset, the authors of the 
Congressional report cited the German anti-socialist law as well as the Haymarket bombing 
to identify anarchists as principally Germans who had fled to England to avoid prosecution 
until “officials there made it so uncomfortable for them that they came to the United States. 
																																																								
65 The same logic was used by Herman Raster, the chief editor of Illinois Staats-Zeitung—one 
of the most successful German language newspapers in the Midwest. See, respectively, H. 
Rpt. 3792, 50th Congress, Second Session: 929-30; 646.     
66 Congressional Record, 53 Cong., Second Session, Vol. 26, Appendix II: 1342. For earlier 
expressions of the same sentiment, see “American Influence Abroad,” New York Times, 3 
August 1881: 4; “Migma,” The Continent 4, no. 94 (28 November 1883): 700.  
67 George Adams [R – Illinois] introduced the original bill, H.R. 1291, on 4 January 1888. 
Initially written to address “dangerous aliens” and the “intent to overthrow the laws of the 
United States,” the bill was fully replaced with a bill on immigration by the Select Committee, 
chaired by Melbourne Ford [D – Michigan]. See H.R. 1291 in Publications of the United 
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Nathaniel Hong, using J.C. Burrows as his source, erroneously cites this as the first anti-
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the bill was strictly concerned with deportation and did not explicitly refer to anarchists or 
nihilists. See Hong, “The Origins of American Legislation to Exclude and Deport Aliens for 
Their Political Beliefs and its Initial Review by the Coursts,” 6.  
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Here they have proven a lawless, turbulent class, and the whole country is familiar with their 
recent acts of violence.”68 As part of the proceedings, the committee heard the testimony of 
Johann Most, the noted German anarchist printer, to whom they directed pointed questions 
about the relationship between legal restrictions and anarchist migration, the size of the 
anarchist and socialist populations around the world, and his definition of anarchism.69 Yet 
the bill gained little traction. Two years later another Select Committee held similar hearings 
pertaining to a bill [H.R. 13175], introduced by William Owen [R – Indiana], to restrict 
immigration and the prospect of exclusion was criticized for how it included anarchists. In 
addition to highlighting the problems of identifying someone who was an anarchist, 
opponents dismissed the bill on grounds that recalled the Chicago Daily Tribune’s commentary 
nearly a decade earlier. While some individuals brought before the committee approved of 
the exclusion of anarchists and socialists because they represented a “permanent danger,” 
others dismissed the notion that any man should be “debarred on account of his opinions” 
as un-American.70 Richard Michaelis, a German-American writer from Chicago, testified 
against restriction, despite knowing that he had been the target of a bomb plot. “Don’t ask 
them if they are anarchists, or socialists, or republicans, … but as soon as they commit an act 
against the laws of the United States, that is a different thing,” he argued. When asked if “an 
																																																								
68 H. Rpt. 3792: “Report of the Select Committee of the House of Representatives.” 50th 
Congress, Second Session: 5. 
69 Most, though making exaggerated claims about the size of the anarchist and socialist 
populations around the world, minimized the numbers immigrating to the United States – he 
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ounce of prevention” was “worth a pound of cure,” he responded “where would you draw 
the line?”71 
As the spate of anarchist violence increased between 1894 and 1901 and blossomed 
into what contemporaries perceived to be a social crisis, people began to focus more on 
security over the power of American institutions to assimilate dangerous anarchists. 
Observers were quick to note that four of the six self-professed anarchists who made 
assassination attempts over that period were Italian – a fact that drew national attention to 
the social and economic plight of this new wave of immigrants and imparted a sense of 
urgency to discussions of the anarchist threat.72 A frequent contributor to the North American 
Review, Felix L. Oswald, wrote, “The suggestive fact that the assassins were natives of the 
country where contrasts of wealth and poverty had reached their most cruel extreme” was 
central; Umberto I, Carnot, Cánovas and Elizabeth, were “representative”; their only crime 
was that they had “contrived to accumulate a little bric-a-brac, while so many of [their] 
countrymen had to sell their furniture for bread.”73 Francis Nichols, writing in Outlook, 
echoed the sentiment, arguing that the danger was that anarchist justifications for Umberto 
I’s death “made positive converts of doubting Italians, and attracted the attention of 
																																																								
71 Ibid., 705; See also the testimony of Emil Praetorius, editor of the Westliche Post in St. Louis 
in Ibid., 811-12. 
72 In addition to President Carnot and King Umberto I, Italian anarchists were responsible 
for the assassinations of President Antonio Cánovas del Castillo of Spain and Empress 
Elizabeth of Austria. The other two assassination attempts were by Jean-Baptiste Sipido on 
the Prince of Wales, the future Edward VII, in 1900 and Czolgosz’s attack on McKinley. Of 
the six, only the attempt on the Prince of Wales failed.  
73 F.L. Oswald, “The Assassination Mania: Its Social and Ethical Significance,” North 
American Review 171, no. 526 (September 1900): 314-15, 17. The trend to see these 
assassinations as part of a trend, rather than isolated incidents, was also a defining quality of 
this period—explicit parallels were made in forums as different as the House of Lords in 
England and the New York Times in the United States. 
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hundreds who believed that the ‘times are out of joint’ but had heretofore seen no cure in 
Anarchy.”74 Government officials echoed these concerns when, in the wake of McKinley’s 
assassination, the U.S. Attorney General’s office drafted a letter to various U.S. Attorneys in 
reference to alleged anarchists and their correspondence. The letter, seventeen pages in total, 
contained lists of Italians in the various districts “said to be correspondents of the 
‘Communist’ and ‘Individualist’ groups of so-called anarchists of Paterson, New Jersey” and 
asked the recipients of these letters to investigate “the antecedents and character of these 
men.” The letter also called particular attention to the non-Italian names on the list, 
indicated by checkmarks, and concluded “the reasons for the association of this man with 
the Italians may be especially important to learn.”75 Whereas for much of the preceding 
twenty years, the risk undesirable immigrants posed to society was counterbalanced by 
arguments about the stabilizing and ameliorating effects of American values and traditions, 
the seemingly escalating violence intensified the rhetoric expressing the need for greater 
security.  
The tendency is to see the 1903 act as the culmination of earlier efforts to restrict 
and exclude anarchists. In particular, it is compared to the “Hill Bill [S. 2314]” of 1894—one 
of the bills on anarchism that came the closest to passing. Sponsored by Senator David Hill 
[D – New York], then chairman of the Senate Committee on Immigration, the bill came up 
for debate in the wake of President Carnot’s assassination. Explicitly raising the issue of 
security, the bill justified the exclusion of anarchists on the grounds that their presence 
																																																								
74 Nichols, "The Anarchists in America," 862.   
75 “Draft of letter to various U.S. Attorneys in reference to alleged anarchists and their 
correspondents.” RG 60, A1 72-B, Box 8, Folder 3: Year Files (Folded), 1884-1903; D.J. 




would “be a menace to the Government or to the peace and well-being of society in 
general.”76 Senator John Sherman [R – Ohio] offered a mild objection after the bill was 
introduced that the proposed legislation did not go far enough and suggested that anarchists 
should be deported even after they had become citizens. However, the bill died in the House 
of Representatives on August 21 after a heated debate in which John Warner – who, like 
Senator Hill, was a Democrat from New York – denounced it as “a bad bill” that was “more 
likely to make anarchists than punish them” because in drafting the bill no suitable definition 
of anarchism had been put forward.77  In the wake of McKinley’s death in 1901, Senator J.C. 
Burrows played up the notion that an opportunity had been lost, bitterly lamenting, “The 
anarchist nests at Paterson, New Jersey, at Chicago and elsewhere would have been broken 
up, and we would not find ourselves to-day in the position of locking the stable door after 
the horse is stolen.”78 
When passed by Congress, the 1903 Immigration Act inserted anarchists “or persons 
who believe in or advocate the overthrow by force or violence of the Government of the 
																																																								
76 Congressional Record, 53 Cong., Second Session, Vol. 26, Part 8, 8627. 
77 Congressional Record, 53 Cong., Second Session, Vol. 26, Part 8, 8628.   
On 25 June 1894, Representative William Stone attempted to introduce a bill [H.R. 7564] 
that awkwardly defined anarchists as “any person or persons who shall belong to, or who 
shall be appointed, designated or employed by any society or organization existing in this or 
in any foreign country which provides in writing or by verbal agreement, understanding or 
countenance for the taking of human life unlawfully or for the unlawful destruction of 
buildings or other property where the loss of life would be the probable result.”  See 
Congressional Record, 53 Cong., Second Session, Vol. 26, Part 7, 6800. 
78 Julius C. Burrows, “The Need of National Legislation against Anarchism,” North American 
Review 173, no. 541 (December 1901): 733. This in itself is a problematic assessment as Leon 
Czolgosz was not an immigrant. Instead, defenders of this position—in keeping with the 
belief that anarchism was foreign—maintained that Czolgosz would have been denied the 
intellectual inspiration for his actions because the advocates of such tactics like Emma 
Goldman, Alexander Berkman, and Johann Most would have been unable to immigrate to 
the United States. 
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United States or of all government or of all forms of law, or the assassination of public 
officials” between polygamists and prostitutes as excluded classes.79 In addition to defining 
[Sec. 38] and excluding anarchists, the bill also prevented their naturalization [Sec. 39] and 
fined those who aided such individuals to enter, or be naturalized in, the United States.80 By 
defining anarchists solely in terms of their advocacy of violence and anti-governmental 
stance, the 1903 bill’s supporters disregarded years of discussion on the merits and adverse 
consequences of exclusion based on ideological beliefs. A decade earlier, at the same time 
the Hill Bill was under consideration, a completely revised version of the Stone Bill [H.R. 
5246] also failed to sway enough members of Congress. Originally written to provide for the 
consular inspection of immigrants in an attempt to prevent the continued emigration of 
criminals and paupers, the original text was completely replaced by a detailed anarchist 
exclusion law written by the Secretary of the Treasury. In voicing his opposition to the 
amended bill, Senator William Peffer [P – Kansas] clearly articulated a familiar problem, 
stating, “I understand that when an educated anarchist is permitted himself to define what 
he believes or what he understands to be meant by the word anarchist in his definition he 
will describe about the highest type of human development. There is nothing destructive, 
nothing violent, nothing denunciatory or derogatory to human happiness or human 
government in such a definition as a man of that kind would give, and yet he calls himself an 
																																																								
79 32 Stat. 1214; Bill Ong Hing, Defining America Through Immigration Policy (Philadelphia: 
Temple University Press, 2004), 210. 
80 32 Stat. 1221-1222. As Kraut and Fine have noted, the definition of anarchists failed to 
differentiate between those who advocated or committed acts of violence from 
philosophical anarchists (in broad terms) who advocated for the abolition of organized 
government. See Fine, “Anarchism and the Assassination of McKinley,” 777-80; Kraut, 




anarchist.”81 Senator George Hoar ventured even further, questioning the objectivity and 
legality of the method proposed, arguing, “The pending bill says that when a majority of the 
board … determine, not that a man has done anything, not even that he has said anything, 
but that he is a character defined by the vague, indeterminate word ‘anarchist[,]’ … he shall 
be excluded and sent back to the country whence he came.”82 In voicing their objections, 
Peffer, Hoar, and others reiterated the argument that exclusion based on ideological 
beliefs—and poorly defined ones at that—was just as potentially threatening to society as the 
belief being excluded.83  
A further departure from other anti-anarchist legislation is evident when examining 
the deportation provisions of the 1903 Immigration Act in light of Congressional reluctance 
to include such measures in other bills pertaining to anarchists.84 In their report evaluating a 
bill introduced for the protection of the president, Congressman George Ray [R – New 
																																																								
81 Congressional Record, 53 Cong., Second Session, Vol. 26, 8231. 
82 Congressional Record, 53 Cong., Second Session, Vol. 26, 8241.  
Advocates for anarchist restriction like William Stone and Senator Henry Cabot Lodge [R – 
Massachusetts] would repeatedly counter that a definition of “anarchist” was either not 
necessary, attached to individuals of “common notoriety,” or was widely understood to 
mean “the reform of society to be brought about by blowing up their fellow beings.” S. Rpt. 
1333: “Investigation by the Committee on Immigration of the United States Senate on the 
Proposition for the Suspension of Immigration for One Year.” 52nd Congress, Second 
Session. Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1893: 147, 155; See also H. Rpt. 
1460: “Exclusion and Deportation of Alien Anarchists.” 53rd Congress, Second Session. 
Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1894: 2; H. Rpt. 3472: “Immigration 
Investigation,” House of Representatives, 51st Congress, Second Session: 646.   
83 Though the Stone Bill passed the House of Representatives in July 1894, the Senate held it 
up and the bill ultimately died in a joint committee.	
84 Section 20 of the act specified that “any alien who shall come into the United States in 
violation of the law … shall be deported as hereinafter provided to the country whence he 
came at any time within two years after arrival.” Subsequent legislation in 1907 and 1910 
pushed this out to 3 years. 32 Stat. 1218; Preston Jr., Aliens and Dissenters: Federal Suppression of 
Radicals, 1903-1933, 32. 
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York] wrote on behalf of the Judiciary Committee that “If permitted to land and they offend 
against our laws and we return them to the country whence they came[,] … it might, and 
probably would, be difficult to get the government of the country from which they came to 
receive them. … Clearly we could not compel such country to receive them except at the 
point of a bayonet.” Acts that contained such provisions, such as the Ray Bill of 1903, 
rejected any articles that dealt with the deportation of aliens who had been permitted to land 
in the country. “What,” Ray and his co-authors asked, “must be the answer of the United 
States to such a proposition coming from some other country? Better make no law than an 
ineffective one or one that might lead to unnecessary foreign complications.”85 Prioritizing 
security and including such major policy departures signified a dramatic shift in the nature of 
the debate over anarchist exclusion. The Anarchist Exclusion Act trumped the diplomatic 
and social concerns that were central to the discussions concerning prior legislative attempts 
to address the issue of anarchist violence, siding instead with the counterargument that the 
immigration of such undesirables was a social threat necessitating a strong response. 
 
CONCLUSION: 
Anarchist exclusion was far more than an example of a rising nativist tide raising all 
boats and excluding a widening spectrum of undesirable aliens. The measures most 
commonly introduced to curtail undesirable immigration – bans on contract labor, as well as 
proposals for quotas and literacy tests – were not well suited to restricting anarchists. Quotas 
might eventually limit the number of immigrants coming from various nations in a given 
year, but they could do nothing to directly restrict anarchists who came from a host of 
different countries and, except for those who attained some wider notoriety, had nothing to 
																																																								
85 H. Rpt. 433, House of Representatives, 57th Congress, 1st Session: 7-8. 
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distinguish them from any other prospective immigrants. A literacy test could possibly keep 
out some individual adherents but would have failed to prevent the immigration of the 
literate, intellectual progenitors of the ideology. Groups that frequently petitioned Congress 
on matters of Immigration saw anarchist exclusion as both part of and separate from general 
immigration restriction. The 94 members of the Molly Pitcher Council of Manasquan, New 
Jersey were in favor of: “1. Re-enactment of the Chinese Exclusion Law[;] 2. A more 
General Restrictive Immigration Law[;] … 4. Law to prohibit landing and for the 
deportation of Anarchists.”86 In their numerous petitions to Congress, other organizations 
and individuals largely agreed. Restricting anarchists was about excluding on the basis of 
thoughts defined as criminal: other immigrant groups may have been said to be inassimilable 
or a threat to domestic labor but anarchy was, as a representative 1901 petition from a town 
meeting in Plymouth, Pennsylvania declared, “a name for treason” and anarchists were 
“dangerous parasites on the body politic.”87    
																																																								
86 “Petition from the Molly Pitcher Council, No. 68 (Daughters of Liberty, Manasquan, NJ),” 
Records of the United States Senate, 57th Congress, RG 46 SEN 57A-J39: Petitions, 
Memorials, Resolutions of State Legislatures and Related Documents which were referred to 
committees, Committee of the Judiciary, Box 150, “1/7/1902 to 3/10/1902,” National 
Archives I, Washington, DC (hereafter RG 46). 
87 “Petition of citizens of Plymouth, PA, 9 September 1901,” RG 46 SEN 57A-J39: Petitions, 
Memorials, Resolutions of State Legislatures and Related Documents which were referred to 
committees, Committee of the Judiciary, Box 150, “01-07-1902 – 03-10-1902.”  
Members of the Buell Post, No. 178 of the Ohio G.A.R. from Marietta, Ohio, framed 
anarchist thought as criminal in the same way arson was: “We have been too tardy and 
lenient in our efforts to suppress dangerous public utterances in this land of free speech. If a 
man sets fire to your house he is arrested and imprisoned for Arson. Is a man or woman 
who, by defamatory utterances arouses an excited audience into a belief that all rulers should 
be destroyed any less criminal?” See “Resolution adopted by the Buell Post No. 178, 
Department of Ohio G.A.R. (Marietta, OH) favoring legislation for the suppression of 
anarchy (dated 7 Jan 1902),” RG 46 SEN 57A-J39: Petitions, Memorials, Resolutions of 
State Legislatures and Related Documents which were referred to committees, Committee of 
the Judiciary, Box 150, “01-07-1902 – 03-10-1902.”  
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From the early 1880s, when the debate over anarchist restriction emerged in the 
United States, voices advocating security concerns debated others who preached on behalf 
of a faith in American institutions and warned that the greater threat came from enacting 
ideologically based exclusion policies. Amid a rising tide of anarchist migration due, in part, 
to restrictive laws passed elsewhere and a growing perception of escalating violence, the cries 
for action grew more urgent. In terms of numbers, anarchist migration was miniscule 
compared to the movement of contract laborers, the illiterate, and other “undesirables,” but 
those individuals were still a part of society; anarchists, both by law and popular conception, 
resided beyond the societal pale. By the turn of the twentieth century, an emigrating 
anarchist was no longer a poor weaver looking to take advantage of more job opportunities 
and better pay—potentially at the expense of American laborers. Instead, that anarchist was 
a demon whose very existence was antithetical to humanity, let alone the principles of 
government and society Americans earlier debated in the context of exclusion. Those voices 
trying to distinguish between philosophical and violent anarchists were overwhelmed by 
others like Charles Smick’s, who exclaimed that “all anarchists are guilty of treason” and 
justified calls for action by appealing to “a higher law – that of self-preservation.”88 As a 
lawyer from Charleston, SC, declared in a letter to the Attorney General, “it behooves us, 
especially of our profession, for the good of ourselves and of those who are to come after us 
in this great Western Land and also of the World at large, to scorch and kill every such 
																																																								
88 See, respectively “Letter from Charles. S. Smick to Jas. M. Beck, 8 Sept 1901,” RG 60, A1 
72-B, Box 8, Folder 2: Year Files (Folded), 1884-1903, D.J. Central Files, 1901 – McKinley 
Assassination (Vault); “Letter from Charles S. Smick to the Atty. General, 17 Sept 1901,” 
RG 60, A1 72-B, Box 8, Folder 4. 
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venomous reptile that the law can reach – as Coleridge says, to ‘Dislodge their reptile souls / 
From the bodies and forms of men.’ I express the sentiment of our entire community.”89  
Anarchists, by nature of the violent deeds attributed to them, gradually transformed 
from being foreigners to being inhuman creatures or demons and, consequently, they 
became easier to exclude. Protections for free speech, from political persecution, and more 
were for members of civil society not for anarchists who, over the preceding twenty years, 
had increasingly found themselves defined as outside of, and in opposition to, that society. 
In a fiery, but hardly exceptional reaction, a resolution passed by the Olympia (Washington) 
Chamber of Commerce in the wake of McKinley’s assassination declared that “the 
propagating and advocacy of anarchistic doctrines under the guise of free speech is not only 
a farce and a travesty[,] … but is such a menace to organized government that its dangers 
cannot longer be endured by an enlightened and patriotic people.” They further resolved, 
“That while we loathe with unspeakable contempt the miserable wretch who is a disgrace to 
humanity [Czolgosz] … we recognize that a far greater measure of responsibility for such 
crime rests with the more enlightened and more intelligent, therefore more devilish, leaders 
of anarchy. … We would visit upon them swift and condign punishment by death or 
banishment from American soil. Our Nations contains [sic.] no room for such vipers of 
discontent and lawlessness.”90 In such a climate, concerns about free speech, political 
intolerance and asylum, or the expansion of federal power were quickly shunted aside. 
																																																								
89 “Letter from Thomas W. Bacot to Knox, 10 September 1901,” RG 60, A1 72-B, Box 8, 
Folder 1. 
90  See Resolution by the Olympia Chamber of Commerce (Washington), dated 18 
November 1901 [but passed in October], RG 46 SEN 57A-J39: Petitions, Memorials, 
Resolutions of State Legislatures and Related Documents which were referred to committees, 
Committee of the Judiciary, Box 150, Folder 1 of 3: “12/4/1901, Folder 1 of 3.” 
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Ultimately, the significance of the Anarchist Exclusion Act dwarfs the relatively small 
proportion of anarchists who tried to immigrate to the United States and far eclipsed the 
incidents of violence that created the atmosphere in which it was shaped. Anarchy, as 
William Preston Jr. writes, “left its mark for posterity in the cement of antialien legislation” 
and “created a criterion of thought and conduct for naturalized citizens that was unknown to 
native-born Americans. In addition it established a pattern of disqualification based upon 
beliefs and associations only.”91 The provisions of the Anarchist Exclusion Act reveal a great 
deal about how growing security concerns over the preceding years shaped key departures 
from earlier legislative efforts to exclude anarchists and understanding how changing 
attitudes shaped the nature of the debate over immigration and security is essential given that 
deportation, as Deirdre Moloney argues, “became a critical mechanism used to control and 
discourage political dissent,” particularly in the wake of national crises like World War I, the 
Cold War, and 9/11.92 Herman Lehlbach, a Republican representative from New Jersey, 
framed the principal dilemma in his 1890 testimony before the Senate Committee on 
Immigration and Naturalization: “the question,” he said, “is whether the anarchists or the 
socialists, the people who don’t harmonize with our institutions, are here in such quantities 
as to make it necessary for us to frame laws that would be an annoyance to ninety-nine out 
of a hundred of the other people who come here and make good citizens.”93 With the 
passage of the Anarchist Exclusion Act in 1903, proponents of restriction were clear that the 
answer to that question was finally a yes. 
																																																								
91 Preston Jr., Aliens and Dissenters: Federal Suppression of Radicals, 1903-1933, 33, 66. 
92 Moloney, National Insecurities: Immigrants and U.S. Deportation Policy since 1882, 163.	
93 H. Rpt. 3472, 51st Congress, Second Session: 716. 
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As for his own cameo role in the assassination fears of the early twentieth century, 
Maresca played the part of a patsy. While he was a recent parolee with a history of violent 
assaults, he was not an anarchist. Nor was he plotting to assassinate President McKinley. 
Guida, his traveling companion, was entirely innocent beyond having struck up a friendship 
with Maresca. Instead, Pedretti, the former newspaper reporter who sent the two 
anonymous letters, hatched the plot out of jealousy over Maresca’s relationship with a 
woman, Teresa Esposita. In the estimation of the Prefect of Naples, having failed to prevent 
Maresca from following her to the United States, Pedretti endeavored to “denounce him as a 
man plotting against the President … in order to make delay and difficulty for him in his 
journey.”94 Given the relative ease with which one could disguise his or her own criminal 
history to get past the immigration authorities, and having already failed to get the desired 
results with the first letter revealing Maresca’s past, Pedretti used the climate of alarm over 
the anarchist threat to great effect. By invoking the spectre of anarchism, Pedretti was 
deliberately playing on the pervasive ontological fear of a chaotic world, knowing that it 
would make trouble for Maresca when he tried to enter the United States. 
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